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ABSTRACT 
Affective polarization, the phenomenon of liberals and conservatives treating each other 
as disliked outgroups, is increasingly intense (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Pew, 2016).  In the 
present research, I used the construct of psychological essentialism (Medin & Ortony, 1989) to 
help understand this intergroup phenomenon. Specifically, I measured political essentialism, or 
the belief that political ideologies are strongly determined, informative, discrete and/or 
immutable, and tested the relationship between these beliefs and affective polarization.  I 
approached this question with both correlational and experimental methods. In a correlational 
study, political essentialism overall is found to covary positively with affective polarization and 
social avoidance of political outgroups. Essentialism is found to be most predictive when treated 
as a collection of distinct lay beliefs, rather than a unitary construct. Informativeness and 
discreteness beliefs correspond strongly and positively with affective polarization, while 
biological basis beliefs and social deterministic beliefs have weak effects in the opposite 
direction. In the experimental study, manipulating essentialism beliefs had no effect on affective 
polarization or desire for social distance.  Potential reasons for the discrepant results are 
explored. In sum, this research supports the hypothesis that political essentialism is associated 
with affective polarization, but does not provide evidence that essentialism plays a causal role in 
this relationship.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODCUTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Few identities in 21st Century United States are as salient, or as divisive, as political 
identities. The attitudes liberal- and conservative-identified people have toward each other are 
not only negative, but explicitly so. The degree of such inter-ideological negativity appears to be 
only getting more severe over the past fifty years (Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes, 2012). The media 
constantly remind American viewers that there is a large group of people in the country who 
oppose them on issues, prefer opposing politicians, and differ on many core values. What do 
people make of this state of affairs?  What explanations do people have for the formation and 
nature of liberal and conservative identity? And what do such explanations have to do with their 
attitudes towards people with opposing views?  
Researchers have explored the phenomenon of political polarization using some social 
psychological lenses, including social identity (Iyengar et al., 2012), prejudice (Chambers, 
Schlenker & Collisson, 2013), stereotyping (Crawford, Modri & Motyl, 2013), meta-
stereotyping (Appleby & Borgida, 2016), and more. The present research explores the use of yet 
another perspective: that of lay beliefs. The present research asks how people’s beliefs about the 
nature of ideology relate to their inter-ideological attitudes. It is proposed that people who 
believe ideological groups to be distinct, to have deeply-rooted causes, etc., will express 
accentuated intergroup antipathy. This dissertation explores this possibility and presents findings 
in the following manner. First, the remainder of this chapter reviews relevant theory and
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research regarding political polarization, as well as work that pertains to psychological 
essentialism (Chapter 1). Next, Chapter 2 provides a conceptual overview of hypotheses and 
research questions that are examined in this dissertation. Two studies investigate the relation 
between political essentialism and intergroup attitudes. Chapter 3 describes the findings obtained 
in a correlational study (Study One), and Chapter 4 describes findings obtained in an 
experimental study (Study Two). Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the research questions 
addressed in this research, and synthesizes evidence gathered in the two studies.  
Polarization 
Polarization by many measures. Political scientists continue to debate whether the 
United States is increasingly polarized. Part of this disagreement rests in focusing on different 
aspects of polarization. Some note the increasing divergence in political elites, e.g., that 
Democrats and Republicans are increasingly divergent in their ideological positions and voting 
records (Iyengar, 2016; Levendusky, 2009; Theriault, 2006). There are also increasing 
correlations between lay people’s ideological identities (e.g., “conservative”) and issue positions 
(e.g., abortion attitudes) (Baldasarri & Gelman, 2008). This suggests people are increasingly 
relying on their ideological identities to derive individual issue stances. On the other hand, lay 
individuals’ attitudes are not becoming more divergent on the majority of policy issues (Fiorina 
& Abrams, 2008). Also, the tendency to identify as “liberal” or “conservative,” (as opposed to 
“independent”) did not increase from the 1970s to the 2000s (Fiorina, 2006).  
One form of polarization, however, is clearly evident: the phenomenon of liberals and 
conservatives treating each other as disliked out-groups. This is referred to as affective 
polarization (Iyengar et al., 2012). Several items in the nationally-representative American 
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National Election Studies (ANES) survey allow trends in political in-group and out-group 
attitudes to be measured over time. Most relevant are “feeling thermometer” (attitude) ratings 
individuals report toward conservatives, liberals, Democrats, and Republicans. Summarizing 
these ratings stretching back to the 1970s, Iyengar et al. report that in-group ratings (e.g., self-
identified Republicans’ ratings of “Republicans”) have remained positive and constant, around 
70 on the 100-point scale. In contrast, out-group ratings have steadily fallen. For example, 
Democrats’ ratings of Republicans was approximately 48 (on a scale from 0 to 100) in 1978; but 
approximately 33 in 2008 (Iyengar et al., 2012). Attitudes towards ideological out-groups (that 
is, conservatives’ attitudes towards liberals, and vice versa) show a similar stark in-group/out-
group gap in affect. These attitudes are largely symmetrical: self-identified liberals and 
conservatives are both “driving” this trend of in-group preference, although the effect may be 
most pronounced among those identifying as “strong Republicans,” (Iyengar & Westwood, 
2015).  
Affective polarization may occur even in the absence of diverging attitudes on policies 
(Iyengar et al., 2012). In other words, the social identity side of polarization may be getting more 
accentuated, while issue polarization remains moderate over time (Mason, 2015). Webster and 
Abramowitz (2017), however, find that affective polarization is in fact most pronounced among 
people whose issue positions (on social welfare issues) are most extreme, suggesting a 
correlation between affective and issue polarization.  
Whether or not it correlates with issue polarization, interideological antipathy is 
consequential. Liberals and conservatives are driving themselves apart, quite literally, into 
monolithic living communities (Motyl, 2015). This sorting is evident in voting patterns by 
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county: in 1992, 39% of voters lived in a county that skewed strongly toward one party or 
another (i.e., voting for one major presidential candidate over the other by double-digit margins); 
by 2016, this share increased to 61% of the population (Wasserman, 2017). This situation 
encourages the polarized electorate to distrust people with opposing views, and overvalue for 
political “wins” for the in-group, perhaps even over the better functioning of the democracy as a 
whole (Mason, 2018). Elected officials are responsive to the preferences and demands of their 
polarized political bases, as well. Observing the negative evaluations their base has of the 
opposing party may push them to adopt a more confrontational, and less compromising, mode of 
governing (Abramowitz & Webster, 2016).  
Polarization as an intergroup phenomenon. Among the different aspects of polarization 
that have be studied, affective polarization is a particularly fruitful area for the application of 
social psychological hypotheses. Understanding polarization as an intergroup phenomenon 
invites the use of social identity theory, and related intergroup attitude frameworks, to 
understanding partisanship (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This approach acknowledges that, rather 
than merely labeling clusters of attitudes, party and ideology serve as social identities. One’s 
identity as “conservative” can function similarly to identifying as “Texan” or “lesbian” (Devine, 
2015; Greene, 2004; Huddy, Mason, & Aaroe, 2013).  
Social identity theory posits that people’s intergroup attitudes are, in part, driven by a 
motivation to maintain positive distinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This creates both a 
tendency for over-valuation of one’s in-group, and a devaluation of out-groups. Along racial, 
ethnic, gender, nationality, and regional lines, we such find patterns of in-group preference, out-
group derogation, along with stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination. Additionally, such 
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intergroup attitudes are shaped by lay theories about the meaning of intergroup differences 
(Levy, Chiu, & Hong, 2006). If polarization is indeed at least partly an intergroup phenomenon, 
one would expect to find evidence of prejudice, stereotyping, discrimination, and the influence of 
lay theories when people view across ideological lines. Recent research suggests this is indeed 
occurring.  
Partisans readily express negative attitudes and stereotypes about one another (Brandt, 
Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014). A particularly relevant concept is the 
ideological-conflict hypothesis, that “conservatives and liberals will display intolerance against 
groups whose values, beliefs, and ideas conflict with their own” (Brandt et al., 2014). This 
hypothesis suggests that people are motivated to dislike, and desire distance from, others who 
they see as violating their worldview and values. This hypothesis has implications for many 
forms of prejudice. For example, it is suggested that conservatives tend to display more racism 
against Blacks (Federico & Sidanius, 2002) in part because they perceive Blacks to be 
ideologically different from themselves (Brandt et al., 2014). The ideological-conflict hypothesis 
is particularly relevant for explicitly ideological groups – there is little doubt that conservatives 
perceive liberals as possessing values that conflict with their own (and vice versa).  
Survey research confirms that partisans make stereotypic, negative trait inferences of 
supporters of the opposing party. A 2008 study conducted by YouGov asked participants to rate 
“People who are Republicans or Democrats” on certain given traits. Self-identified Republicans 
and Democrats rated partisans from the opposing party as more selfish, more closed-minded, and 
less intelligent than their in-group (YouGov, 2008, as cited in Iyengar et al., 2012).  
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Capturing traits more uniquely descriptive of liberals and conservatives, Crawford, 
Modri, and Motyl (2013) found that partisans endorsed subtly dehumanizing stereotypes of 
political groups. Conservatives were rated as more mechanistic (dehumanized along “human 
uniqueness” lines); while liberals were rated as more emotional or impulsive (dehumanized 
along “human nature,” animalistic lines; Haslam et al., 2009; Crawford et al., 2013). In this 
study, people also displayed in-group favoritism: conservatives were more likely to endorse the 
negative aspect of these stereotypes in regards to liberals, and the positive aspect in regards to 
conservatives (and vice versa; liberals endorsed the more negative aspects of conservatives, and 
more positive aspects of liberals; Crawford et al., 2013).  
Democrats and Republicans also possess skewed, stereotypic views of party membership 
(Ahler & Sood, 2016). For example, while only 6% of Democrats self-identify as LGBT, 
Americans estimate that approximately a quarter of Democrats are LGBT (Ahler & Sood, 2016). 
This misperception is amplified among Republicans, who on average reported that 36% of 
Democrats are LGBT (Ahler & Sood, 2016). Similar overestimates are found when estimating 
the percent of Democrats who are Black or atheist; or the percent of Republicans who earn over 
$250,000 yearly or are over the age of 65 (Ahler & Sood, 2016). Overall, people perceive 
political parties to be composed of more party-stereotypical members than they really are, and 
this effect is amplified in the out-group. Furthermore, those who are most interested in political 
news tend to hold the most stereotypic views (Ahler & Sood, 2016). This suggests that people 
who are more familiar with political information (rather than people who are naive politically) 
tend to stereotype the most.  
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 Partisans not only make negative trait inferences about opposing party members, they 
also assume that opposing partisans hold negative stereotypes about their in-group (Appleby & 
Borgida, 2016). Liberals assume that conservatives possess negative stereotypes of liberals; 
while conservatives assume liberals believe negative stereotypes of conservatives. This 
phenomenon is referred to as meta-stereotyping, and has previously been observed among 
interracial beliefs (Sigelman & Tuch, 1997; Vorauer, Main, & O’Connell, 1998). These political 
meta-stereotypes are even more negative than the actual stereotypes possessed by out-group 
members (Appleby & Morgida, 2016). That is, for example, liberals’ perception of how 
conservatives view liberals is even more negative than conservatives’ actual evaluation of 
liberals. Such negative meta-stereotypes can contribute uniquely to intergroup anxiety during 
social interactions (Appleby & Morgida, 2016). 
Interpartisan negativity is not limited to attitudes and beliefs; it extends into behavioral 
intentions and behaviors as well. Liberals’ and conservatives’ mutual antipathy can motivate 
discriminatory behavior and promote a desire for social distance. This group-based behavior has 
been observed in laboratory studies, using methods that mirror previous work on social identity-
motivated action. For example, strong partisans gave less favorable recommendations to a 
hypothetical scholarship applicant when they believed that applicant was from an opposing 
party, vs. a control condition when no party was mentioned (Munro, Lusane, & Leary, 2010). 
People were less likely to cooperate in a prisoner’s dilemma game with another-party vs. same- 
party member (Balliet, Tybur, Wu, Antonellis, & Van Lange, 2016). Partisans were more likely 
to choose in-group party members as team-mates in an in-lab game; and the more they reported 
in-group party favoritism, the less likely they were to choose an out-party member as a teammate 
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(Lelkes & Westwood, 2015). They also express more support for institutional discrimination 
against out-group members, in the form of fines for protesters (Lelkes & Westwood, 2015); or 
limitations on free speech (Wetherell, Brandt, & Chambers, 2013).  
Survey research has revealed increases in the discomfort people feel around ideological 
others. In 1960, Almond and Verba asked a representative sample of Americans how pleased or 
displeased they would be if their son or daughter married a supporter of the opposing party. In 
1960, approximately five percent of people reported that they would be “displeased” with cross-
party marriage (as cited in Iyengar et al., 2012). In 2010, a YouGov survey asked a similar 
question – and found that 49% of Republicans, and 33% of Democrats, would be “very” or 
“somewhat” unhappy about such an inter-marriage (as cited in Iyengar et al., 2012).  
These tendencies, revealed in survey and experimental research, are reflected in broader 
sociological trends. Liberals increasingly live in “blue state” enclaves with like-minded 
Democrats; while conservatives are increasingly more likely to live in “red states” and 
Republican communities (Greenblatt, 2012; Tam Cho, Gimpel, & Hui, 2013; Motyl, 2015). 
When people move, there is a significant tendency for them to move toward communities they 
are more ideologically congruent with, even when controlling for racial and economic factors 
(Tam Cho et al., 2013). The desire to move to more ideologically-congruent community is 
mediated by a need to belong (Motyl et al., 2014). This strongly suggests that it is 
psychologically uncomfortable to be politically “different” from close others. This need to fit in, 
ideologically, with one’s neighbors motivates moving to new regions within the United States 
(Motyl et al., 2014), and even intentions to move to another country (Motyl et al., 2014). It is not 
clear whether this sorting is motivated by in-group liking or out-group dislike, but regardless, it 
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suggests a clear ideological preference for proximity to the in-group over the out-group (Mason, 
2014).  
Political correlates of affective polarization. While a majority of people demonstrate 
some amount of affective polarization (Iyengar et al., 2012), some people may display it to a 
greater degree than others. Facets of ideology (right vs. left; extreme vs. moderate), as well as 
measures of political engagement (interest, political media consumption) may moderate this 
tendency.  
Ideology. Affective polarization is common to liberals and conservatives; ideological 
orientation does not appear to moderate this tendency overall (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). 
However, when considering party identification, out-group animosity is more pronounced among 
strong Republicans than strong Democrats (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015).  
Political news consumption & political interest. The “selective exposure” hypothesis 
suggests that people attend more to political news sources that confirm, rather than challenge, 
their prior opinions. This can lead to increasing polarization, as people become increasingly 
certain of their own political viewpoints (Stroud, 2010). In support of this hypothesis, Stroud 
(2010) found that liberals and conservatives who paid more attention to congenial news sources 
had more polarized attitudes toward salient political figures. This was the case for consumption 
across a variety of news sources (newspapers, television, and Internet). Iyengar et al. (2012) 
argued that partisan news can contribute to affective, as well as attitudinal polarization. Partisan 
media’s negative portrayal of political out-groups can contribute to out-party animus. In the 2004 
election “battleground states,” where people were exposed to a higher than normal degree of 
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negative campaign advertising, people displayed significantly greater partisan antipathy (Iyengar 
et al., 2012).  
Interest in politics tends to be correlated with political news consumption; perhaps 
increasingly so (Strömbäck, Djerf-Pierre, & Shehata, 2012). Political interest is a motivational 
dimension of political engagement: it reflects the seeking-out of, rather than mere exposure to, 
political information. Interest is therefore likely to also be associated positively with affective 
polarization. Iyengar et al. (2012) reported that political interest was positively correlated with 
out-group antipathy for both Democrats and Republicans (in 2004; but not in 1988). 
Furthermore, Ahler and Sood (2016) found that the more interested participants were in political 
news, the more exaggerated their stereotypes were about party membership.  
Ideological extremity. While even independent “leaners” held out-group animosity, 
animosity is more pronounced among people who associate strongly with one political side or 
another (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). People who place themselves near the poles of the 1-7 
ideological scale tend to express lowest ratings of the opposing party (Webster & Abramowitz, 
2017). Ideological extremity is also associated with skewed and stereotypic out-group 
perceptions (Homola et al., 2016). Extreme liberals and extreme conservatives (vs. moderates of 
both camps) both perceive the political out-group to be more extreme and homogenous in their 
beliefs (Homola et al., 2016). That is, for example, extreme conservatives were more likely than 
moderate conservatives to view liberals as all in agreement with liberal issue positions. People 
with strong partisan identities and extreme attitudes also perceived polarization in general to be 
more intense than others did (Westfall, Van Boven, Chambers, & Judd, 2015).  
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Disgust sensitivity. The emotion of disgust has been linked both to avoidance of out-
groups, and to political outcomes. Disgust can be regarded as a dimension of the “behavioral 
immune system:” a collection of evolved behaviors that promote avoidance of perceived 
contaminants (Terrizzi, Shook, & McDaniel, 2013). Because other people, particularly out-group 
members, may be seen as sources of contamination, people who are high in disgust sensitivity 
tend to express more out-group prejudice (Faulkner, Schaller, Park, & Duncan, 2004). Prejudice 
toward gay people and ethnic minorities, in particular, are often found to correlate positively 
with disgust sensitivity (Terrizzi, Shook & Ventis, 2010). This extends toward political views: 
disgust sensitivity corresponds positively with political conservativism, even when controlling 
for personality factors, and using international samples (Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer & Haidt, 2012; but 
also see Tybur et al., 2010 for a contrasting view). Disgust sensitivity, and in particular the 
contamination dimension of disgust, also predicts negative evaluation of political groups who 
threaten traditional sexual values (e.g., pro-gay activists, pro-choice activists) (Crawford, Inbar 
& Maloney, 2014). Attitudes towards even non-sexuality related concepts (e.g., tax cuts, 
affirmative action) are also at times found to relate to disgust sensitivity (Inbar, Pizzaro & 
Bloom, 2009). This is particularly interesting, as this dimension of disgust sensitivity measures 
reactions toward things like “seeing mold on leftovers” or “seeing a cockroach,” phenomena that 
do not explicitly relate to devalued groups, or stereotypes thereof. Therefore, there is some 
evidence to suggest that disgust sensitivity may predict conservatives’ negative evaluation of 
liberals, insofar as liberals are seen as violating sexual norms (Crawford et al., 2014).  
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Psychological Essentialism 
Defining psychological essentialism. An important tool for understanding intergroup 
relations is the concept of psychological lay theories (Hong, Levy, & Chiu, 2001; Levy, West, & 
Ramirez, 2005). Lay theories are working concepts of the world that lay people subscribe to – 
such as the idea that hard work pays off; that people can (or cannot) change; or that talent is 
inborn. Lay theories help imbue meaning to events and entities observed in the world, as they 
impose “psychologically meaningful constraints on the infinite variety of interpretations 
available for a particular stimulus or event” (Levy, Plaks, Chiu, & Dweck, 2001, p. 157); and 
thus help create potential explanations for another person or group’s behavior.  
 Particularly relevant to intergroup relations is the lay theory of psychological essentialism 
(Medin & Ortony, 1989). Psychological essentialism is the belief that categories possess a 
unique underlying essence, whether observable or not, that inherently imbues categories with 
meaning. This is in contrast to the view that categories represent more arbitrary, fluid, or 
relativistic social constructions. People may take an essentialist view of many different kinds of 
categories, including objects (such as tables, squares, or houses), institutions (marriage, the 
state), and the natural world (racoons, skunks). What the “essence” itself is, is not typically 
acknowledged or directly observed by individuals. Rather, there exists what is described by 
Medin and Ortony (1989) as an “essence placeholder” (p. 184) – a notion that a unique essence 
exists, without necessarily knowing what this essence exactly is. What is more observable is the 
consequences of a category having an essential nature. For example, that category membership is 
immutable, that the group is homogenous, and that it is distinct from other groups, are all 
features associated with an essentialized category. In recent times, “genes” have often stood in 
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for the essential nature of different human groups (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011), but are not the 
only possible “placeholder” (Rangel & Keller, 2011).  
Essentialist views may be applied to social groups – categories such as race, gender, and 
ethnicity have all been understood, to varying degrees, as being essential categories. This has 
been an important observation in the study of intergroup relations, prejudice, and discrimination 
in social psychology. Allport wrote that, “one consequence of least effort in group categorizing is 
that a belief in essence develops. There is a ‘Jewishness’ to every Jew. The ‘soul’ of the 
Oriental,’ ‘Negro blood,’… ‘the passionate Latin’ – all represent a belief in essence. A 
mysterious mana (for good or ill) resides in a group, all of its members partaking thereof” (1954, 
pp. 173-174). Allport believed that essentialism applied to social categories leads to increased 
prejudice and general strain on intergroup relations.  
More formal and systematic study of essentialism’s relationship to prejudice, 
stereotyping and discrimination emerged in the late 1980s (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; 
Medin & Ortony, 1989; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). This current understanding of essentialism, 
and its relationship to other attitudes, owes a great deal to other well-developed social 
psychological constructs-- most notably, entitativity (Campbell, 1958) and entity theory (Dweck, 
Chiu, & Hong, 1995). Entitativity is the perception that a group is a holistic entity, rather than a 
loose or random assortment of people (e.g., five members of a family, as compared to five people 
waiting at the same bus stop; Lickel et al., 2000). “Entity theory” is the lay belief that traits, such 
as personality traits or intelligence, are fixed or immutable (Dweck et al., 1995). It is contrasted 
with the alternate, “incremental” lay theory: that competence in a domain, or even intelligence in 
general, can be improved through effort.  
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The concepts of entitativity and entity theory both have a rich body of literature 
demonstrating that these beliefs affect attitudes and behavior towards out-groups. The lay theory 
of essentialism relates both of these constructs, among others.  
Facets of essentialism. Psychological essentialism is considered to be, and is measured 
as, a multi-faceted construct. It is not reducible to other constructs; essentialism goes further to 
explain attitudes and behavior than either entity theory or entitativity alone (Bastian & Haslam, 
2006). Common attributes associated with essentialism include that membership in a given group 
is immutable; that the group is defined by discrete boundaries; that group membership is 
informative (that is, inductively potent); and that group membership is biologically-based 
(Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Delgado-Acosta, Betancor, Rodrigeuez-Perez & Delgado, 2016). 
Relatedly, essentialist beliefs relate to a belief in genetic determinism (Keller, 2005), as well as a 
belief in social determinism (Rangel & Keller, 2011). Therefore, multiple kinds of features 
(discreteness, immutability) and etiology beliefs (genetic, social) are associated with 
essentialism.  
There is no strict consensus on which features precisely compose essentialism. Adding 
further complexity, it is likely that the number and types of features varies by the domain being 
essentialized. Rothbart and Taylor (1992) argued that essentialism consists of two main 
dimensions: inalterability (immutability) and inductive potential (the ability to draw inferences 
based on category membership). Using factor analysis based on ratings of multiple social 
categories, Haslam et al. (2000) concluded there are two main dimensions, but they determined 
these to be a natural kind dimension and an entitativity/reification dimension. The concept of a 
natural kind is that category members possess intrinsic, biological features that imbue them with 
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an essence. In Haslam et al.’s (2000) study, participants ranked the categories of “male,” “Asian” 
and “blind” as very high on this dimension. Such categories are perceived as possessing 
biologically-derived properties, and may be perceived as “akin to biological species” (Haslam & 
Levy, 2006). Entitativity, on the other hand, refers to the perception that a group is a coherent 
and unified entity: relatively homogenous and distinct from other groups (Campbell, 1958; 
Haslam et al., 2000). Haslam et al. (2002) found the social categories of “Liberal,” 
“homosexual,” and “Jew” were rated highly on entitativity, while the categories “White” and 
“ugly” were rated very low on this factor.  
When examining specific domains, even more factor structures of essentialism have 
emerged. Essentialist beliefs about homosexuality were determined to consist of three factors 
(entitativity, biological basis, and cultural invariance; Haslam & Levy, 2006). In regards to 
personality judgements, essentialist beliefs appear to coalesce around a single factor (Gelman, 
2003; Haslam, Bastian, & Bissett, 2004). Even between sexuality-related categories (e.g., 
lesbians vs. prostitutes vs. transsexuals), differential correlations between sub-factors of 
essentialism are found (Delgado-Acosta, Betancor, Rodriguez-Perez, & Delgado, 2016). 
Therefore, while essentialism is clearly often multi-faceted, how to conceptualize and measure 
those facets varies across domains and individual studies.  
Developmental underpinnings of essentialism. Essentialism appears to arise early in 
development; children as well as adults use essentialism as a lay “folk theory” to understand the 
world. Gelman (2003) synthesized a great deal of research suggesting that children intuitively 
perceive essences and make inferences based upon them. Rather than deriving category 
judgments based on superficial features, children intuit that there are deeper reasons for certain 
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category labels. For example, in one study, children are shown a picture of a leaf bug that looks 
more like a leaf than a bug. When this insect is labeled as a “bug,” children inferred that it had 
properties similar to bugs rather than leaves (despite its superficial features being entirely leaf-
like; Gelman & Markman, 1986, as cited in Gelman, 2003). Similarly, an animal was described 
to children: a raccoon that was surgically modified (new fur, etc.) to look and smell precisely like 
a skunk. Children were asked what the resulting animal would be; and tended to report that the 
animal is still a raccoon (Gelman & Wellman, 1991). These findings, while they may seem 
intuitive to adults, contradict previous theories of development that suggest young children 
understand nature only in terms of superficial, external features (Piaget, 1970; as cited in 
Gelman, 2003).  
 As illustrated in the “skunk” and “leaf bug” studies, essentialism can be a useful theory 
for understanding nature. However, studies demonstrate that children may over-rely on 
essentialist reasoning. Children report, for example, that a child adopted at birth would speak the 
language of their birth parents, not their adoptive parents (Hirschfield & Gelman, 1997). While 
essentializing about natural categories may be rather universal, the degree to which social 
categories are essentialized is more context-dependent (Diesendruck & Haber, 2009). A key 
insight of Rothbart and Taylor (1992) was that while social groups (such as race) actually reflect 
human conventions (or “artifacts”), in some contexts, we tend to treat them as “natural kinds.”  
 Although the tendency to essentialize categories may be, in part, hard-wired, research 
suggests children’s understanding of social categories is also influenced by their environment 
(Bigler & Lieben, 2007). Adults’ language is an important force influencing whether children 
will essentialize a category (Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2013). In several studies, adults using 
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generic language about a fictional group caused children (and other adults) to essentialize that 
group (Rhodes et al., 2013). For example, when shown the expression “Zarpies are scared of 
ladybugs!,” participants rated “Zarpies” as a more essential category than after they read “Look 
at this Zarpie!  This one is afraid of ladybugs” (Rhodes et al., 2013). Because of this 
environmental influence, children vary in the degree to which they essentialize social categories. 
For example, older children in more conservative communities essentialize race to a greater 
degree than older children in more liberal communities (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). Similarly, 
Orthodox Jewish fifth graders in Israel essentialized social categories to a greater degree than did 
their secular counterparts (Diesendruck & Haber, 2009).  
Essentialism and intergroup attitudes and behaviors. Endorsement of essentialist 
beliefs varies among adults as well. This variation has been found to uniquely predict intergroup 
attitudes, stereotypes, and desire for social distance between groups. Essentializing lay theories 
predict attitudes related to race (Jayaratne et al., 2006; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008), sexual 
orientation (Jayaratne et al., 2006; Haslam & Levy, 2006; Hegarty, 2010), mental illness (Dar-
Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Howell & Woolgar, 2013; Kvaale, Haslam, & Gottdiener, 2013), 
immigration (Rangel & Keller, 2011), and gender (Mahalingam, 2003; Brescoll & LaFarce, 
2004). These effects often persist even when controlling for other intergroup attitude-related 
constructs (e.g., right-wing authoritarianism; Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Levy, Stroessner, & 
Dweck, 1998). However, research suggests essentialism’s multiple facets can have distinct 
effects; some of which enhance intergroup negativity, while others may dampen it.  
 Stereotyping. Essentialist lay beliefs appear to enhance stereotyping. Stereotypes are 
most pervasive when category membership appears to be meaningful, rather than haphazard. For 
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example, it is more likely there would be stereotypes about lawyers than there would about 
people currently standing at a bus stop near a law office. Essentialist lay explanations, suggesting 
a deep essence underlying group membership, can provide such meaning (Yzerbyt, Rocher, & 
Schadron, 1997). Consistent with this theory, several studies have found correlations between 
endorsement of essentialism and endorsement of stereotypes.  
 Possessing an implicit “entity theory” about personality (also referred to as immutability; 
believed to be one facet of essentialism; see Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Haslam, Bastian, Bain, & 
Kashima, 2006) is associated with greater agreement with stereotypes. People who endorsed 
entity theories were also more likely to endorse stereotypes about African Americans, Asians, 
Caucasians, Hispanics/Latinos, and Jews (Levy et al., 1998). Entity theorists also more readily 
formed stereotypes about a novel fictional group. These effects also appeared to be causal, as 
demonstrated by an experiment where implicit theories were manipulated. These results are 
particularly striking, given that the measure of entity theory serving as the predictor in these 
studies made no reference to race or ethnicity, only to personality in general (e.g., “Everyone is a 
certain kind of person, and there is not much that they can do to really change that” (Levy et al., 
1998, p. 1423).  
Bastian and Haslam (2006) replicated Levy et al.’s results (1998), and furthermore found 
that measuring additional facets of essentialism helped predict additional variance in 
stereotyping. In addition to measuring entity theory using the same items as in the Levy et al. 
(1998) study, they measured three additional dimensions: biological basis, discreteness, and 
informativeness. This formed an overall “essentialism index,” which was positively correlated 
with stereotyping (R = .33, p < .01). Furthermore, every one of these four dimensions of 
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essentialism were also positively associated with stereotype endorsement (all Rs ≥ .20). These 
effects were not reducible to the effect of immutability alone; nor did they disappear when 
controlling for right wing authoritarianism, need for closure, or social dominance orientation. 
Several studies have also shown connections between essentialism and gender 
stereotyping in particular. Participants exposed to a genetic essentialist explanation of gender, 
rather than a social constructivist view of gender, agreed more strongly with gender stereotypes 
(Brescoll & LaFarge, 2004). Coleman and Hong (2008) similarly found greater self-stereotyping 
among women after exposing them to biological explanations of gender. Stereotype threat 
(Steele & Aronson, 1995) effects also appear to be activated by providing genetic, rather than 
socio-cultural, explanations for gender differences (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2006).  
 Prejudice. Essentializing lay theories, like stereotyping, may have positive as well as 
negative connotations. For example, one may essentialize their in-group (e.g., “Americans”) and 
have an entirely positive view of that group. Whether essentialism also connects to prejudice1 
therefore is a distinct question.  
Essentialism, or components of essentialism, correlate positively with various measures 
of prejudice. Haslam et al. (2002) found the entitativity facet of essentialism is positively 
correlated with racism (as measured by the Anti-Black Scale, R = .40; and disagreement with the 
Pro-Black scale, R = .29; Katz & Hass, 1998). However, the measure of the “natural kinds” 
dimension of essentialism was unassociated with racist attitudes (Haslam et al., 2002). Keller 
                                                          
1 In this dissertation, following Brandt and Crawford (2016), prejudice will be defined as “a negative evaluation of a 
group or of an individual on the basis of group membership” (Crandall et al., 2002, p. 359). This is a deliberately 
broad definition of prejudice, that does not require the target group to be lower-status, nor for the negative 
evaluation to be unjustified -- conditions that are difficult to demonstrate in this case of political antipathy.  
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(2005) also found the “natural kinds” index fails to relate to negative attitudes toward Turkish 
immigrants (a relevant target group for the German sample used in the study). However, in the 
same study, negative attitudes towards Turkish immigrants were significantly correlated with 
Belief in Genetic Determinism scale, as well as the entitativity and immutability dimensions of 
essentialist beliefs. Modern sexism was found to positively correlate with Belief in Genetic 
Determinism, as well as immutability beliefs. Similarly, in Jayaratne et al. (2006), endorsement 
of genetic explanations was positively associated with both traditional racism (R = .25) and 
modern racism (R = .18).  
Essentialism research, which often highlights a “natural” or “biological” variant of 
essentialism, are supplemented by a more recently proposed construct: Belief in Social 
Determinism (Rangel & Keller, 2011). Rangel and Keller (2011) advanced the notion that genes 
and biology may not be the only perceived engines of essence – rather, the culture one is 
socialized within may also lend a perceived essence to a group. To clarify, what Rangel and 
Keller refer to as social determinism is not the lay belief that people are continuously shaped by 
their social environment. Rather, it is the lay belief that people’s attributes are culturally shaped 
at an early age, and after this point, the attributes are fixed. For example, an American may 
believe that Syrians possess a discrete and immutable character not (only) because of their 
genetic makeup, but because of the social environment they were raised in. This belief can 
justify or enhance prejudices against immigrants, just as a belief in genetic determinism can 
(Rangel & Keller, 2011). In fact, belief in genetic determinism and belief in social determinism 
were both found to be uniquely predictive of anti-Turkish prejudice (Rangel & Keller, 2011).  
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Notably, essentialism is also at times unassociated with prejudice, or even associated with 
reduced prejudice. For example, one study found no particular relationship between general 
essentialism and multiple forms of sexism (modern, old-fashioned, hostile or benevolent) 
(Haslam et al., 2002). The relationship between essentialism and homophobia is also more 
complex; while an entitativity or discreteness factor of essentialism is positively correlated with 
homophobia (R = .53; Haslam et al., 2002; R = .67; Haslam & Levy, 2006), other studies have 
found a negative correlation between belief in the genetic determination of sexuality and 
homophobia (Jayaratne et al., 2006; Haslam & Levy, 2006). That is, the belief that gays’ and 
lesbians’ sexuality was biologically determined prior to birth was associated with lessened 
homophobia. Similarly, biogenetic explanations may dampen the perception that people with 
mental illness are responsible, or to blame, for their illness (Angermeyer, Matschinger, & 
Corrigan, 2004).  
These mixed findings relating essentialism to prejudice suggest a tension in essentialist 
beliefs. To the extent that essentialism implies that people are “not responsible” for stigmatized 
conditions (e.g., homosexuality, mental illness), essentialism may reduce facets of prejudice and 
discrimination. To the extent that essentialism makes a group seem meaningful, coherent, and 
truly distinct from others (e.g., in the case of race or ethnicity), it may lead to increased 
prejudice. This highlights the complexity of essentialist attitudes; there are nuances to how 
essentialism affects different target groups. Similarly, there may be distinct effects of different 
dimensions of essentialist thinking: “discreteness” assumptions may function differently than 
“biological basis” assumptions.  
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Social avoidance. In addition to stereotypes and prejudices, there are also behavioral 
consequences of essentialist beliefs. Essentialism is also connected with a desire for social 
distance, above and beyond what is predicted by prejudice alone. Williams and Eberhardt (2008) 
found that possessing a biological conception of race was associated with having a less racially 
diverse friend group, and decreased interest in cross-race friendship. Biological essentialism 
appears to play a causal role in this relationship; participants primed with a biological conception 
of race were less interested in forming a friendship with a racial-outgroup confederate (Williams 
& Eberhardt, 2008).  
People who hold essentialist beliefs are in some cases more likely to tolerate 
governmental discrimination against out-group members. Rangel and Keller (2011) found that a 
belief in social determinism predicted acceptance of discriminatory policies (e.g., “Persons 
without German citizenship should not be allowed to produce newspapers or magazines,” p. 9). 
On the other hand, consistent with effects on prejudice, people who held a genetic lay theory of 
homosexuality were less in favor of discrimination against gays and lesbians (e.g., ‘Homosexual 
couples should not be allowed to adopt children,’ Jayarante et al., 2006, p. 83).  
 Essentialist beliefs also affect how people respond to someone who makes an offensive 
statement. Specifically, believing personality to be immutable predicted intention to withdraw 
from future interactions with someone who made a biased statement (Rattan & Dweck, 2009). In 
one experiment, immutability beliefs also reduced the likelihood of confronting a confederate 
about the biased statement they made. About 10% of those who possessed an entity theory of 
personality confronted the confederate; in contrast, close to 40% of those with an incremental 
theory of personality confronted the confederate. The lay theory of personality did not shape 
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whether the statement was perceived as biased or not, it only shaped the preferred reaction. In 
this case, believing personality to be fixed predicted reduced willingness to engage with the 
person who made the prejudiced comment; but increased interest in withdrawing from them.  
In-group and out-group essentialism. Many studies presume essentialist beliefs about 
the out-group drive prejudice (e.g., heterosexual people’s beliefs about gays and lesbians can 
shape their attitudes towards gays and lesbians). But it is also true that believing one’s in-group 
to have an essential nature can facilitate out-group negativity. For example, biological basis and 
immutability beliefs about the in-group can make it seem impossible for the out-group to 
assimilate with the in-group. This function of in-group essentialism has been shown to increase 
prejudice, particularly against immigrants. For example, British citizens who believed the British 
identity to be rooted in biology were both less likely to believe that Pakistani immigrants could 
assimilate, and were more prejudiced against Pakistani immigrants (Zagefka, Nigbur, Gonzaelz, 
& Tip, 2013).  
Perceiving one’s in-group to be entitative can also enhance the expression of out-group 
prejudice. Effron and Knowles (2015) argue that prejudice can be seen as more socially 
acceptable and understandable (in their words, “rationalistic”) when done in the name of 
collective self-interest. In this way, prejudice is analogous to violence: though generally 
unacceptable, violence is perceived as more understandable or justifiable when done in pursuit of 
some collective self-interest (such as during the American Revolution) rather than when 
perpetuated alone for one’s individual self-interest. Entitative groups (such as a religious 
minority) are more likely to be perceived as having legitimate collective interests than non-
entitative groups (such as White people, able-bodied people, heterosexual people, etc.). 
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Therefore, the argument follows that entitative groups are more likely to be seen as possessing a 
“rationalistic” basis to compete with out-groups. This lends greater justification to the expression 
of prejudice against out-groups (Effron & Knowles, 2015). Supporting this notion, American 
Christians experimentally manipulated to believe that American Christians were a highly 
entitative group were more likely than a control group to express Islamophobia (Effron & 
Knowles, 2015).  
Potential mitigators of essentialist beliefs. A great deal has been written about potential 
correlates and consequences of essentialist beliefs. Less has been stated about what variables 
may predict variation in essentialist beliefs. Several interesting possibilities exist that may reduce 
the tendency for people to essentialize social categories:  
 Intergroup contact. Intergroup contact is a demonstrably powerful tool in improving 
intergroup relations, particularly when conducted under certain favorable conditions (Allport, 
1954; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kawamaki, 2003; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005, 2006, 2008; Pettigrew, 
Tropp, Wagner, & Christ, 2011). A meta-analysis of over 500 studies conducted on intergroup 
contact concluded that there is a reliable negative relationship between contact and prejudice, 
with an estimated strength of R = -.21 (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008). Longitudinal and experimental 
studies demonstrate that intergroup contact has a causal effect on intergroup attitudes (and vice 
versa; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008).  
 Allport (1954) argued that certain conditions are necessary for intergroup contact to 
successfully reduce prejudice; suggesting contact quality matters as well as quantity. 
Specifically, Allport suggested that in order to be effective, interactions should take place under 
conditions where the parties held equal status, shared cooperative goals, did not have to compete, 
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and enjoyed support from legal or cultural authorities. Pettigrew and Tropp’s meta-analysis 
(2006) determined that these conditions may help enhance intergroup contact’s effects, but are 
not necessary conditions. Even in situations where these conditions were largely unmet, 
intergroup contact still tended to relate to reduced prejudice (R = -.20). Intergroup contact effects 
were also observed in a variety of domains, including sexual orientation, race, and disability, 
suggesting that these effects are not limited to one type of target group. This is not to claim, 
however, that there are no meaningful moderators of intergroup contact’s effects. For example, 
negative intergroup interactions also exist; these typically involve involuntary interactions in 
which people feel threatened (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). Such interactions have been shown to 
relate to increased racism (Barlow et al., 2012) and ethnic prejudice (Graf, Paolini, & Rubin, 
2014).  
Intergroup contact effects have been observed in the political domain. A survey by Pew 
(2016) found that people who have “some” or “a lot of” friends from the opposing party are less 
likely to report “very cold” feelings toward members of that party (Pew, 2016). Analyzing 
nationally representative survey data, Mutz (2002a) also found that closeness with cross-
ideological contacts related to greater political tolerance. Exposure to divergent views alone was 
insufficient to predict increased tolerance; but greater social intimacy with politically discordant 
friends was positively related to tolerance (Mutz, 2002a). In a separate study, however, Mutz 
(2002b) reported that exposure to dissonant political views within social networks functioned to 
decrease political participation. This effect was heightened among people who were conflict 
avoidant, suggesting that political participation may be eschewed in order to avoid social conflict 
(Mutz, 2002b). This is consistent with theories suggesting that “cross-pressures” or conflict can 
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reduce tendencies to vote or interest in elections (e.g., Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 
1960). Therefore, when investigating positive effects of intergroup contact in the political 
domain, negative effects on political participation may also be considered.  
Research directly connecting intergroup contact to essentialism is not as prevalent as 
research connecting intergroup contact to prejudice per se. The existing research supports the 
notion that intergroup contact may also function to erode certain essentialist beliefs. After getting 
to know someone who belongs to an out-group, it may be difficult to maintain certain essentialist 
assumptions, like that one’s group membership is completely informative about that person’s 
personality (undermining the informativeness dimension); or that the boundary around the 
category is entirely rigid (undermining the discreteness dimension). Deeb, Segall, Birnbaum, 
Ben-Eliyahu, and Diesendruck (2011) argued that when someone is familiar with members of a 
social group, they have to rely less on “essentialist placeholders” to assess that category. 
Consistent with this notion, Deeb et al. (2011) reported that increased interethnic exposure in 
schools (between Arab and Jewish children) was associated with reduced essentialist beliefs 
about ethnicity. While all students started out with a relatively essentialist view of ethnicity, 
children who attended integrated schools (vs. “regular” segregated schools) showed decreasing 
essentialist beliefs about ethnicity over time.  
Brown, Eller, Leeds, and Stace (2007) found that both quantity and quality of intergroup 
contact related to reduced intergroup infrahumanization. Infrahumanization is an essentialism-
related process, in which people view the in-group as possessing the human “essence,” while the 
out-group does not (see Leyens et al., 2000). In their longitudinal study, high quality intergroup 
contact between private and public school children in Britain (school type is an important class 
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marker in this context) was associated with reduced out-group infrahumanization. The reverse 
causation was not evident (that is, reduced infrahumanization at Time 1 did not relate to greater 
contact at Time 2). This suggests that at least in this instance, intergroup contact may be more of 
an antecedent of essentialist beliefs than a consequence.  
Open-Minded Cognition. Open-minded cognition (“OMC”) is the tendency to 
cognitively process information in a manner that is relatively unbiased toward the individuals’ 
prior opinion (Price, Ottati, Wilson, & Kim, 2015). Because OMC implies a less rigid and 
prescriptive style of thinking, it may be negatively related to essentialism – which consists of a 
relatively rigid view of categories. OMC has also been shown to be negatively associated with 
various forms of prejudice against various social groups, even when controlling for similar 
cognitive constructs (e.g., need for closure; Price et al., 2015). One cross-sectional study tested 
the relationship between OMC and essentialism (Wilson & Ottati, 2016). This research revealed 
a negative correlation between OMC and the overall essentialism measure. This association was 
primarily driven by the facets of discreteness and immutability; the biological basis and 
informativeness dimensions were not associated with OMC. Therefore, more cognitively open-
minded people may be less likely to perceive boundaries between groups, and be more likely to 
think that group membership is not fixed.  
 Ideology and other political variables. Ideology may influence the endorsement of 
essentialist beliefs. Rhodes and Gelman (2009) found that self-reported conservatism among 
adults is associated with more essentialist views of race. Other research suggests this relationship 
is context-dependent. One study suggests conservatism is positively associated with genetic 
explanations for race (R = .10), but that conservatism is negatively associated with genetic 
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explanations for sexual orientation (R = -.19; Jayaratne et al., 2006). This pattern was replicated 
with a more recent study (Suhay & Jayaratne, 2012), which also found that conservatism was 
associated with greater endorsement of genetic explanations for economic class differences, yet 
had no association with genetic explanations for personality differences. Political orientation 
appears to be reliably associated with essentialism, but it is consistently moderated by the target 
group of interest. Essentializing race and class helps to justify existing hierarchies (a more 
conservative tendency; see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003); whereas biologically 
essentializing sexual orientation differences is more associated with the promotion of liberal 
values (Suhay & Jayaratne, 2013).  
 Ideology may also moderate a link between essentialism and prejudice. Suhay, Brandt, 
and Proulx (2016) found a stronger association between belief in biopolitics (biologically 
essentializing politics) and political intolerance among liberals than conservatives. This was an 
exploratory finding rather than confirmation of an a priori hypothesis. It is not clear, 
theoretically, why this would be the case.  
 It can be reasonably suggested that reduced essentialism can result from open-
mindedness, from intergroup contact, or from political ideology. It is also possible, however that 
essentialism influences and determines variation in these constructs. For example, having a less 
essentialist view of an out-group (e.g., not believing non-Americans to be fundamentally 
different from Americans) may lead people to more seriously consider out-group members’ 
viewpoints. This in turn may influence one’s overall level of open-minded cognition. 
Experimental tests are needed in order to determine causality. For purposes of the present cross-
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sectional Study 1, these will be referred to as proposed antecedents, acknowledging that this 
direction of causality has not firmly been established.  
Direction of causality. Many studies of the relationship between essentialism and 
intergroup attitudes are cross-sectional (Haslam et al., 2000; Haslam et al., 2002; Suhay et al., 
2016). The nature of these studies leaves the direction of causality as a somewhat open question. 
At least since Allport (1954), there has been a suspicion of an association between group-based 
essentialism and prejudice. However it is not entirely obvious whether possessing essentialist 
beliefs about a group causes prejudice, or if there is some other chain of causation. A great deal 
of research rests on the prior assumption. This is a reasonable hypothesis, as beliefs about target 
groups (or one’s own group) can easily shape what attitudes you have toward that group. At the 
same time, is also possible that prejudiced attitudes could lead to greater endorsement of 
essentialist beliefs.  
Theoretically, essentializing beliefs about a group can help provide important cognitive 
justification for espousing and expressing prejudices. Crandall and Eshleman (2003) argued that 
“justification allows the expression of prejudice without shame; adequately justified prejudices 
are not even labeled as prejudices (e.g., prejudice toward rapists, child abusers, enemy soldiers)” 
(p. 417). Therefore, to the extent that essentialism’s features (e.g., immutability, discreteness) 
help justify that a group is worthy of derision and social distance, these features can be endorsed 
simply to help validate pre-existing prejudice. 
Studies that have tested both causal directions have found evidence for bidirectionality 
(Keller, 2005; Rangel & Keller, 2011). This question is important, because if essentialism is 
playing at least partially a causal role, reducing essentialist lay beliefs may be a tool to help 
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decrease prejudice (Hegarty, 2010). If such beliefs simply follow, or co-occur, with prejudice, 
changing them would not be expected to influence intergroup attitudes per se. However, even in 
this case, essentialism beliefs may still influence other downstream consequences, such as 
political tolerance, or interest in compromise. 
Psychological Essentialism and Political Ideology 
 A limited number of studies have specifically examined the relationship between political 
orientation and essentialism. One question of interest is whether political orientation predicts 
endorsement of general essentialist lay theories (i.e., are conservatives or liberals more likely to 
have essentialist lay theories about group membership?). As described in an earlier section 
(potential mitigators of essentialist beliefs, ideology), there are relationships between ideology 
and essentialism, but this relationship varies by target group.  
A second question, more relevant to this dissertation, is whether people in general treat 
political affiliation groups (e.g., liberals, conservatives, Republicans, Democrats) as essentialized 
social groups. Relative to categories like race and gender, political orientation may be seen as a 
less essential category (Gelman, 2003). However, it would be overly simplistic to claim that 
people never essentialize political identity. As mentioned earlier, Haslam et al. (2000) asked 
participants to rate a variety of categories (e.g., Liberal, Black, male, heterosexual) on different 
facets of essentialism. The two political categories they measured, “Liberal” and “Republican,” 
were indeed rated particularly low on the “natural kind” dimension of essentialism, but were 
rated particularly high on the entitativity dimension. Therefore, “Liberals” and “Republicans” 
may not be seen as “species-like,” as racial groups sometimes are. However, they are perceived 
as particularly homogenous and distinct. Bernstein et al. (2010) furthermore found that 
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essentialist beliefs about political identity are malleable. Participants primed with an article 
stating that partisan identity is diffuse and malleable rated political identity low in essentialism; 
but those primed with an article stating that political identity is innate and immutable rated 
political identity as more essential than not (M = 5.44 on a 7-point scale; vs. M = 3.39 in control 
condition).  
Finally, the core question of this research, is what the relationship is between 
essentializing lay theories and affective polarization. Several studies have examined a construct 
referred to as “biopolitics” – the belief that political identity is rooted in biology. The popularity 
of research on biological determinants of political identity (“biopolitics;” Hibbing, Smith, & 
Alford, 2014) makes this question quite pertinent. Such research suggests political identity is 
heritable through genes via more fundamental predictors of political orientation, such as 
negativity bias (Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost et al., 2003). It has been suggested that acknowledging 
biological roots of political identity can lead to increased tolerance across the political divide 
(Hibbing et al., 2013). In two correlational tests of this biopolitics-tolerance hypothesis, Suhay et 
al. (2016) found the opposite. In fact, increased endorsement of biopolitics was associated with 
decreased tolerance. Participants who held biological lay theories of politics were less likely to 
believe that opposing views should be tolerated. They also expressed more desire for social 
distance from people with opposing views. These patterns were found both within a Mechanical 
Turk sample and a nationally-representative sample across two studies. Therefore, while there 
are situations where understanding the biological roots of a category can help promote tolerance 
(e.g., Jayaratne et al., 2006), the opposite may be true in the case of ideology.  
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Summary 
 Polarization, particularly affective polarization, is a phenomenon receiving a great deal of 
academic and popular attention. It is particularly interesting at this point in history, as it is more 
apparent in the current decade than at any other point in recent history. As an intergroup 
phenomenon, affective polarization has been interpreted with a variety of social psychological 
lenses, including stereotyping, discrimination, and lay beliefs. Such research largely confirms 
that ideology can be viewed as a social identity, and displays effects similar to other intergroup 
phenomena. Liberals and conservatives view each other in stereotypical terms, tend to give 
preferential treatment to members of their ideological in-group, and prefer to maintain social 
distance from the ideological out-group. 
Psychological essentialism is a lens that has been used to understand intergroup attitudes 
on a variety of subjects. It is a multi-faceted construct that tends, in many cases, to correspond 
positively with in-group preference and desire for social distance. Only one of these facets, 
biological essentialism, has been directly studied as a potential determinant (or at least correlate) 
of affective polarization. Therefore, an opportunity exists to measure additional essential beliefs 
about politics, and assess whether and how these relate to affective polarization.
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CHAPTER TWO 
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AND HYPOTHESES 
Overview 
 The present research introduces the construct of political essentialism – essentialism 
about political identity---and studies its relationship with affective polarization. Does 
essentialism relate to heightened polarization, contributing to the large discrepancy in affect 
toward the ideological ingroup versus the ideological outgroup?  Or, as some suggest, are there 
features of essentialism that are associated with reduced affective polarization (e.g. Hibbing, 
2014)?  Do different facts of essentialism relate differentially to these outcomes? Two studies are 
proposed to address these questions, using divergent methodological approaches.  
Study 1 is broad cross-sectional study, that examines the relationship between essentialist 
beliefs and inter-ideological attitudes and behaviors, and also considers several other potential 
antecedent and correlated variables. Study 2 is an experimental study, in which essentialist 
beliefs are manipulated and inter-ideological attitudes are measured. Therefore these studies 
focus on multiple constructs, measured in several ways. The present section introduces the 
constructs considered in each study, the general predictions made about these constructs, and the 
most relevant literature supporting these general predictions. Finally, the formal hypotheses and 
exploratory research questions for each study are presented. 
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Key Constructs and General Predictions 
Political essentialism is the primary construct of interest across the two studies. Drawing 
from prior research, several “facets” or manifestations of essentialism are considered, and 
specifically tied to the political domain. Both studies also focus on affective polarization as a key 
consequence of essentialist beliefs. Political correlates of essentialism (e.g., political interest, 
ideology) are also addressed in each study. Potential antecedents of political essentialism (e.g., 
intergroup contact) are also explored in Study 1. Each of these categories of variables are 
addressed below, but more details about precisely how they are measured are within the Methods 
section of Chapters 3 and 4. General predictions are also outlined in this section. More formally 
introduced predictions and research questions are provided at the end of this chapter.  
Political essentialism. Essentialism is sometimes treated as a unitary construct, and 
sometimes as a collection of distinct but related beliefs. Different essentialist beliefs can function 
differently – for example, entitativity but not natural-kind beliefs were associated with negative 
group evaluation (Haslam et al., 2000). Research consistently demonstrates the importance of 
measuring domain-specific (rather than general) essentialist beliefs, as the structure and 
consequences of essentialist beliefs varies by topic (Jayaratne et al., 2006; Delgado-Acosta et al., 
2016). Therefore, in Study 1, political essentialism is measured as a multi-faceted construct 
drawing upon facets of essentialism that have been proposed in previous research (Bastian & 
Haslam, 2007; Rangel & Keller, 2011; Delgado-Acosta et al., 2016): discreteness, 
informativeness, immutability, biological basis, and social determinism. A novel, politics-
specific measure of essentialism is used (the “political essentialism scale”), allowing the 
construct to be tested as an overarching construct and as a collection of subscales. Reliability and 
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factor analyses are also used to explore the structure of the scale.  
 In Study 2, political essentialism beliefs are manipulated. This is accomplished by 
exposing participants to one of two fabricated news articles. These articles maximally 
manipulate essentialism: that is, the “high essentialism” version of the article argues that 
ideology is an essential quality in terms of all five facets that were measured, while the “low 
essentialism” version argues the opposite.  
Proposed consequences of political essentialism.  
Affective polarization and social distance. The key outcome explored in these studies is 
political polarization as an intergroup, affective phenomenon. As such, it is operationalized as 
feelings that members of ideological groups express toward the opposing group as compared to 
their ingroup. Within this dissertation, the term “affective polarization” refers to the degree to 
which people prefer their ideological ingroup (e.g., “liberals,” for liberal participants) over the 
most salient ideological outgroup (e.g., “conservatives,” for liberal participants) 1.  
The affect toward the political ingroup and outgroup is assessed with a scale known as the 
“feeling thermometer.” This is a persistently popular, 101-point measure of attitudes that asks 
participants to rate their feelings toward each target, on a scale form “very cold or unfavorable” 
to “very warm or favorable” (Nelson, 2008). The vast majority of people gravitate toward 
“rounded” spots within the scale (e.g., 80 rather than 79) so it may not function as fine-grained a 
                                                          
1 In the literature, the term “affective polarization” can also refer not just to the gap in affect towards one’s 
ideological in-group versus the ideological outgroup, but to the increase in this gap over time (Iyengar, Sood & 
Lelkes, 2012). As this is a cross-sectional study, I am necessarily only capturing this gap at one moment in time. 
However, the term is still useful in the context of this dissertation. The phrase “polarization” captures, better than 
other potential terminology, simultaneous warmth toward the ingroup and coldness toward the outgroup. In contrast, 
an expression such as “political outgroup antipathy” would only refer to half of the attitudinal divergence.  
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measure as “101 points” implies  (Alwin, 1992). Nevertheless, it has been used extensively in 
survey research. When used in online surveys, warmth expressed tends to be lower (Liu & 
Wang, 2015), but test-retest reliability tends to be higher (Chang & Krosnick, 2009), than when 
this scale is used in face-to-face surveys. 
 Closely tied to political affective polarization is the conative, or behavioral, dimension of 
polarization. That is, polarization can be expressed not just by reporting differential warmth 
toward the ingroup versus the outgroup, but also via a behavioral preference to avoid the 
ideological outgroup. In this dissertation, this construct is referred to as desire for social 
distance.  
As essentialism as a whole often relates to more negative intergroup attitudes, it is 
generally predicted that political essentialism will accentuate affective polarization and desire for 
social distance. An important question for the present research is which facets of political 
essentialism will correspond with these outcomes, and in which direction. In many instances, 
perceived discreteness and informativeness are associated consistently with increased prejudice 
(Haslam et al., 2002). On the other hand, perceptions of immutability and biological basis are at 
times associated with tolerance. Political identity could be regarded more like mental illness or 
homosexuality, in which biological basis and immutability beliefs are associated with reduced 
prejudice (Jayaratne, 2005; Phelan et al., 2002). It is also possible that political identity will 
function more akin to race or immigration status, wherein immutability beliefs are associated 
with increased prejudice (e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2008; Zagefka et al., 2013). I predicted that 
political identity will behave more like the latter, for two reasons: one based on empirical results 
to date, and one more theory-driven.  
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First, Suhay et al. (2016) found a positive association between biological basis beliefs 
and political intolerance. This suggests the biological basis facet is associated with a more 
negative inter-ideological orientation. Further, their measure of the biological-basis construct 
contained some items that also referred directly to immutability (e.g., “Political beliefs do not 
have an inherent biological basis, and thus can be changed” [emphasis added]). If immutability 
beliefs were contributing to more positive outgroup evaluations, we might expect any negative 
biological-basis effects to be dampened by the presence of immutability statements. On the 
contrary, a significant negative relationship between such items and outgroup orientation was 
maintained across two studies. Furthermore, when entered as a control variable, “entity theory” 
(basically synonymous with “immutability” beliefs) was positively associated with desire for 
social distance from political outgroups (B = .25, SE = .08, p < .01; however, it should be noted 
that this measure assessed “general” immutability beliefs about personality, rather than about 
political orientation more generally). Therefore, empirical results point toward immutability 
beliefs having a positive association with intergroup tension rather than tolerance. 
The second reason is more theory-driven. The proposed theoretical explanation for why 
biology and immutability beliefs reduce some forms of prejudice (e.g., homophobia) is they 
lessen the blame and personal responsibility for carrying a stigmatized status (Jayaratne, 2005; 
Dar-Nimrod & Henie, 2011). This blame-reduction function is bolstered by cultural frames that 
use biology and immutability statements in arguments supporting stigmatized groups (e.g., Lady 
Gaga’s pro-LGBT anthem “Born this Way”; Bennett, 2014; Jayaratne, 2005). No such cultural 
frame exists to support the identities of liberals or conservatives (as in, “we must accept liberals; 
they were ‘born that way’ and cannot change.”). On the contrary, because politics is goal-driven, 
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there may be some demand for others to adopt one’s own political orientation (e.g., for 
instrumental reasons, conservatives would prefer liberals to become more conservative – this 
would only help advance conservatives’ political goals). This potential demand for outgroup 
assimilation, combined with a belief that assimilation is impossible, is associated with greater 
outgroup prejudice (Zagefka et al., 2013). Therefore, I expected that all measured facets of 
political essentialism, including immutability and biological-basis beliefs, would relate to greater 
affective polarization.  
Political participation. While the main outcomes of interest in this dissertation are 
affective polarization and desire for social distance, an additional construct is considered: 
political participation. On the basis of Mutz’s (2002b) findings that political disagreement in 
social networks depresses voting intention, this potential “side effect” of inter-ideological contact 
(see next section) will also be explored in Study 1. Political participation is measured both as a 
summary index of participation over the past year, and as intention to vote in the 2018 
Congressional midterm election.  
 Proposed antecedents of political essentialism. The correlational study also addressed 
two proposed predictors of political essentialism: one related more to behavioral history 
(intergroup contact), and one related to cognitive style (open-minded cognition). 
Intergroup contact. I predicted that intergroup contact with people of opposing political 
views (which I will refer to as “inter-ideological contact”) would have a negative relationship 
with both political essentialism and affective polarization. As intergroup contact appears to be 
associated with a decrease in essentialist beliefs in other domains (Deeb et al., 2011), it is 
anticipated that liberals and conservatives may have a less essentialist view of ideology if they 
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have had more extensive inter-ideological contact. While Pettigrew and Tropp (2011) are overall 
optimistic about intergroup contact’s positive effect on intergroup attitudes, they note that the 
conditions under which it takes place can moderate its effects. Those that fulfilled Allport’s 
conditions for effective intergroup contact (equal status, common goal, etc.) yielded greater 
reduction in prejudice than those that did not (though contact outside of these conditions still 
tended to yield some prejudice reduction; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Some more recent research 
cautions even more strongly that negative interactions can result in accentuated prejudices 
(Barlow et al., 2014; Graf et al., 2004). Finally, Mutz (2002a) found that it was greater intimacy 
in cross-ideological friendships, rather than mere exposure to opposing views, that led to 
increased political tolerance. With these qualifications in mind, the present study will assess 
inter-ideological contact quality as well as quantity.  
Open-minded cognition2. I expected open-minded cognition would be negatively related 
to both political essentialism and affective polarization. This prediction is based both on 
empirical findings as well as the theoretical content of the two constructs.  
Previous empirical research has found a significant negative relationship between OMC 
and a general measure of essentialism (Wilson & Ottati, 2016). Prior research has also 
demonstrated that OMC is positively related to affect toward a variety of outgroups – including 
                                                          
2 Another potentially interesting construct to assess would be Political Open-Minded Cognition (“P-OMC,” Price et 
al., 2015), a measure of how open-minded people within the domain of politics. I am primarily interested, however, 
in the antecedent role of OMC as a general cognitive style that potentially determines how people perceive social 
and political categories. Research suggests individuals possessing a high level of General Open-Minded Cognition 
have a less rigid view of social categories (Wilson & Ottati, 2016), and therefore may view liberals and 
conservatives in less essentializing terms. P-OMC, in contrast, may be more of a consequence than antecedent of 
essentialist lay beliefs about politics. People low in political essentialism may be more inclined to listen more openly 
to others about politics, since they view those with opposing views as less fundamentally different. 
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those relating to gender identity, ethnicity, and race -- even when controlling for a set of related 
constructs (Price et al., 2015; Wilson & Ottati, 2016). Similarly, Price et al. (2015) reported that 
OMC positively predicted empathic concern for others; again controlling for openness to 
experience and other related constructs. The authors stated that overall, results indicate that 
“individuals possessing an open-minded cognitive style often respond to outgroup members in a 
more positive emotional manner” (p. 13). This suggests there is a robust connection between this 
cognitive style and more positive outgroup attitudes, which quite possibly could extend to 
ideological outgroup members.  
In addition to these empirical findings, the content of the OMC and political essentialism 
constructs suggests they are likely to be negatively related. The two constructs offer different 
frames for nature and importance of others’ beliefs. For example, an item from the political 
essentialism scale states, “People’s political views can’t really be changed”; see Appendix A). 
As this item suggests, the notion that one’s beliefs may change is contrary to political 
essentialism. One item of the open-minded cognition scale, in contrast, states “I am open to 
considering other viewpoints” (Price et al., 2015; see Appendix A for all OMC items). A 
willingness to entertain “other” views is one of the core facets of OMC.  
The political essentialism scale directly measures beliefs about people in general 
(“people’s views…”), while the OMC scale measures one’s own cognitive orientation (“I am 
willing…”). However, one’s own cognitive orientation is likely to influence their perception of 
possibilities for “people” in general. Consider, for example, an individual who is particularly 
high in OMC. They express a willingness to listen to “both sides,” consider “many opinions,” 
and reject the notion that it is a “waste of time” to listen to dissenting views. By observing their 
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personal experience, they are unlikely to believe that personal beliefs in general are immutable, 
or arising solely from primordial biological sources. Furthermore, via their active open-
mindedness towards others’ views, the high-OMC individual has the opportunity to reject 
essentialist assumptions of others (that they “can’t really change”; they belong to a “distinct 
camp,”). In contrast, a low-OMC individual may observe from their own personal experience 
that it is true that beliefs are fixed, self-defining and pre-determined. As they “tune out” 
perspectives they disagree with, they may also fail to notice nuances or changes within others’ 
belief systems.  
For all of these reasons, I predicted that open-minded cognition would be related both to 
greater warmth toward the political outgroup and to reduced essentialism. The cross-sectional 
nature of this study did not enable me to strongly demonstrate a chain of causation between 
OMC, outgroup warmth, and political essentialism. A mediational model, however, tests the 
notion that OMC mediates the link (if one is present) between essentialism and affective 
polarization (see RQ5).  
 Political correlates of political essentialism and affective polarization. The studies 
also include political variables: ideology, political extremity, political interest, political news 
consumption, and disgust sensitivity. With the exception of ideology, each one is expected to be 
positively correlated with affective polarization; and may correspond with political essentialism 
as well. Political extremity has been demonstrated to be correlated with political outgroup 
antipathy (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015) and holding more extreme and incorrect stereotypes of 
political outgroups (Homola et al., 2016). Political interest is also associated with more 
accentuated affective polarization (Iyengar et al., 2012). People who pay attention to congenial 
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news sources also tend to display stronger affective polarization than those who do not (Garret at 
al., 2014; Stroud, 2010).  
 These political variables are assessed in the two present studies. One goal of measuring 
these is to replicate previous research findings regarding the relationship between each of these 
and affective polarization. Another goal is to test the degree to which each of these relates to 
political essentialism. For example, it is feasible that political extremity influences political 
essentialism, because extremity increases partisan stereotyping (Homola et al., 2016), and 
essentialism and stereotyping tend to be correlated (Bastian & Haslam, 2006). It may also be the 
case that political essentialism beliefs function as a partial mediator; that is, part of the reason 
that extremity relates to greater affective polarization is that it heightens political essentializing 
lay beliefs. This mediational relationship is tested in Study 1.  
 Causality. Finally, it is important to provide an initial test of causality. This is the focus 
of Study 2. The Suhay et al. (2016) study addresses the association between biopolitical lay 
theories and political prejudice, but does so in a cross-sectional manner. They write that it is 
feasible that biopolitics beliefs increase political prejudice, but that, “it also may be that higher 
levels of political prejudice lead to greater belief in biopolitics via a motivated reasoning process. 
Future research should study this important question experimentally” (2016, p. 8). In many 
instances, the relationship between essentialism and intergroup attitudes is bi-directional (Keller, 
2005; Rangel & Keller, 2011). In the present studies, one causal direction – from essentialist 
beliefs to prejudice –is tested.  
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Study 1: A Cross-sectional Approach 
Study 1 provides a cross-sectional test of the relationship between essentialist beliefs 
about ideological groups and affective polarization. As described previously, it also measures 
some of the proposed antecedents (open-minded cognition; intergroup contact) and correlates of 
political essentialism (ideology, political extremity, political interest, political news 
consumption). Psychological essentialism is assessed with new items, building upon previous, 
theory-driven scales, but revised to be specific to the domain of political identity. Affective 
polarization is measured, as well as the closely-related construct of desire for social distance. It is 
generally predicted that the political essentialism scale will positively relate to affective 
polarization and desire for social distance; and this relationship will not be reducible to 
biological-basis beliefs.  
Another core goal of this study is to test two proposed antecedents of political 
essentialism, open-minded cognition and inter-ideological contact, which are both expected to 
attenuate essentialism. Also, several political correlates that are frequently of interest in political 
science research are measured: political interest, political extremity, political ideology, political 
news consumption, and disgust sensitivity. They are included as control variables in some 
analyses, allowing for a more rigorous test of the essentialism-attitude link. Measuring these 
variables allows their own bi-directional relationship with political essentialism to be tested. This 
has the potential to also yield helpful evidence about the sources and/or consequences of 
essentialist attitudes.  
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A priori hypotheses (Study 1). 
H1: Participants will, on average, indicate greater warmth for their political ingroup than the 
political outgroup, demonstrating evidence of affective polarization. 
H2: The total political essentialism scale will be positively associated with both affective 
polarization and desire for greater social distance from political outgroups.  
H3: Replicating previous research, belief in a biological basis of politics (biological basis 
subscale) will be positively associated with a greater desire for social distance from political 
outgroups, and greater affective polarization. Additionally, the discreteness, immutability, 
informativeness, and social determinism facets will also all be positively related to affective 
polarization. Controlling for biological basis will not eliminate the effect of the remaining 
subscales on affective polarization and desire for social distance.  
H4:  Open-minded cognition will be negatively related to the overall political essentialism scale. 
It will also relate negatively to affective polarization and desire for social distance.  
H5: Inter-ideological contact quantity and quality will be negatively related to the overall 
political essentialism scale. They will also relate negatively to affective polarization and desire 
for social distance.  
 Exploratory research questions (Study 1).  
RQ1: What factor structure best describes the political essentialism scale?  Does it consist of the 
five proposed theoretical factors (discreteness, immutability, informativeness, biological 
determinism, and social determinism); a smaller number of more general factors (natural kinds 
versus entitativity); or some other structure?  
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RQ2: Does ideology moderate the link between political essentialism and affective polarization?  
That is, is the association between political essentialism and affective polarization stronger for 
liberal participants (as in Suhay et al., 2016), or for conservative participants, or is this 
association equivalent across groups? 
RQ3: Which political correlates (i.e., political extremity, political interest, political news 
consumption, and disgust sensitivity), if any, are associated with political essentialism or 
affective polarization? Are any sub-types of news consumption particularly associated with 
political essentialism or polarization  (i.e., congenial versus non-congenial news consumption)? 
RQ4: To the extent that political correlates are associated with affective polarization, are these 
mediated by political essentialism beliefs? 
RQ5: To the extent that open-minded cognition is associated with reduced affective polarization, 
is this relationship mediated by political essentialism?  
RQ6: To the extent that inter-ideological contact is associated with reduced affective 
polarization, is this relationship mediated by political essentialism?  
RQ7: Which facets of political essentialism beliefs are most and least influenced by intergroup 
contact?  Which facets (quantity versus quality) of intergroup contact are most and least related 
to political essentialism?  Which facets of political essentialism are most strongly associated with 
open-minded cognition?  Does contact quality moderate effects of contact quantity on political 
essentialism?  
RQ8: To the extent that political essentialism is associated with affective polarization, is this 
effect primarily driven by heightened ingroup liking, by decreased outgroup liking, or both?  
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RQ9: Does inter-ideological contact negatively predict political participation? Is political 
participation associated at all with affective polarization or political essentialism? 
 
Study 2: An Experimental Approach 
 Study 2 provides an experiment to test causation. This study intentionally includes fewer 
measures, particularly in the “proposed antecedents” category, than Study 1 does. Belief in 
political essentialism is manipulated, rather than measured. The manipulation will prime multiple 
facets of essentialism using fabricated articles that endorse an essentialist or non-essentialist 
view of political identity. In order to confirm the effectiveness of this manipulation, a pilot study 
is run prior to the main study. In the pilot study, participants read one of the two versions of the 
article, then rate whether they believe that the researchers described in the article believe 
ideology to be discrete, immutable, informative, socially determined, and biological (or their 
opposites). In the main study, participants will read one of the two versions of the article, then 
simply rate their attitudes on the feeling thermometer, and desire for social distance from 
ideological others.  
A priori hypotheses (Study 2).  
H6: Participants in the “high essentialism” condition will report that the researchers described in 
the article view ideology as more essentialized than will participants in the “low essentialism” 
condition. 
H7: Those primed with an essentialist view of political identity will display greater affective 
polarization than those primed with a non-essentialist view of political identity.  
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H8: Those primed with an essentialist view of political identity will display greater desire for 
social distance than those primed with a non-essentialist view of political identity. 
Exploratory research questions (Study 2).  
RQ10: To the extent that people display greater affective polarization in the high-essentialism 
condition than in the other two conditions, is this difference primarily driven by increased 
ingroup liking, or by decreased outgroup liking?  
RQ10: Does ideology moderate the effect of political essentialism on affective polarization?  
That is, is the effect of political essentialism on affective polarization stronger for liberal or 
conservative participants?  Or is this effect equivalent across groups? 
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CHAPTER THREE 
STUDY ONE: A CROSS-SECTIONAL APPROACH 
 This chapter presents the methodology and results from Study 1. In this study, political 
essentialism is considered both as a unitary construct and as a collection of related constructs. 
Factor analysis is also performed on the political essentialism scale. The chapter is divided into 
five sections: 1) methods; 2) descriptive statistics; 3) results concerning political essentialism as 
a unitary construct; 4) results considering essentialism as a multi-faceted construct; 5) 
discussion.  
Methods 
Design and participants. Study 1 used a cross-sectional design, with the level of 
political essentialism as a measured, continuous, between-subjects factor. The primary dependent 
variables are affective polarization and desire for social distance. Affective polarization is 
measured using a difference score (ingroup – outgroup thermometer rating; see Iyengar et al., 
2012) in some analyses, and as repeated measure in others. Desire for social distance is measured 
with a three-item scale assessing participants’ discomfort with interacting with people of 
opposing ideologies.  
Power analysis suggested that 377 participants would be needed in order to detect a small 
correlation (R = .15) with 90% power. I therefore set a sampling goal of 420 (377*110%, 
rounded up to nearest 10), to account for the potential need to drop subjects. 
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Participants were Amazon Mechanical Turk (“MTurk”) workers. MTurk is an online 
platform that allows people to complete tasks, including surveys, for money. MTurk workers, 
while not truly nationally representative, are more representative of the United States than are  
traditional  college student samples (Huff & Tingley, 2015). Furthermore, MTurk workers have 
been demonstrated to be an appropriate sample for studying political variables: liberals and 
conservatives recruited on MTurk appeared to have nearly identical political values and 
rmotivations as liberals and conservatives in nationally-representative samples (Clifford, Jewell, 
& Waggoner, 2015).  
MTurk workers were recruited via TurkPrime. TurkPrime interacts with MTurk, and 
screens participants based upon various demographic characteristics, including ideology. To do 
this, TurkPrime intermittently surveys MTurk workers about their demographic characteristics. 
After responding consistently (twice or more) that they are “liberal” or “conservative,” 
TurkPrime identifies them as such for purposes of later recruiting (hereafter referred to as 
“TurkPrime-identified liberals” and “TurkPrime-identified Conservatives”). On the basis of this 
pre-screening, I posted one study which allowed only TurkPrime-identified conservatives to 
participate, and one that allowed only TurkPrime-identified liberals to participate.    
TurkPrime also allows requesters to select certain additional attributes they would like 
participants to have. I employed two such criteria. The first is that the worker should be a US 
resident. This helps ensure that the study, which focuses on US politics and US political identity, 
is relevant to the participants, and that they are somewhat familiar with the concepts presented. 
The second criteria will be that workers have a 95% “success rate” on previous tasks. Selecting 
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only such “high reputation” workers helps ensure high-quality data, without the need to utilize 
attention check questions (Peer, Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 2014).  
Two-hundred ten participants of each ideology were requested, for a total of 420. Data 
collection for both groups occurred simultaneously in January, 2018. Informal pre-testing 
suggested the study would take about 12 minutes to complete, on average. Workers were each 
paid $1.25 for participation.  
Materials. The measures employed by the proposed study are clustered into the 
following categories: primary variable (political essentialism scale); proposed antecedents 
(open-minded cognition; intergroup contact); proposed consequences (inter-ideological affect; 
desire for social distance, political participation); and potential political correlates (ideology, 
political extremity, political interest, political news consumption, disgust sensitivity).  
Political essentialism scale (“PE”). Political essentialism is a measured with a 20-item 
self-report measure (the “political essentialism scale”), see Appendix A. The scale is inspired by 
several existing scales (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Keller, 2005; Rangel & Keller, 2011; No et al., 
2008; Suhay et al., 2016), and also includes some completely newly written items. It is designed 
to distinctly assess the four measurable features of essentialism proposed by Bastian and Haslam 
(2006): immutability (Levy et al., 1998), discreteness, informativeness, and biological basis. 
While research has been varied in what is regarded as the observable facets or factors of 
essentialist beliefs, these four dimensions encompass many of these concepts (e.g., belief in 
genetic determinism can be regarded as a type of “biological basis” belief). This set of four 
features has also been widely used in research relevant to essentialism and intergroup attitudes 
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(Bastian & Haslam, 2006, 2007, 2008; Demoulin, Leyens, & Yzerbyt, 2006; Delgado-Acosta, 
Betancor, Rodriguez-Perez, & Delgado, 2016).  
While drawing inspiration from previous scales, the political essentialism scale departs from 
the items used by Bastian and Haslam (2006) and Levy et al. (1998) in several important ways. 
The aim of the political essentialism scale, following Suhay et al. (2016) was to focus on 
essentialism about political identity specifically. Given that essentialism regarding different 
categories has different implications (e.g., essentializing about homosexuality vs. race; Jayarante 
et al., 2006), it is important to specifically measure essentialist beliefs about political identity.  
 Another unique feature of the political essentialism scale is that it was designed to 
contain five subscales: the four features noted above (Bastian & Haslam, 2006), as well as 
assesses belief in social determinism (Rangel & Keller, 2011). This potential variant of 
essentialism was proposed more recently than Bastian and Haslam’s (2006) scale, so it was not 
assessed in any previous overall essentialism scales. Therefore, the political essentialism scale 
measures beliefs about discreteness, immutability, informativeness, biological basis, and social 
determinism. While multi-faceted, the scale was designed to be relatively brief. Bastian and 
Levy’s (2006) scale contained 32 items; and the belief in social determinism scale (2011) 
consists of 12 items. Rather than maintain this total volume of items (44), I restricted the total 
number to 20: four items per subscale.  
A related goal was for each scale item to be primarily referent to only one feature of 
essentialism only. Some items used in previous research were “double-barreled.”  For example, 
the item “Race does not have an inherent biological basis, and thus can be changed” (No et al., 
2008) simultaneously refers to both biological basis and immutability. The new items were 
52 
 
 
written with the intention of explicitly referring to one of the five concepts only. This may allow 
a better statistical test of the unique contributions of biology beliefs vs. immutability beliefs.  
Care was also taken to select terminology that would be familiar to the majority of 
participants. Some previous essentialism scale items used rather advanced terminology (Suhay, 
2017, personal communication). For example, “Political beliefs are fluid, malleable constructs” 
(emphasis added; No et al., 2008; Suhay et al., 2016); “It is hard, if not impossible to change the 
dispositions of a person’s political beliefs” (emphasis added; No et al., 2008; Suhay et al., 2016). 
Items were written to avoid such academic terms.  
This scale possesses an equal number of items that are “pro-essentialist” (e.g., “A 
person’s political views can tell you a lot about the kind of person they are”) and “anti-
essentialist” (e.g., “A person’s genetics don’t influence their political ideology”). This helps 
control for the effect of acquiescence bias – the tendency to simply agree with all items. 
Outcome variables.  
Affective polarization (“AP”). Following a large body of research based on ANES and 
Pew data, affective polarization is measured using thermometer ratings of the political ingroup 
and political outgroup (i.e., liberals and conservatives; Hetherington, 2001; Iyengar et al., 2012; 
Iyengar, 2016). This consists of a scale of how “warm or cold” one feels toward the target group 
(on a scale from 0 to 100), with a neutral midpoint (50). For some analyses, a simple difference 
score will be used (political ingroup rating minus political outgroup rating). This allows for 
hypothesis testing via straightforward correlation and regression procedures. For other analyses, 
a repeat-measures design will be used (ingroup vs. outgroup evaluation as a within-subject 
factor), which will help differentiate unique effects on ingroup ratings vs. outgroup ratings.  
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Desire for social distance (“DSD”). Desire for social distance will be measured using 
three items borrowed from previous research. These tap several distinct types of social distance 
(living preferences, family preferences, and social interaction preferences). The items include 
(see Appendix A for response scales and other details), “In deciding where to live, how 
important would it be to you to live in a place where most people held political views similar to 
your own?” (see Pew, 2014; Suhay et al., 2016); “How do you think you would react if a 
member of your immediate family told you they were going to marry a [liberal/conservative 
(opposing ideology to participant)]?  Would you be generally happy about this, generally 
unhappy, or wouldn’t it matter to you at all?” (see Pew, 2014); “I would like to meet and get to 
know people with political beliefs different from my own” (adapted from Suhay et al., 2016 and 
Williams & Eberhardt, 2008).  
Proposed antecedents.  
Open-Minded Cognition. Open-minded cognition is measured using the six-item General 
Open-minded Cognition Scale (Price et al., 2015). See Appendix A.  
Past intergroup contact. Past intergroup contact quantity and quality (labelled “past” to 
distinguish it from “desire for social distance”) is assessed with a measure partially adapted from 
Brown et al. (2007). See Appendix A for the full wording of this measure. Participants were 
asked to estimate the percentage of their social contacts who are liberal, conservative, and 
moderate/other/unsure. Those who report more than 0% are from the opposing ideology were 
also asked four additional questions to assess quality of their closest intergroup relationship: how 
positive, close, equal, and cooperative the relationship is. This reflects methods employed by 
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Brown et al. (2007), and furthermore assesses positive vs. negative contact (Barlow et al., 2012; 
Graf et al., 2014).  
 Political correlates.  
Political interest (PI). Political interest was measured by a single item: “In general, how 
interested are you in politics and public affairs?” [1 = not at all interested to 7 = extremely 
interested] (adapted from Homola et al., 2016) 
 Political news consumption (PN). Participants were asked to report how frequently they 
watch, listen to, or read political news. The full text of this measure is available in Appendix A.  
 Selective news consumption (SN). An additional question asked the participant to select 
all of the sources they had gotten political news from in the past week (see the scale computation 
section for how this item was constructed to reflect selective news consumption). The news 
sources chosen to be included in this scale were selected by reviewing survey research from Pew 
(2015) that identified sources strongly preferred by liberals and conservatives. Only sources that 
were clearly identifiable as clearly liberal-congenial, conservative-congenial, and 
moderate/mixed were chosen. Furthermore, only sources that Pew identified as familiar to a 
majority of people were included.  
 Disgust sensitivity (DS). Following Aaroe, Petersen, and Arceneaux (2017), disgust 
sensitivity was measured with the 7-tem pathogen sensitivity subscale of the disgust scale 
(Tybur, Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009).   
 Ideology. Ideology is measured on a 7-point scale from 1 (very conservative) to 7 (very 
liberal).  
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 Ideological extremity. Extremity is measured by subtracting 4 from ideology scores, and 
then taking the absolute value of this score (e.g., 1, representing “very conservative”, will 
become a 4). Extremity will therefore be measured on a 0 to 3 scale.  
 Partisan identity. Partisanship was measured via several items, reflecting ANES (e.g., 
ANES, 2016) methods. In the first question participants will be asked whether they identify as 
Democrat, Republican, Independent, or Something Else. If they selected Democrat (or 
Republican), they were asked how strongly they identify as a Democrat (or Republican). If they 
select “Independent” or “something else,” they were asked to report whether they lean towards 
the Democrat or Republican Party, or neither. Thus, a 7-point scale was constructed that ranged 
from “Strong Democrat” on the low end, to “Strong Republican” on the high end.  
 Demographics. Demographic measures assessed, racial identity, gender identity, 
geographic region, education level, income level, age (year born), religious identity, and degree 
of religiosity (see Appendix A for precise wording). 
Procedure. 
 Participants encountered the study online, listed on MTurk’s platform as “social attitudes 
study.”  After choosing to participate in the study, they were provided a link to the survey, hosted 
on SurveyGizmo.com. Via SurveyGizmo, they completed the following steps: 
1. Complete the political essentialism scale 
2. Complete the thermometer ratings (measure of affective polarization) 
3. Complete the preferred social distance measure 
4. Complete the past intergroup contact measures 
5. Complete the open-minded cognition measure 
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6. Complete political questionnaire (political interest, political news consumption, and 
political participation ratings) 
7. Complete the disgust sensitivity measure    
8. Complete demographic questionnaire  
The survey program randomized the placement of the political essentialism scale, either 
before or after measuring the dependent ratings (steps 2 and 3 above). This was to help address 
the concern that the dependent variables may be influenced by having first completed the 
Political Essentialism scale (or vice versa). The survey program tracked what order participants 
saw the pages in, so that this potential order factor could be controlled for.  
Median study completion time was 11.5 minutes (predicted to be 12 minutes).  
Results: Preliminary and Descriptive Analyses 
Data filtering. A total of 434 participants began the survey. Fourteen exited the survey 
before completing the demographic measures (including the ideology measure) and were thus 
dropped. Therefore, 420 participants completed the survey: 210 TurkPrime-identified 
conservatives and 210 TurkPrime-identified liberals.  
Among the TurkPrime-Identified conservatives, 179 described themselves as 
conservative in the demographic section of the present study; 13 described themselves as 
moderate, and 18 described themselves as liberal. Among the TurkPrime-identified liberals, 195 
identified as liberal, 8 identified as moderate, and 7 identified as conservative in the demographic 
section. Those who indicated an ideological identity in the demographics section opposite to 
their TurkPrime-identified ideology were dropped (i.e., those who TurkPrime screened as 
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conservative, but identified themselves as liberal, and vice versa). However, I retained moderates 
–those who selected the midpoint of the ideology scale1.  
Furthermore, participants were dropped for missing data on any of the most central 
measures: the political essentialism measure, the dependent measures, or any of the controls for 
primary regression analyses. The final N for all main analyses is 385: 187 conservatives and 198 
liberals.  
Demographics. 49.1% of participants were female, 55.4% had a bachelor’s degree or 
higher level of education, and the median age was 35. 50.4% were Democrat-identified, 43.6% 
Republican, and 6.0% reported an independent or “other” party identification. Full demographics 
are provided in Table 1. 
Table 1. Study 1 Demographics 
 Full sample Liberals Conservatives 
N 385 198 187 
Party Democrat: 50.4%  
Republican: 43.6% 
Other/Independent: 6.0% 
Democrat: 92.4% 
Republican: 6.1% 
Other/Independent: 5.9% 
Democrat: 5.9% 
Republican:  88.2% 
Other/Independent: 5.9% 
Age Mean = 37.56 
(SD=11.06) 
Median = 35.00 
Mean = 36.1 
(SD=10.81); Median = 
33.5 
Mean =  39.11 
(SD=11.15) 
Median = 36.0 
Gender Male: 50.6% 
Female: 49.1% 
Other/Non-binary: 0.3% 
Male: 51.5% 
Female: 48.0% 
Non-binary: 0.5% 
Male: 49.7% 
Female: 50.3% 
Non-binary: 0 
Income Under $40,000: 34.6%  
$40,000 - $99,000: 
49.9% 
$100,000 or greater: 
15.6% 
Under $40,000: 40.9% 
$40,000 - $99,000: 
46.5% 
$100,000 or greater: 
12.6% 
Under $40,000: 27.9% 
$40,000 - $99,000: 
53.5% 
$100,000 or greater: 
18.8% 
Education Some HS or HS degree: Some HS or HS degree: Some HS or HS degree: 
                                                          
1 Such participants consistently identified themselves to TurkPrime as liberal or conservative on two or 
more occasions, and only selected the scale mid-point in the present study. Therefore the majority of 
evidence suggest they possess a liberal or conservative identity, and thus were not dropped.  
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12.2% 
Some college or 2 year 
degree: 32.5% 
4 year degree: 41.6% 
Graduate/Professional 
degree: 13.8% 
9.1% 
Some college or 2 year 
degree: 33.3% 
4 year degree: 47.5% 
Graduate/Professional 
degree: 10.1 
15.5% 
Some college or 2 year 
degree: 31.5% 
4 year degree: 35.3% 
Graduate/Professional 
degree: 17.6% 
Race White: 76.1% 
Black: 9.1% 
Hispanic: 6.0% 
Asian: 5.7% 
All other: 2.4% 
White: 73.2% 
Black: 8.6% 
Hispanic: 7.6% 
Asian: 7.1% 
All other: 3.5% 
White: 79.1% 
Black: 9.6% 
Hispanic: 4.3% 
Asian: 4.3% 
All other: 2.6% 
Religion Atheist/Agnostic/Nothing 
in particular: 37.2% 
Catholic: 19.2% 
Protestant (Evangelical): 
14.0% 
Protestant (Non-
evangelical): 11.4% 
Spiritual, but not 
religious: 8.3% 
Jewish: 2.1% 
All other: 7.8% 
Atheist/Agnostic/Nothing 
in particular: 58.6% 
Catholic: 14.6% 
Protestant (Evangelical): 
1.5% 
Protestant (Non-
evangelical): 9.1% 
Spiritual, but not 
religious: 9.1% 
Jewish: 2.5%  
All other: 6% 
Atheist/Agnostic/Nothing 
in particular: 14.9% 
Catholic: 24.3% 
Protestant (Evangelical): 
27.6% 
Protestant (Non-
evangelical): 14.1% 
Spiritual, but not 
religious: 7.6% 
Jewish: 1.6%  
All other: 10.2% 
Religious 
Importance 
Mean = 4.14 (SD=3.18; 
Scale of 1-9; median = 
3.00) 
Mean = 2.64 (SD=2.51, 
median=1.00) 
Mean = 5.73 (SD = 3.05; 
median = 7.00) 
Urban/ 
Rural 
42.9% live in a medium 
or large city 
23.1% live in a suburb of 
a large city;  
33.5% live in a small 
town or rural 
environment  
(0.5% missing)  
50.0% live in a medium 
or large city 
21.2% live in a suburb of 
a large city;  
28.2% live in a small 
town or rural 
environment  
(0.5% missing) 
35.3% live in a medium 
or large city; 
25.1% live in a suburb of 
a large city; 
39.0% live in a small 
town or rural 
environment  
(0.5% missing) 
 
Variable computation and descriptives. In all cases (except where noted below), scales 
were computed by reverse-coding items where appropriate, then averaging of all relevant items 
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for a composite mean score. A full table of scale descriptives are shown in Table 2, along with 
Cronbach’s α scores where relevant. 
 
Table 2. Primary IV, DV, and antecedent descriptives 
Scale N α Scale range Observed range Mean SD 
Political Essentialism Scale 
(total) 
385 .782 1 to 7 1.70 to 5.85 3.70 0.68 
Political Essentialism Scale 
(item 2 deleted) 
385 .795 1 to 7 1.63 to 5.79 3.65 0.72 
Affective polarization 
(ingroup thermometer 
rating – outgroup 
thermometer rating)  
385 N/A -100 to 100 -37 to 100 49.79 32.84 
Desire for social distance 385 .636 1 to 7 1.33 to 7.00 4.18 1.15 
Intergroup contact quantity 382     N/A 0 to 100 0.00 to 96.00 25.23 19.04 
Intergroup contact quality 358 .809 1 to 7 1.00 to 7.00 4.95 1.26 
Open-minded cognition 379 .857 1 to 7 1.17 to 7.00 5.04 1.17 
 
Dependent variables. Affective polarization was computed by subtracting outgroup 
thermometer scores from ingroup thermometer scores. Confirming Hypothesis 1, participants 
rated their members of their own ideology (M=77.61, SD=18.84) more positively than members 
of the opposing ideology (M=27.82, SD=23.27), Mdiff = 49.79, SD=32.84, t(384)=29.75, p < 
.001. There was no significant difference in ingroup minus outgroup ratings for liberals vs. 
conservatives, t(383) = 1.546, p = .12, though it trended towards being accentuated among 
liberals, Mlib = 52.30 (SDlib = 32.32); Mcon=47.13 (SDcon = 33.27). Figure 1 illustrates the 
breakdown of thermometer ratings by ideology.  
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Figure 1. Thermometer ratings by participant ideology and target group ideology 
 
Desire for social distance was measured by three items, one that measured how important 
it is to the participant to live among people with similar political views (“live”); how happy they 
would be if a family member were to marry someone with views that opposed their own 
(“marry”); and how much they would like to meet and get to know people with opposing views 
(“meet”). The “meet” and “marry” items were reverse scored, so that higher scores on all items 
generally reflect a desire to be distant from political others. The 3-item “Desire for Social 
Distance” scale produced an α of 0.64; with small to moderate item intercorrelations (“Live” and 
“Marry” items” correlate R = .312; “Marry” and “Meet” correlate R = .621; “Live and “Meet” 
correlate R = .219, all Ps <.001). To retain a reasonable number of primary analyses, the three-
item scale will be used, despite having less than optimal reliability (α <.70). The small number of 
items is likely contributing to the α falling below .70 (Field, 2009).  
Independent variable. The overall political essentialism scale possessed good reliability 
(α = 0.78), but “alpha if item deleted” analysis suggest that the overall reliability could be 
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improved by dropping Item 2 (resulting α = 0.80). Subscale analysis strongly confirm that Item 2 
failed to measure the intended construct (see Table 13 more detail on subscales). When included 
in the immutability subscale, the resulting α is 0.48; if this item is dropped, reliability rises to 
0.67. Therefore, in all subsequent analyses, Item 2 is dropped.  
Antecedent variables. Intergroup contact quantity was operationalized as the percent of 
“people you spend time with” indicated as being of the opposing ideology (i.e., “liberals” for 
conservative participants, “conservatives” for liberal participants), ranging from 0 to 100. 
Intergroup contact quality was computed by averaging the ratings for intergroup contact quality 
positivity, closeness, equality, and cooperativeness (α = .809). Only participants who indicated 
knowing at least one person with opposing ideology were asked these questions, so 27 
participants were excluded from this item (N=358). Open-minded cognition was computed by 
reverse-scoring the questions written in the close-minded direction, then averaging the scores to 
all 6 items (α = .857). Descriptives of these scales are provided in Table 2.  
Political correlates. Characteristics of the political correlates are provided in Table 3. 
Overall news consumption and political interest were each measured with a single item. Political 
extremity was calculated by taking the absolute value of the ideology value minus 4, so scores 
range from 0 (most moderate) to 3 (most extreme). Disgust sensitivity (α = .813) was computed 
by calculating the mean of the responses to each item. Political participation was computed by 
summing the total number of forms of political engagement the person participated in (α = .687). 
Vote intention for the Midterm 2018 elections was measured by a single item that ranged from 1 
to 10.  
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Selective news exposure was calculated by subtracting the number of news sources 
selected from the “opposing side” from the number of news sources selected from the “same 
side,” and dividing this number by the total number of news sources selected. Therefore, the 
scale ranged from -1 (selected only “opposing” new sources); to 0 (selected an equal number of 
opposing and same-side sources; or only “moderate” sources); to +1 (selected only “same side” 
news sources). For example, a liberal participant who selected NPR (liberal source), MSNBC 
(liberal source), USA Today (neutral source) and Fox News (conservative source) would receive 
a score of (2-1)/4 = 0.25. Those who selected 0 news sources (N=80 individuals) did not receive 
a score on this variable (final N for analyses including this variable = 305). These individuals 
were counted as “missing” rather than “0,” as it is quite possible they consume news from 
sources not listed; but there is no way to estimate the selectivity of those sources. 
Table 3. Descriptives for political correlates 
Scale N Scale Range Observed Range Mean SD 
Political interest 385 1 to 5 1.0 to 5.0 3.184 1.099 
Frequency of news 
consumption 
383 1 to 8 1.0 to 8.0 6.345 1.420 
Selective news 
exposure* 
305 -1 to 1 -1.0 to 1.0 0.401 0.5288 
Political extremity 385 0 to 3 0.0 to 3.0 1.907 0.8207 
Disgust sensitivity 378 1 to 5 1.0 to 5.0 3.468 0.733 
Political 
participation (total) 
377 0 to 7 0.0 to 7.0 1.714 1.4523 
Vote intention 2018 384 0 to 10 0.0 to 10.0 7.693 2.8577 
Ideology 385 1 to 7 1.0 to 7.0 3.808 2.069 
Party 385 1 to 7 1.0 to 7.0 3.784 2.312 
*Participants who did not select any of the news sources listed were coded as missing for this 
variable 
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Results Concerning Political Essentialism as a Unitary Construct 
 
Bivariate correlation analysis. As illustrated in Table 4, there is a positive correlation 
between political essentialism and degree of affective polarization. There is also a positive 
correlation between political essentialism and a desire for social distance. These correlations 
provide preliminary evidence for Hypothesis 2.  
Relevant to Hypothesis 4, intergroup contact quality, and to a lesser extent, quantity, are 
both negatively related to political essentialism. Quantity and quality are also both negatively 
associated with both dependent measures. Similarly, supporting Hypothesis 5, open-minded 
cognition (OMC) relates negatively to political essentialism,  as well as both dependent 
measures.  
Table 4. Correlations among essentialism, antecedent variables, and dependent variables 
 
Variables 
 
ESS 
 
AP 
 
DSD 
 
IC Quant 
 
IC Qual 
 
OMC 
Political Essentialism (ESS) 1 .31** .46**   -.13* -.32***   -.42** 
Affective Polarization (AP)   1 .56**    -.22** -.18***   -.18** 
Desire for Social Distance 
(DSD) 
  1  -.24** -.42***   -.39** 
Intergroup Contact Quantity     1   .16** .16** 
Intergroup Contact Quality     1   .22*** 
Open-Minded Cognition (OMC)      1 
       
*Correlation is significant at the p < .05 level 
**Correlation is significant at the p < .01 level 
Ns range from 382 to 385, due to occasional missing data, except for correlations with IC Quality 
(N=358) for which there was additional missing data due to lack of cross-ideological 
relationships 
 
 Research Questions 7 and 9 concerned additional explorations of past intergroup contact 
quality and quantity: whether the two variables interact to predict outcomes; and whether these 
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two variables predict political participation. Regression analyses addressing these two questions 
are addressed in Appendix C.  
Table 5 illustrates the relationship between the overall essentialism scale, the dependent 
variables, and potential political covariates. Political extremity is positively correlated with both 
dependent variables and with political essentialism. Interestingly, political interest is completely 
uncorrelated with either dependent variable. Frequency of watching political news overall was 
positively correlated with affective polarization and desire for social distance but was 
uncorrelated with essentialism. However, selective news exposure was positively associated with 
the outcome measures and essentialism. Disgust sensitivity was not correlated with either 
outcome measure, but it was positively correlated with political essentialism2.  
Table 5. Correlations between essentialism, affective polarization, and potential political 
correlates  
*p < .05; ** p < .01 
                                                          
2 Additional regression analyses were run to test the possibility that ideology moderates the relationship between 
disgust and interideological attitudes, as prior research suggests disgust may motivate conservatives attitudes 
towards liberal activists (Crawford et al., 2014). However, no interaction between ideology and disgust was found, 
whether predicting affective polarization, desire for social distance, or essentialism. These analyses are presented in 
Appendix C.   
 
Variables 
 
ESS 
 
AP 
 
DSD 
 
Extremity 
 
Interest 
 
News 
freq. 
 
Selective 
news 
(N = 305) 
 
Disgust 
Sens. 
(N = 378) 
ESS 1 .31** .46** .19** .01 -.03 .15* .20** 
AP  1 .56** .54** .05 .27** .28** .03 
DSD   1 .42** .08 .22** .23** .09 
Extremity     1 .18** .30** .20** -.00 
Interest     1 .09 .22** -.08 
News Freq.      1 .25** -.10* 
Selective     
news  
      1 -.18** 
Disgust Sens.        1 
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Based on these bivariate relationships, subsequent analyses will test whether the influence of 
extremity, political news frequency, and/or news selectivity on the dependent variables is 
mediated by essentialism beliefs. 
Regression analyses.  Regression analyses are used to confirm the bivariate correlational 
results, to demonstrate unique effects after controlling for other factors, and to allow for 
moderation analyses. In the following analyses, the essentialism scale is entered as the primary 
independent variable. Two dependent variables are also measured: affective polarization and 
desire for social distance. Results are displayed both with and without controls included.  
 Please note that for all regression analyses, unstandardized regression coefficients (B) 
and standard errors (SE) are reported in tables. However, when discussing results in-text, 
standardized regression coefficients (β) are used.  
Preliminary correlational analyses were run to determine which variables to include as 
controls in the main regression analyses. To balance both parsimony and consistency across 
analyses, any variable that significantly covaried with one or both dependent variables is retained 
in as a control in all regression analysis. Preliminary analyses revealed that White (M = 53.26, 
SD = 31.78) and Hispanic/Latinx (M = 54.04, SD = 29.27) participants expressed greater 
affective polarization than did Black/African American (M = 30.26, SD = 38.10), Asian (M = 
44.41, SD = 29.0) and other race participants (M = 23.58, SD = 24.69). Therefore, to maximize 
the  variance controlled for, while remaining parsimonious, race was coded as 0=White and 
Hispanic, 1=all other races.  
As illustrated in Table 6, affective polarization was significantly correlated with age 
(higher for older people), gender (higher for women), race (higher for White and Hispanic 
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respondents), party (higher for Democrats) and order (higher among those who responded to the 
thermometer rating before completing the essentialism scale). Desire for social distance was 
associated significantly with age (lower among older people), religiosity (higher among the less 
religious), race (higher for White and Hispanic respondents), ideology (higher for liberals), and 
party (higher for Democrats). There was no association between education and income and either 
dependent variable. Therefore, all subsequent analysis described as being run “with controls” 
contain the same set of seven control variables: ideology, party, order, gender, race, age and 
religiosity. All of these variables were centered so that 0=the true scale midpoint (for ideology 
and party); 0=the sample mean (age, religiosity); 0=the hypothetical midpoint between 
dichotomous values (gender, race, order).  
Table 6. Pearson correlations between proposed control variables and dependent variables 
 Affective  
Polarization 
Desire for 
Social 
Distance 
Age .103* -.105* 
Education+ .031 .006 
Income+ 
Religiosity 
.053 
0.066 
-.038 
-.126* 
Gender -.120* -.074 
Race -.230*** -.130* 
Order -.140** -.089 
Ideology -.083 -.163** 
Party -.105* .146** 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05  
+Relationships with Education and Income were tested using Spearman Rank Order correlation.  
Race is coded as 1=Black, Asian or Other; -1=White or Hispanic. Gender was coded 1=male/other; -
1=female. Ideology is scored as higher=more conservative; party is scored as higher= more Republican-
identified. Order was coded such that 1=Essentialism scale measured first, -1=DVs were measured first. 
 
Regression analyses: predicting affective polarization. Results are displayed in Table 7. 
As Model 1 illustrates, without controls entered, the overall essentialism scale significantly 
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predicts degree of affective polarization, β = .311, p < .001. As shown in Model 2, entering 
control variables does not eliminate the effect of essentialism, β = .306, p < .001. Nevertheless, 
some controls continued to be uniquely associated with the outcome measure. Race was 
associated with affective polarization, confirming that Whites and Hispanics (M = 53.32, SD = 
31.56) display higher affective polarization than do members of other racial groups (M = 33.61, 
SD = 33.95). A significant order effect emerged, such that respondents who completed the 
essentialism scale before filling out the dependent measure expressed less affective polarization 
than those who responded to the dependent measure first. Gender related to degree of affective 
polarization, such that men expressed less affective polarization than women did (Mmale = 45.98, 
SDmale = 32.87; Mfemale = 53.81, SDfemale = 32.48). Age was a weaker predictor, suggesting that 
older people express more affective polarization than younger people do. 
Two models were run testing for possible interactions. The centered, normalized ideology 
and essentialism measures were multiplied to create an interaction term. As shown in Table 7, 
Model 3, this interaction term was not significant, β =.001, p = .98. Therefore, essentialism 
beliefs do not appear to influence affective polarization differentially for liberals versus 
conservatives.  
Table 7. Regression models predicting affective polarization 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 B  (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Essentialism 10.22** (1.60) 10.22** (1.55) 10.04** (1.56) 10.02** (1.55) 
Ideology   0.846 (3.34) 0.85 (3.35) 0.97 (3.35) 
Party   -4.00 (3.15) -4.01 (3.16) -4.07 (3.15) 
Order   -9.32** (3.07) -9.32** (3.07) -9.33** (3.07) 
Gender   -7.02* (3.11) -7.02* (3.11) -6.78* (3.12) 
Race   -16.55** (4.14) -16.55** (4.15) -16.66** (4.15) 
Age   3.51* (1.60) 3.51* (1.60) 3.41* (1.60) 
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Religiosity   -.105 (1.82) -.104 (1.83) -.087 (1.83) 
Ideology X       
Essentialism 
  
  .048 (1.52)   
Order X 
Essentialism 
  
    -2.569 (3.07) 
Constant 49.79** (1.59) 44.24** (5.48) 44.07** (2.04) 44.07** (2.04) 
N 385 385 385 385 
Adjusted R2 .097 .177 .175 .177 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
Race is coded as 1=Black, Asian or Other; -1=White or Hispanic. Gender was coded 1=male/other;           
-1=female. Ideology is scored as higher=more conservative; party is scored as higher= more Republican-
identified. Order was coded such that 1=Essentialism scale measured first, -1=DVs were measured first. 
 
An additional model tested whether the order factor interacted with essentialism to 
predict affective polarization. A centered term for order was computed, such that -0.5 = 
dependent measures were completed first, and +0.5 = essentialism measure was completed first. 
This term was multiplied with the centered normalized essentialism score to form an interaction 
term. As shown in Model 4, this interaction was also nonsignificant, β = -.039, p = .40. 
Therefore, while order influenced scores on the dependent measure, this effect was not 
moderated by scores on the essentialism scale. People both high and low in essentialism 
similarly reported reduced affective polarization if they completed the essentialism scale first.  
Regression analyses: predicting desire for social distance. A similar set of regression 
models tested the effect of the overall essentialism scale on desire for social distance. Results are 
displayed in Table 8. The overall essentialism scale significantly predicted desire for social 
distance, β = .464, p < .001. As shown in Model 2, adding in controls did not eliminate the effect 
of essentialism on desired social distance, β =.451, p < .001. Race and gender influenced desire 
for social distance in the same direction as they influenced polarization, but no other controls 
were significant in this model. 
69 
 
 
Model 3 illustrates that there is no interaction between ideology and essentialism in 
predicting desired social distance, β = .037, p = .412. As shown in Model 4, there is also no 
interaction between essentialism and order effects in predicting desired social distance, β = 
0.033, p = .45.  
Table 8. Regression models predicting desire for social distance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 B  (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Essentialism 0.53** (0.05) 0.52** (0.05) 0.52** (0.05) 0.52** (0.05) 
Ideology   -0.18 (0.11) -0.18 (0.11) -0.18 (0.11) 
Party   0.06 (0.11) 0.06 (0.11) 0.06 (0.11) 
Order   -0.19 (0.10) -0.20 (0.10) -0.20 (0.10) 
Gender   -0.22* (0.10) -0.22* (0.10) -0.22* (0.10) 
Race   -0.29* (0.14) -0.29* (0.14) -0.29* (0.14) 
Age   -0.07 (0.05) -0.07 (0.05) -0.07 (0.05) 
Religiosity   -0.06 (0.06) -0.06 (0.06) -0.06 (0.06) 
Ideology X 
Essentialism 
    0.04 (0.05)   
Order X 
Essentialism 
      0.08 (0.10) 
Constant 4.18** (0.05) 4.07** (0.07) 4.07** (.07) 4.07** (.07) 
N 385 385 385 385 
Adjusted R2 .214 .252 .251 .251 
*p < .05; **p < .01.  
Race is coded as 1=Black, Asian or Other; -1=White or Hispanic. Gender was coded 1=male/other; -
1=female. Ideology is scored as higher=more conservative; party is scored as higher= more Republican-
identified. Order was coded such that 1=Essentialism scale measured first, -1=DVs were measured first. 
 
Mixed general linear model analysis. For analyses involving affective polarization up 
until this point, a difference score has been used: ratings of the ingroup minus ratings of the 
outgroup. There is strong evidence that this dependent measure is associated significantly with 
essentialism. However, such a measure of polarization does not differentiate between inflated 
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ingroup evaluation (e.g., essentialist liberals rating liberals more highly), or deflated outgroup 
evaluation (e.g., essentialist liberals rating conservatives more negatively). A generalized linear 
model was used to address this question.  
A general linear model was built with essentialism serving as a continuous, between-
subjects predictor, and ingroup vs. outgroup evaluation as a binary within-subjects predictor. The 
dependent variable is the thermometer rating. This analysis allows at test of the main effect of in 
vs. outgroup ratings, the main effect of essentialism on evaluation (regardless of ingroup vs. 
outgroup), and the interaction between the target group being rated and essentialism. Most 
importantly, it also demonstrates the simple effects of essentialism on ingroup ratings and on 
outgroup ratings independently.  
 There was, unsurprisingly, a huge effect of in vs. outgroup rating on thermometer ratings, 
F(1, 383) = 977.12, p < .001. Consistent with main effects found when using a difference score, 
this effect was moderated by essentialism, F(1, 383) = 41.105, p < .001. Simple effects tests 
revealed that essentialism predicts significantly more positive evaluations of the ingroup, B = 
3.719 (SE = .944), t(376) = 3.939, p < .001. Essentialism also negatively predicts evaluations of 
the outgroup, B =  -6.506 (SE = 1.142), t(376) = -5.697, p < .001. Therefore, essentialism relates 
to both heightened ingroup liking and reduced outgroup liking. As illustrated in Table 9 and 
Figure 2, being one standard deviation low in essentialism relates to an approximate 40-point 
difference between ingroup and outgroup ratings. Being one standard deviation high in 
essentialism relates to an approximate 60-point gap between ingroup and outgroup ratings. 
Table 9. GLM results, predicting Ingroup and Outgroup ratings from levels of essentialism  
 Low 
Essentialism 
(Mean- 1 SD) 
Mean 
Essentialism 
High 
Essentialism 
(Mean + 1SD) 
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   Mean ingroup rating 73.889 77.608 81.327 
Mean outgroup rating 34.327 27.821 21.315 
Difference 39.562 49.787 60.012 
 
 
Figure 2. Predicting ingroup and outgroup ratings from levels of essentialism 
 
 Another GLM analysis was run to determine whether this pattern remained even when 
including the primary controls (ideology, party, order, gender, age, race, religiosity) in the 
model. Controlling for these variables, and each of their interactions with within-subject factor, 
did not eliminate the significant interaction between essentialism and in vs. outgroup ratings, 
F(1, 378) = 41.801, p < .001. Just as in the original analysis without controls, essentialism 
positively predicted ingroup ratings, B = 3.913 (SE = .928), t=4.218, p < .001, and negatively 
predicted outgroup ratings, B =  -6.125 (SE = 1.13), t=-5.433, p < .001. 
Mediation analyses. Correlational analyses suggested that open-minded cognition, inter-
ideological contact quantity, and inter-ideological contact quality all relate both to essentialism 
and to affective polarization (see Table 4). Similarly, two political correlates related to 
essentialism, affective polarization, and desire for social distance on a bivariate label: political 
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extremity and selective news exposure (see Table 5). I performed a series of analyses to test 
whether essentialism functions as a mediator of these six variables’ effects on affective 
polarization and desire for social distance. 
Mediation analysis methods. All of the mediational analyses include all primary controls 
as covariates, controlling for both the effect of the IV on essentialism, and the IV predicting 
affective polarization. For these analyses, the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2017) was used to 
generate 5,000 bootstrapped samples of the dataset. In all cases, a proposed antecedent of 
essentialism (e.g., OMC) was entered as the independent variable, and the total essentialism 
scale was entered as the mediator. The primary controls (party, ideology, order, race, gender, 
age, and religiosity) were entered as covariates. In the first cluster of analysis, affective 
polarization (ingroup minus outgroup ratings on thermometer scale) was entered as the 
dependent variable. In the second, desire for social distance served as the dependent variable. An 
example mediational model is illustrated in Figure 3. In these analyses, significant mediation is 
reported if the 99% confidence interval around the indirect effect does not contain 0. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Example mediation diagram. An example mediation diagram, showing the IV (here, 
Open-Minded Cognition), influencing the mediator (here, and in all cases, political essentialism) 
and the dependent variable (affective polarization). The covariates enter into both the models 
predicting the mediator and the dependent variable. 
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Mediation results. Table 10 summarizes the results of the mediation tests predicting 
affective polarization on thermometer ratings. As the figures in the “A path” column illustrate, 
each variable, with the exception of frequency of news exposure, continued to significantly 
predict essentialism, even when controlling for the primary controls. Scoring high in open-
minded cognition, having a larger proportion of friends who are of an opposing ideology, and 
having a good-quality relationship with a person of opposing ideology all related negatively to 
essentialist beliefs about politics. Conversely, more extreme political identities, and selectively 
attending to congenial news sources relate positively to essentialism.  
As shown in the “B path” column, essentialism consistently continued to significantly 
predict affective polarization, even when controlling for the primary controls and the 
independent variables of interest (see Appendix C for additional analyses regarding essentialism 
as a unique predictor). The “indirect path” for OMC, inter-ideological contact quality, and 
ideological extremity were significant at the p < .01 level, indicating significant mediation. That 
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is, part of the reduced affective polarization predicted by high OMC is “explained” by reduced   
essentialist beliefs (in fact, the relationship between OMC and affective polarization drops to 
non-significance when controlling for essentialist beliefs, see “C’ Path” column). Similarly, the 
direct relationship between intergroup contact quality and affective polarization becomes only 
marginally significant when controlling for essentialism. Intergroup contact quantity follows a 
similar patterns, but the indirect path is not significant at the p < .01 level. 
Ideological extremity’s strong positive relationship with affective polarization is also 
mediated by increased essentialism, but also remains a significant predictor even when 
controlling for essentialism. The full model including extremity, essentialism and controls 
provides a high degree of predictive power, explaining 40.5% of the variance in affective 
polarization. In contrast, while selective news exposure is significantly related to both 
essentialism and affective polarization, essentialism does not serve a significant mediator in this 
relationship. 
Table 11 illustrates a parallel set of analyses, replacing affective polarization with desire 
for social distance as the dependent variable. Results are similar to those predicting affective 
polarization. Here, the effects of intergroup contact quality and open minded cognition are 
mediated by essentialism. In contrast to results predicting affective polarization, intergroup 
contact quantity also is mediated by essentialism. The direct effects of open-minded cognition, 
intergroup contact quality, and quantity all remain significant when controlling for essentialism. 
Among the political correlates, the effect of extremity on desire for social distance is mediated 
via essentialism, but the effect of selective news exposure is not. This mirrors the results when 
predicting affective polarization.  
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Table 10. Mediation results: direct and indirect effects of each variable on affective polarization, controlling for party, ideology, order, 
gender, race, age, and religiosity. Unstandardized regression coefficients are displayed.  
Independent Variable (X) Effect of X on 
essentialism 
(MV) 
 
 
 
(A Path) 
Effect of 
essentialism on 
affective 
polarization, 
while controlling 
for X 
(B Path) 
Direct effect of X 
on affective 
polarization 
(controlling for 
mediator) 
 
(C’ path) 
Indirect effect 
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Indirect effect 
(SE) 
99% confidence 
interval of indirect 
effect 
Open-minded cognition 
(N=379) 
-.264 (.03)** 13.148 (2.42)** -0.963 (1.46) (ns) -3.469 (.72)** -5.5967 -1.8750 
Inter-ideological contact 
quantity 
(N=382) 
-.004 (.002)* 12.866 (2.14)** -0.289 (.079)** -0.054 (.02) -.1358 .0014 
Inter-ideological contact 
quality 
(N=358) 
-.174 (.03)** 12.474 (2.31)** -2.338 (1.31)+ -2.174 (.54)** -3.8772 -.9953 
Selective news exposure 
(N=305) 
.180 (.08)* 13.633 (2.44)** 12.970 (3.51)** 2.458 (1.25) -.4899 6.2089 
Ideological extremity 
(N=385) 
.155 (.04)** 10.179 (1.89)** 19.165 (1.66)** 1.581 (.53)** .4432 3.2454 
+ p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.  
When analyzing effects of this variable, I controlled for “ideology” not with the 7-point scale (confounded w/ extremity) but with a 
binary liberal vs. conservative variable. 
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Table 11. Mediational results: direct and indirect effects of each variable desire for social distance, controlling for party, ideology, 
order, gender, race, age, and religiosity. Unstandardized regression coefficients are displayed. 
+ p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
 When analyzing effects of this variable, I controlled for “ideology” not with the 7-point scale (which is confounded with the 
extremity variable) but with a binary liberal vs. conservative variable. 
 
Independent Variable 
(X) 
Effect of X on 
Essentialism 
(MV) 
 
 
 
(A Path) 
Effect of 
Essentialism on 
desire for social 
distance while 
controlling for X  
 
(B Path) 
Direct effect of 
X on desire for 
social distance 
(Controlling for 
mediator) 
 
(C’ path) 
Indirect effect 
 
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) Indirect effect 
(SE) 
99% confidence 
interval of indirect 
effect 
Open-minded cognition 
(N=379) 
-.264 (.03)** .533 (.08)** -.257 (.05)** -.141 (.03)** -.2143 -.0773 
Inter-ideological contact 
quantity (N=382) 
-.004 (.002)* .692 (.07)** -.010 (.003)** -.003 (.001)** -.0065 -.0001 
Inter-ideological contact 
quality (N=358) 
-.174 (.03)** .567 (.08)** -.252 (.05)** -.099 (.03)** -.1665 -.0452 
Selective news exposure 
(N=305) 
.180 (.08)* .741 (.08)** .255 (.12)* .134 (.07) -.0279 .3151 
Ideological extremity 
(N=385) 
.155 (.04)** .626 (.07)** .449 (.06)** .097 (.03)** .0235 .1804 
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Results Concerning Political Essentialism as a Multi-Faceted Construct 
 
The political essentialism scale was designed to reflect five theoretically distinct facets of 
essentialism: discreteness, immutability, informativeness, social determinism, and biological 
basis. In this section, the attributes of the five theoretically-determined subscales are described, 
and a confirmatory factor analysis is presented showing the fit of the five-subfactor model. Then 
a set of analyses are shown, replicating the main correlation and regression analyses described in 
the previous section, but substituting the five-subscale model for the overall scale.  
Initial descriptives. Table 12 illustrates the properties of the theoretically derived 
essentialism subscales. Subscales ranged in reliability from α=.63 to α=.83. Means varied from 
the low end of the scale (biological basis) to above the midpoint (informativeness). 
Table 12. Descriptives for theoretically determined subscales 
Scale N α Scale range Observed range Mean SD 
Discreteness 385 .675 1 to 7 1.00 to 7.00 4.307 1.169 
Immutability (all 
four items included) 
385 .478 1 to 7 1.00 to 6.25 3.078 0.874 
Immutability (item 2 
deleted) 
385 .665 1 to 7 1.00 to 6.00 2.605 1.069 
Informativeness 385 .785 1 to 7 1.00 to 7.00 4.430 1.260 
Social determinism 385 .626 1 to 7 1.50 to 7.00 4.411 1.063 
Biological basis  385 .833 1 to 7 1.00 to 6.25 2.257 1.232 
 
Confirmatory factor analysis. Before proceeding with subscale analyses, a more 
rigorous test of the implied model was tested using confirmatory factor analysis. The idea that 
the scale is measuring a multi-faceted “political essentialism” construct suggests a certain 
theoretical factor structure of the scale. This is a hierarchical model: five first-order factors 
representing discreteness, immutability, informativeness, social determinism, and biological 
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basis beliefs about politics; and one overarching political essentialism factor which these all 
correspond to (see Figure 4). The confirmatory factor analysis tested whether the present data 
conform well to this theoretical model. 
To maintain consistency across analyses, the factor analyses were performed on the same 
sample used in the main regression analyses (N = 385). Also to maintain consistency, item 2 was 
dropped from factor analyses.  
Analyses were performed using LISREL 9.30. Many scale items displayed either 
significant skew or kurtosis; to control for this non-normality, ML robust estimation was used to 
produce the Satorra-Bentler Scale Chi Square statistic. Each item was allowed to load on its  
 
Figure 4. Proposed hierarchical model for confirmatory factor analysis
 
 
 
 
80 
  
 
single, relevant first-order factor (e.g., Item 1 loaded onto the Discreteness factor). Each first 
order-factor loaded freely onto the one second-order factor (i.e., all five “subscale” factors 
loaded onto the Political Essentialism factor). Goodness of fit statistics are displayed in Table 13 
and Factor loadings for this model are displayed in Table 14.  
Table 13. Confirmatory factor analysis goodness of fit statistics 
Model Satorra-Bentler Scaled 
Chi Square (C3) 
RMSEA SRMR NNFI CFI 
Hierarchical model 47.07, df = 147, p = 1.00 <0.0001 0.133 1.0 1.0 
Hierarchical model 
with Method Factor 
261.833, Df = 146, p <.001 .0455 0.215 0.235 0.336 
 
 
Table 14. Individual loadings onto first order factors 
Item Pro- or anti-
essentialism item 
First-order factor Standardized 
Lambda 
Completely 
standardized 
Lambda 
1 Pro Discreteness 1.053 0.672 
6 Anti Discreteness -1.011 -0.583 
11 Pro Discreteness 1.243 0.670 
16 Anti Discreteness -0.709 -0.485 
7 Anti Immutability 1.503 0.674 
12 Pro Immutability -0.793 -0.696 
17 Anti Immutability 1.032 0.677 
3 Pro Informativeness 1.543 0.899 
8 Anti Informativeness -1.404 -0.679 
13 Pro Informativeness 2.970 0.870 
18 Anti Informativeness -0.522 -0.432 
4 Pro Social determinism 1.189 0.645 
9 Anti Social determinism -0.598 -0.488 
14 Pro Social determinism 1.072 0.713 
19 Anti Social determinism -0.587 -0.410 
5 Pro Biological basis 1.686 0.904 
10 Anti Biological basis -1.383 -0.796 
15 Pro Biological basis 1.626 0.859 
20 Anti Biological basis -2.344 -0.730 
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As shown in Table 14, individual items loaded in predicted fashion onto each factor, e.g., 
the discreteness items worded in an anti-essentialist direction loaded negatively onto the 
discreteness factor. The exception to this overall pattern is with the immutability factor. One of 
the four immutability items, Item 2, was dropped from analysis. This was a pro-immutability 
item. Therefore, two of the three indicators of immutability are anti-essentialist, causing this 
factor to overall stand for anti-immutability beliefs. Therefore, for this factor, the two anti-
immutability items load positively onto the factor, and the single pro-essentialist item loads 
negatively. As demonstrated in Table 15, four of the five subscales load significantly onto the 
overarching factor. Discreteness is most closely tied to the overarching factor, while biological 
basis does not load significantly.  
 Table 15. Gamma loadings onto second order political essentialism factor 
Factor Loading onto Political Essentialism factor 
Discreteness 0.921 (0.18)** 
Immutability -0.498 (0.17)** 
Informativeness 0.79 (0.16)** 
Social determinism 0.32 (0.13)* 
Biological basis 0.088 (0.06)  
*p < .05, **p < .01 
 
Table 16 shows the correlation between the subscale factors, as well as the relationship 
between each subscale and the overarching essentialism factor. Discreteness and informativeness 
are strongly correlated with each other and, confirming the gamma loadings, with the political 
essentialism construct overall (R = .92 for discreteness, R = .79 for informativeness). 
Immutability corresponds negatively with discreteness (R = -.50) and informativeness (R =  -
.39). Though, again, the “immutability” factor should be in fact considered an “anti-
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immutability” factor. These negative correlations should therefore be considered conceptually to 
be positive correlations with the construct of immutability. 
Table 16. Correlations between first order factors and second order factor 
  
The two factors concerning the “etiology” of ideology relate to the overarching political 
essentialism factor more weakly (social determinism, R = .32; biological basis, R = .09). In 
general, social determinism’s relationship to the other factors is stronger, e.g., with discreteness, 
R = .30; and with informativeness, R = .25. Biological basis beliefs’ correlation to other factors 
are all < .10.   
The overall fit of this model was assessed with measures of absolute fit: chi-square, root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and standardized root mean square residual 
(SRMR); and relative fit: non-normed fit index (NNFI), comparative fit index (CFI). The 
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi Square value was nonsignificant, and in fact lower than the number 
of degrees of freedom. Therefore, RMSEA is determined to be 0. The calculated NNFI 
and CFI values were also higher than 1, so are set at a 1. All of these indexes suggest excellent 
fit. In contrast, the SRMR value exceeds 0.08, which is indicative of inadequate fit (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999).  
 PE Dis A-Imm Inf Soc  Bio 
Political Essentialism (PE) 1      
Discreteness (Dis) 0.921 1     
(Anti-)Immutability (A-Imm) -0.498 -0.459 1    
Informativeness (Inf) 0.790 0.728 -0.393 1   
Social determinism (Soc) 0.322 0.297 -0.160 0.254 1  
Biological basis (Bio) 0.088 0.081 -0.044 0.069 0.028 1 
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In sum, confirmatory factor analysis provides some support for the proposed hierarchical 
model. The items load in a sensible and interpretable fashion, and four of the five substantive 
factors do significantly correspond to the overarching essentialism factor. However, while four 
out of five fit statistics support the model (χ2, RMSEA, NNFI, CFI), one clearly does not 
(SRMR). Therefore, it is not possible to completely confirm that this model provides a good 
summary of the data; though there are good indications that it is not far off. 
 Alternate model. Because the primary model resulted in inconclusive fit, an alternate 
confirmatory model was considered. This model accounts for acquiescence bias, which can 
attenuate true inter-item correlations when items are worded in opposing directions (Billiet & 
McClendon, 1998). This model is identical to the one described above, with one exception: a 
sixth first-order “method” factor was included along with the five substantive subscale factors. 
All individual items were required to load equally onto this method factor, while they were 
allowed to load freely onto their relevant substantive subscale factor. The method factor and 
substantive factors were specified to remain uncorrelated.  
 Fit indices suggested that this alternate “Method Factor” model was not an improvement 
over the more parsimonious original model, see Table 13. Relative to the original model, the χ2 
value is inflated and becomes significant, and all other measures of model fit become worse. 
Therefore, this “method factor” approach is not a useful model in this case and is rejected.  
 Summary of CFA results. Confirmatory factor analysis did not definitively confirm the 
5-factor structure of the scale, but provided some evidence that the subscales describe the data 
sufficiently well. The following analyses address the five theoretically proposed subscales. An 
attempt to specify a better model for the data, using exploratory factor analyses, is described in 
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Appendix C. The exploratory factor analysis results essentially produced the same factor solution 
as the confirmatory model, but suggested splitting the “social determinism” factor into two 
separate factors, resulting in a 6-factor solution. This adjustment does not provide a clear 
substantial improvement to understanding the structure of political essentialism. The remainder 
of the present section explores relationships using the originally proposed five factors.  
Bivariate correlation matrix. For purposes of the following analyses (correlation, 
regression, and GLM), essentialism subscale scores were computed by simply averaging the 
responses to each of the four3 items that were intended to measure them. Of course, these 
analyses will yield correlations between subscales that are similar to those derived from the 
confirmatory factor analysis (as in Table 16). The distinction between the approach going 
forward, as opposed to the previous CFA approach, is that all items are now equally-weighted, 
rather than weighted by their respective loadings.  
As shown in Table 17, all subscales are positively correlated with one another, with the 
exception of biological basis beliefs, which only correlate with immutability beliefs. The 
strongest relationship is between the informativeness and discreteness subscales.  
Table 17 also illustrates the relationship between each subscale and outcome measures. 
Contrary to Hypothesis 3, biological basis beliefs are slightly negatively associated with affective 
polarization (R = -.10, p = .04985) and are unrelated to a desire for social distance (R = .03, p = 
.62). Similarly, social deterministic beliefs appear to be unrelated to affective polarization, and 
are only slightly related to desire for social distance (R = .11, p = .04).  
 
                                                          
3 Three, in the case of the immutability subscale.  
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Table 17. Correlations between theoretically proposed subscales and key outcome variables (N = 
385) 
 
Variables 
 
M 
(SD) 
 
Dis. 
 
Imm. 
 
Inf. 
 
Soc. 
 
Bio. 
 
AP 
 
DSD 
Discreteness 4.31 
(1.17) 
1 .33** .57** .14** -.05 .50** .45** 
Immutability 2.61 
(1.07) 
 1 .28** .19** .34** .13* .22** 
Informativeness 4.43 
(1.26) 
  1 .31** .07 .42** .58** 
Social determinism 4.43 
(1.26) 
   1 .07 -.03 .11* 
Biological basis 2.26 
(1.23) 
    1 -.10* .03 
Affective 
polarization 
      1 .56* 
Desire for Social 
distance 
       1 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
 
Discreteness and informativeness beliefs are much more strongly and consistently associated 
with these outcomes. Immutability positively correlates with both outcomes to a smaller degree. 
This provides preliminary support for the other assertion of Hypothesis 3: that subscales aside 
from biological basis will likely explain unique variance in affective polarization.  
 Table 18 illustrates the bivariate relationship between each antecedent variable and the 
essentialism subscales. Intergroup contact quality negatively relates to every facet of the 
essentialism scale, including biological basis beliefs. Intergroup contact quantity relates 
negatively to discreteness, immutability, and informativeness beliefs -- the same subscales that 
are most strongly associated with affective polarization. Open-minded cognition relates 
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negatively to each subscale of the essentialism scale, though not significantly with the social 
determinism element. 
Table 18. Correlations between theoretically proposed essentialism subscales and proposed 
antecedents 
 
Variables 
 
Dis 
 
Imm 
 
Inf 
 
Soc 
 
Bio. 
 
IC 
Quant. 
 
IC 
Qual. 
 
OMC 
Discreteness 1 .33** .57** .14** -.05 -.16** -.19*** -.31** 
Immutability  1 .28** .19** .34** -.13* -.20*** -.38** 
Informativeness   1 .31** .07 -.11* -.32*** -.34** 
Social 
determinism 
   1 .07 -.02 -.16** -.09+ 
Biological basis     1 .02 -.11* -.21** 
Intergroup 
Contact Quantity 
     1 -.16** .02 
Intergroup 
Contact Quality 
      1 .22** 
Open-Minded 
Cognition 
       1 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Regression analyses. In the previous results section (results concerning essentialism as a 
unitary construct), it was revealed that affective polarization and desire for social distance 
significantly are predicted by the overall essentialism scale, both with and without controls. In 
the present section, these regression models are replicated using each of the five theoretically-
derived factors as predictors, rather than the overall scale. Maintaining consistency across 
analyses, the same controls are entered in these models as in the previous analyses.  
Subscales predicting affective polarization. Table 19 displays the regression models 
predicting affective polarization as measured by thermometer ratings. Model 1 shows results 
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predicting affective polarization with each subscale, controlling only for each other subscale. 
Model 2 displays results with controls added.  
Table 19. Regression analysis predicting affective polarization from theoretically proposed 
subscales 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 b  (SE) b (SE) 
Discreteness 10.55** (1.53) 12.30** (1.76) 
Immutability -0.44 (1.52) -0.97 (1.59) 
Informativeness 6.76** (1.42) 7.52** (1.77) 
Social determinism -4.67** (1.40) -4.57** (1.48) 
Bio. determinism -2.27+ (1.24) -1.87 (1.53) 
Ideology   0.84 (3.02) 
Party   -4.79+ (2.75) 
Order   -7.73** (2.75) 
Gender   -0.98 (2.87) 
Race   -14.36 (3.73) 
Age   1.70 (1.44) 
Religiosity   1.89 (1.65) 
Constant 49.79** (1.40) 44.67** (1.83) 
N 385 385 
Adjusted R2 .297 .339 
*p < .05; **p < .01. Race is coded as 1=Black, Asian or Other; -1=White or Hispanic. Gender 
was coded 1=male/other; -1=female. Ideology is scored as higher=more conservative; party is 
scored as higher= more Republican-identified. Order was coded such that 1=Essentialism scale 
measured first, -1=DVs were measured first. 
 
In Model 1, confirming the overall pattern observed in the bivariate correlation matrix, 
discreteness (β = .374, p < .001) and informativeness (β = .229, p < .001) are the strongest 
positive predictors of affective polarization. Social determinism beliefs here are negatively 
related to ideological affective polarization, in contrast to the bivariate level, where these 
variables were uncorrelated to the outcome. Therefore, controlling for each of the other four 
subscales, belief in social determinism appears to attenuate affective polarization. Biological 
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determinism is somewhat negatively associated with affective polarization, a marginally 
significant effect when controlling only for the effect of the other four subscales. Also contrary 
to the first-order bivariate correlation results, immutability has no significant relationship to 
affective polarization. With the inclusion of additional control variables (Model 2), the effect of 
biological determinism becomes non-significant. However, the pattern of significant effects for 
discreteness, informativeness, and social determinism remain.  
Subscales predicting desire for social distance. The overall scale analyses demonstrated 
a relationship between essentialism overall and desire for social distance. Table 20 illustrates the 
unique effects of each subscale. Results are largely similar to those predicting affective 
polarization on thermometer ratings. Focusing on Model 2 (controls included), informativeness 
and discreteness beliefs are consistent positive predictors of desire for social distance. When 
predicting desire for social distance, informativeness (β = .479, p < .001) appears to be a stronger 
predictor than discreteness (β = .167, p < .001). As with affective polarization, social 
determinism relates significantly to reduced scores on the dependent variable. This is contrary to 
the bivariate correlational findings, in which social determinism was weakly positively related to 
desire to social distance. Biological determinism and immutability were both unrelated to the 
outcome variable.  
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Table 20. Regression analysis predicting desire for social distance from theoretically proposed 
subscales 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 b  (SE) b (SE) 
Discreteness 0.180** (.06) 0.192** (.06) 
Immutability 0.058 (.05) 0.055 (.05) 
Informativeness 0.579** (.06) 0.550** (.06) 
Social determinism -0.097+ (.05) -0.119* (.05) 
Bio. determinism -0.016 (.05) -0.002 (.05) 
Ideology   -0.142 (.10) 
Party   0.038 (.10) 
Order   -0.157+ (.09) 
Gender   -0.059 (.10) 
Race   -0.210+ (.13) 
Age   -0.130** (.05) 
Religiosity   -0.010 (.06) 
Constant 4.178** (0.47) 4.099** (0.062) 
N 385 385 
Adjusted R2 .357 .379 
 
Mixed general linear model results. In the previous section, a general linear model was 
built to distinguish the effect of essentialism on ingroup ratings vs. outgroup ratings. Here, an 
identical GLM analysis is run, but testing the effects of each subscale on ingroup vs. outgroup 
ratings. The primary controls, and each of their interactions with the within-subject factor were 
also included. As illustrated in Table 21, discreteness, informativeness, and social determinism 
significantly interacted with in vs. outgroup ratings to predict thermometer scores. Immutability 
and biological basis did not.  
The pattern of simple effects revealed interesting divergent patterns. The discreteness 
subscale behaved similarly to the essentialism scale as a whole: strongly predicting enhanced 
warmth toward the ingroup, and coldness toward the outgroup. The informativeness factor, 
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Table 21. GLM analysis: effect of theoretically proposed essentialism subscales on ingroup and 
outgroup ratings 
Subscale Interaction Effect on ingroup 
ratings 
Effect on outgroup 
ratings 
Discreteness F(1, 372) = 48.742,  
p < .001 
B = 6.469, SE = 1.105,  
t = 5.852, p < .001 
B = -5.828, SE = 1.330, 
t = -4.381, p < .001 
Immutability F(1, 372) = 0.379  
p = .538 
B =  -0.164, SE = .995, 
t = -.164, p = .870 
B = .813 SE = 1.197,  
t = .679, p = .498 
Informativeness F(1, 372) = 18.028,  
p < .001 
B = 1.482, SE = 1.111, 
t=1.334, p = .183 
B = -6.037, SE = 1.338,  
t =    -4.513, p < .001 
Social 
determinism 
F(1, 372) = 9.537,  
p = .002 
B = -3.288, SE=.929,  
t = -3.539, p < .001 
B =  1.284, SE = 1.118, 
t= 1.148, p =.252 
Biological basis F(1, 372) = 1.493,   
p = .223 
B = .668, SE = .960,  
t = .696, p = .487 
B = 2.536, SE=1.155,  
t = 2.196, p = .029 
Results are presented controlling ideology, party, order, gender, race, age, religiosity 
 
however, strongly predicts decreased outgroup ratings, but has no significant effect on ingroup 
ratings. Interestingly, social determinism factor is negatively related to ingroup ratings, contrary 
to the overall essentialism factor; and is unassociated with outgroup ratings. This confirms, and 
further clarifies, the overall negative relationship between social determinism and affective 
polarization (See Table 19). Although there was not a significant interaction between the within-
subject factor and biological basis ratings, there was a notable pattern of simple effects: while it 
was unassociated with ingroup ratings, it was significantly positively associated with outgroup 
ratings. 
Study 1 Discussion 
 Study 1 was a broad, cross-sectional examination of affective polarization, political 
essentialism, and the relationships between these two constructs and other variables. Among the 
five primary hypotheses tested, the data fully supported four of the hypotheses, and partially 
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supported one. This section will review the main hypotheses and research questions posed in this 
study, and summarize the findings related to each.  
The first hypothesis contended that participants would express greater warmth for their 
political ingroup than the political outgroup. This non-controversial postulate was firmly 
supported. Evaluations of the outgroup tended to be cold (approximately 28 on the 0-to-100 
feeling thermometer scale), while ingroup evaluations were, on average, quite warm (78). 
Relevant to Research Question 2, the degree of outgroup preference seems slightly, though non-
significantly, accentuated among liberal participants. However, any trend in this direction is 
erased when controlling for political extremity, (see Tables 45 and 46 in Appendix C). 
Therefore, this finding was likely an artifact of the an extremity effect: liberals in this sample 
were more extreme in their ideology than conservatives.  
 Hypothesis 2 stated that the overall political essentialism scale will be positively 
associated with affective polarization, as well as a desire for social distance from political 
outgroups. This prediction was borne out across correlational and regression analyses, without 
and with controls. In fact, even in the most conservative estimation (controlling for extremity, 
biased news consumption, etc.) essentialism remained a significant unique predictor of both 
outcomes (see Appendix C). Therefore, for separate measures, one of affective reactions (feeling 
thermometer), and one more relevant to intended behaviors (desire for social distance), political 
essentialism appears to provide unique explanatory power. Contrary to the overall trend found in 
Suhay et al. (2016) ideology did not moderate the effect of essentialism on intergroup attitudes: 
among liberals and conservatives alike, heightened essentialism beliefs are associated with 
greater affective polarization and desire for social distance.  
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 The use of theoretically determined subscales allowed a more nuanced evaluation of the 
link between essentialism beliefs and political attitudes. Hypothesis 3 stated that biological basis 
beliefs would relate to increased affective polarization and desire for social distance. Such a 
result would echo the findings Suhay et al. (2016). The present set results suggest, however, that 
this relationship is non-existent. If anything, the opposite relationship is found. On a bivariate 
level, and in some regression analyses (depending on the controls included), biological basis 
beliefs appear to attenuate political affective polarization. They appear to have no effect on 
desire for social distance. 
 Hypothesis 3 also stated that additional dimensions of essentialism, beyond biological 
basis, would explain further variance in affective polarization and desire for social distance. This 
hypothesis was clearly supported; both informativeness and discreteness beliefs consistently 
related to outcomes across analyses. However, immutability tended to only relate on a bivariate 
level with the outcomes; controlling for the other facets tended to render this factor less potent. 
Unexpectedly, the social determinism subscale tended to correspond consistently with reduced 
desire for social distance, and also occasionally with reduced affective polarization. Therefore, 
beliefs about what “causes” ideologies to form (biology, upbringing) may ameliorate, rather than 
exacerbate, affective polarization.  
 The GLM analyses, which teased apart evaluations of ingroup from evaluations of 
outgroup, provided more data on precisely how essentialism beliefs affect affective polarization. 
This produced interesting results that varied by subscale. Discreteness related to both greater 
ingroup liking and reduced outgroup liking. Perceiving conservatives and liberals as truly 
distinct and differentiable “camps” appears to facilitate more extreme attitudes about the ingroup 
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and outgroup alike. Other facets of essentialism only related to one “piece” of the difference 
score each: informativeness decreased, and biological basis increased, warmth toward the 
outgroup. Social determinism had no effect on outgroup ratings, but reduced the degree of 
warmth toward the ingroup. Such interactions were not predicted a priori, but have interesting 
implications that may be explored further (see Chapter 5, General Discussion).  
 Hypotheses Four and Five predicted that intergroup contact quantity, intergroup contact 
quality, and open-minded cognition would all relate to reduced essentialism and reduced 
affective polarization. Correlational and mediational tests largely supported these hypotheses. 
Having a positive, cooperative, high-quality relationship with a member of the opposing 
ideology related to reduced political essentialism along all five dimensions. People who had a 
greater proportion of social contacts who were of the opposing ideology also showed reduced 
discreteness, immutability, and informativeness beliefs. However, no interaction between 
quantity and quality was found; having a large number of opposing-ideology contacts did not 
accentuate the effect of having one high-quality cross-ideology relationship. Open-minded 
cognition also related to reduced endorsement of all subscales except for social determinism. 
Mediational tests suggested that the effects of these variables “flow through” reduced 
essentialism to ultimately reduce affective polarization and desire for social distance (with the 
exception of intergroup contact quantity’s effects on desire for social distance). This all largely 
supports Deeb et al.’s (2011) argument that exposure to outgroup members in a certain category 
reduces essentialist beliefs about that category.  
 Intergroup contact appears to reduce (or at least negatively co-vary with) essentialist 
beliefs and inter-ideological negativity. This corresponds with Mutz’s (2002a) finding that 
94 
  
 
political tolerance is predicted by increased ideological diversity in one’s social network. For the 
most part, Mutz’s (2002b) finding that ideological diversity dampens political participation was 
not replicated in these data (see Appendix C). However, there was a borderline effect in this 
direction: intergroup contact quantity corresponded with a slightly reduced likelihood of 
intending to vote in the 2018 midterm election (p = .057). Especially when given the large 
number of analyses run, a single “marginal effect” should not be interpreted with a great deal of 
excitement; but it does trend in the expected direction.  
 Several political correlates, political news frequency, selective news exposure, and 
political extremity, all correlated positively with affective polarization and desire for social 
distance, confirming Iyengar et al.’s (2012) contention that media exposure can exacerbate 
affective polarization. Selective news exposure and extremity also related to increased 
essentialism. Disgust sensitivity, while unrelated to the dependent measures on a bivariate level, 
did relate positively to essentialism.  
Mediational analyses suggested that ideological extremity’s relationship to affective 
polarization and desire for social distance partially flowed through enhanced essentialism beliefs, 
but selective news exposure’s did not. Therefore, essentialism may not be involved in how media 
exposure influences inter-ideological attitudes.  
 The structure of the political essentialism scale was tested through reliability analysis, 
confirmatory factory analysis, and exploratory factor analysis (see Appendix C). The overall 
essentialism scale, excluding Item 2, cohered well enough according to reliability analysis (α = 
.80), and functioned sufficiently to predict outcomes on relevant variables. Confirmatory factor 
analysis suggested the proposed one-overarching factor, five-subfactor hierarchical model was 
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not an unambiguously good fit for the data, with an SRMR value exceeding .80. On the other 
hand, other fit indices suggested excellent fit, leaving the results of confirmatory factor analysis 
less than clear. The data-driven exploratory factor analysis mostly reproduced the proposed set of 
intercorrelated factors, but suggested eliminating one item, and reconfiguring the social 
determinism factor into two factors (see Appendix C). In all, factor analyses lend some support 
to the theoretical conceptualization of political essentialism, but suggest that the measure could 
be improved. This issue is explored further in the general discussion.  
Finally, it is worth noting that several unpredicted but consistently significant 
demographic covariates emerged. While these were peripheral to the hypotheses, gender, race, 
and age at times significantly predicted affective polarization. Overall, women, White people, 
and Hispanic/Latinx people were most likely to report a high degree of political affective 
polarization and desire for social distance. Older people also reported greater affective 
polarization on thermometer ratings, but reduced desire for social distance. These effects are 
interesting, but should be confirmed with new data (via Study 2) before much speculation. Those 
demographic covariates whose relationship with the outcomes consistently replicate across both 
studies will be of most interest.  
It is notable that there were rather consistent order effects on affective polarization. 
People who responded to the essentialism scale before responding to the DV measures reported 
reduced polarization. This suggests affective polarization is malleable in response to context. 
First considering whether ideological groups are essential categories seems to attenuate affective 
polarization. However, moderation analysis revealed no interaction: agreement vs. disagreement 
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with the overall essentialism scale did not influence the order effect. Therefore, the order effect 
does not appear to be restricted to agreement or disagreement with the essentialism items.  
In sum, this study provided ample basis for the claim that essentialism overall relates to 
accentuated affective polarization and desire for social distance from the political outgroup. It 
also provides some richness in describing which facets of essentialist beliefs are most and least 
associated with polarization, and in what direction. While the mediational analyses statistically 
support a model of precursors (e.g., OMC) causally influencing intergroup attitudes “via” 
essentialism, they cannot strictly establish causation. The results of this study, however 
consistent with that interpretation, leave open possibility that essentialism is a cluster of beliefs 
that tends to either follow, or simply covary with, affective polarization.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
STUDY TWO: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH 
Overview 
 Study 1 established a significant, but correlational, relationship between political 
essentialism and affective polarization. Study 2 is an experiment designed to test whether 
increased essentialism causes increased antipathy. Belief in political essentialism is therefore 
manipulated, rather than measured. This study intentionally includes fewer measures, 
particularly in the “proposed antecedents” category, than Study 1 does. The study entailed asking 
participants to read one of two versions of a fabricated article, adapted from Bernstein et al. 
(2010). The article either endorses an essentialist or non-essentialist view of political identity. 
Participants then rated their attitudes toward liberals and conservatives. Before Study 2 was run, 
a pilot study assessed comprehension of the stimulus materials.  
Study 2 Manipulation and Pilot Study 
 Study 2 manipulates participants’ beliefs in political essentialism by using a pair of 
fabricated news articles. One version of the article declares that political identity is fixed at birth, 
immutable, socially determined, discrete and informative; while the other makes the opposite 
assertions. The bogus articles are adapted from a previous study (Bernstein et al., 2010), which 
was reported to successfully manipulate political essentialism beliefs. 
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 While these materials were effective in Bernstein et al. (2010), a pilot test was run to 
determine if they were still interpretable and useful for the current study. Differences in history 
and sample characteristics may render the manipulation less (or more) effective for the present 
study than it was in the past. Moreover, the materials were edited for the present study. 
Therefore, a pilot study was conducted, checking the manipulation before running Study 2.  
 The Bernstein et al. (2010) materials were edited in the following ways:  
1. The original articles referred primarily to party identification. This has been changed 
to refer primarily to ideological identity (e.g., many instances of the term 
“Republican” has been changed to “conservative.”).  
2. The original article did not explicitly refer to the social determinism concept, and 
only vaguely referred to the informativeness notion. Additional paragraphs have been 
added to more fully reflect the construct measured in Study 1.  
3. The original article had a lengthy portion referring to shared fates within social 
networks (e.g., adverse events that occur to Democrats only negatively affect other 
Democrats). This is somewhat peripheral to the essentialism definition used in the 
present research, so this portion has been reduced.  
4. The original materials used the names of actual political science researchers. To avoid 
misrepresenting the views of real people, the articles were edited to replace 
researchers’ names with made-up names.  
See Appendix B for the full text of the articles. In this pilot study, understanding, rather 
than persuasion, was assessed. That is, participants are asked what the article states, rather than 
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what they themselves believe about essentialism. Asking participants directly about their 
personal beliefs about essentialism immediately following the manipulation may engender 
resistance. That is, participants may be unwilling to readily report agreement with beliefs that 
were directly presented to them. I therefore selected to measure the subtler, and less reactive, 
outcome of whether participants comprehended and could report the contents of the article.  
Pilot study methods. Participants were randomly assigned to read either the 
essentialism-endorsing version of the article (“high essentialism” condition) or the non-
essentialism-endorsing version of the article (“low essentialism” condition). They then answered 
two questions about their opinion of article, then completed five questions that gauged their 
interpretation of the message conveyed in the article. 
 Participants. A large effect of the article on responses was anticipated. Power analysis 
suggested a sample of 33 would be sufficient to detect a medium-to-large effect with 95% power. 
I set a sampling goal of 50, to ensure power would remain high, after dropping incomplete 
subjects and/or random assignment resulting in unequal assignment to condition.  
 Participants were first recruited from an undergraduate student participant pool (N = 16). 
Because an insufficient number of students participated before the end of the semester, the 
remainder of the sample was recruited via MTurk. 34 participants were requested via MTurk; 37 
began the study, and 35 completed the key dependent variable outcomes. Four participants 
indicated they did not live in the United States. Therefore, the total sample from MTurk was 31, 
and the overall sample total was 47.   
 Procedure and materials. Participants arrived at the study, hosted on SurveyGizmo, via 
the online undergraduate participant pool portal (“SONA”), or via the MTurk platform. The 
100 
 
study was presented as an assignment to “Read and rate an article.” An instructions page 
informed participants that they would be reading an article that was adapted from the popular 
press, and that they would rate its appropriateness for a high school audience (see Appendix B). 
They then proceeded to the next page, which contained the article text. Via random assignment 
programmed by SurveyGizmo, the participants were either presented with the high- or low-
essentialism version of the article. Following this, participants were asked two questions relevant 
to the cover story (e.g., 11th graders would likely find this article…”, scale of 1=boring to 
7=interesting). Next, five questions measured whether participants understood the essentialism-
related arguments in the article (e.g., “according to the researchers described in the article, 
political beliefs are…” 5-point scale from “are not changeable” to “are changeable”). Finally, 
participants completed a demographics section and were shown a debriefing form.  
Undergraduate participant pool participants received 1 credit hour for their participation. 
MTurk workers received $0.75. Data collection occurred between November 2017 and January 
2018. 
 Pilot study results. Demographics are summarized in Table 22. Because, unlike in Study 
1, no effort was made to collect an ideologically balanced sample, the sample skews liberal (64% 
liberals vs. 17% conservatives) and Democratic (55% Democrats vs. 13% Republicans). This 
reflects the left-leaning tendency of both the MTurk and the undergraduate samples. The 
undergraduate participants also contributed to the younger median age compared to Study 1. 
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Table 22. Demographics of Study 2 Pilot Test 
N 47 
Recruitment  
 
Undergraduate Participant Pool: 16 
(33%) 
MTurk: 31 (67%) 
Ideology Liberal: 30 (64%) 
Moderate: 7 (15%) 
Conservative: 8 (17%) 
Missing: 2 (4%) 
Party Democrat: 26 (55%) 
Republican: 6 (13%) 
Other/Independent: 14 (30%) 
Missing: 1 (2%) 
Age Mean = 27.80 (SD =  10.53)  
Median = 25.0 
Gender Male: 28 (60%) 
Female:  18 (38%) 
Missing/no answer: 1 (2%) 
Race White: 30 (64%) 
Black: 0 (0%) 
Hispanic/Latino: 4 (9%) 
Asian: 8 (17%) 
All other/no answer: 5 (10%)  
 
 Five items assessed the degree to which participants believed the article described 
ideology as an essentialized category. That is, they rated whether the “researchers described in 
the article” believed political beliefs are: unchangeable, biologically based, determined by 
upbringing, group people into distinct camps, and tell you a lot about someone’s personality. 
Items were reverse scored, so that higher values reflect higher essentialism, and the five items 
were averaged (alpha = .879). Possible responses on each item ranged from one to five. Average 
scores were higher in the in the high-essentialism condition (M = 3.71, SD = 0.71), and lower in 
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the low-essentialism condition (M = 1.95, SD = 0.80). This contrast was significant, 
t(45)=8.009, p < .001. 
Table 23. Means and T statistics for Pilot Study variables 
 Full sample 
(N = 47) 
MTurk 
sample only 
(N = 31) 
Item Mean (and 
SD) in high 
essentialism 
condition, 
 N = 25 
Mean (and 
SD) in low 
essentialism 
condition,  
N = 22 
Mean 
diff. 
T-test T-test 
Discreteness 3.88 (0.97) 2.27 (1.39) 1.61 t(45)=4.65, p<.001 t(29) = 3.69, 
p =.001 
Immutability 3.76 (1.01) 1.50 (0.74) 2.26 t(45)=8.64, p<.001 t(29) = 6.62, 
p < .001 
Informativeness 3.76 (1.30) 1.81 (0.91) 1.94 t(45)=5.86, p<.001 t(29) = 4.52, 
p < .001 
Social det. 3.52 (1.19) 2.27 (1.08) 1.25 t(45)=3.74, p=.001 t(29) = 2.87, 
p =.008 
Biological basis 3.64 (0.95) 1.86 (1.28) 1.78 t(45)=5.43, p .001 t(29) = 4.17, 
p < .001 
 
To further explore the effectiveness of the manipulation, a t-test was run on each item 
individually. As Table 23 illustrates, scores on each individual item were significantly higher in 
the high-essentialism than low-essentialism condition. Therefore, confirming Hypothesis 6, 
participants understood the intended message of the article in respect to all 5 dimensions. 
Main Study Methods 
Sample. As in Study 1, participants were American Mechanical Turk “workers” with a 
successful HIT completion rate of >95%. Power analysis suggested 172 participants would be 
sufficient to detect a medium sized effect at 90% power. I intended to collect responses from an 
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equal number of liberals and conservatives. I rounded up the initial number (86 of each group) to 
100 for each, to account for the possible need to drop subjects. Therefore, a total sampling goal 
of 200 was set. 
Materials. The manipulation consists of the two versions of the essentialism article, as 
shown in Appendix B. More discussion related to the development of this measure is in the 
previous section, Study 2 Pilot Study.  
The following variables were measured and/or calculated exactly as in Study 1: affective 
polarization (in-group minus outgroup thermometer ratings), desire for social distance, political 
news consumption (frequency only, selective news exposure was not measured), ideology, party 
identification, extremity, and demographic variables, including age (year born), race, gender, 
region, religion, urban vs. rural residence, and religious importance.  
Procedure. Participants encountered the study listed on MTurk as an assignment to 
“Read and rate an article.” If they agreed to participate in the study, they followed a link to the 
survey hosted on SurveyGizmo.com.  
After agreeing to the consent form, participants were shown instructions orienting them 
to the study. Instructions stated that they will be asked to read an article and consider its 
appropriateness for an 11th grade audience. They were then randomly assigned, via the 
SurveyGizmo program, to either the high- or low-essentialism condition. After reading the 
article, they completed three “bogus” questions about the article. These questions asked how 
interesting the article would be for 11th graders, how difficult it would be for this age group, and 
what sort of subject interest areas it most relates to. These questions were intended as part of a 
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cover story to reduce the salience of the ultimate dependent measure, avoiding hypothesis-
guessing or demand characteristics.  
After answering the three bogus questions, participants completed a “political 
questionnaire” that measured their desired social distance, as well as their overall political 
interest, and political news consumption. On the following page, they completed the 
thermometer ratings, which randomized whether they evaluated liberals or conservatives first. 
On the last pages they responded to demographic items, and finally, were shown a debriefing 
statement, which explained the purpose of the experiment.  
Data were collected in February 2018. I used TurkPrime (see Study 1 methods) to recruit 
100 liberal and 100 conservative participants from MTurk. MTurk workers who participated in 
either Study 1, or the pilot study, were precluded from participating in this study. I predicted the 
time to complete the study would be 10 minutes, based on informal pre-testing. Participants were 
offered $1.00 for completion of the study. Actual median completion time was 9.1 minutes.  
 204 people began the survey, and 201 completed all key dependent variables and 
reported their ideology. Among the 101 TurkPrime-identified liberals, 93 identified as liberal in 
the present study, 5 identified as moderate, and 3 identified as conservative. Among the 100 
TurkPrime-identified conservatives, 84 identified as conservative, 8 identified as moderate, and 8 
identified as liberal. The 11 completely mismatched participants (3 conservative-liberals; 8 
liberal-conservatives) were excluded from analysis (those who selected “moderate” were 
retained, as in Study 1). There was a total of 190 participants in these analyses: 98 liberals and 92 
conservatives.  
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Results: Descriptive and Preliminary Analyses 
Demographics. 55.3% of participants were female, 81.8% were White, and median age 
was 34. 53% of participants described themselves as Democrats, 42% as Republicans, and 5% as 
Independents. Full demographics are described in Table 24.  
Table 24. Demographics for Study 2 Main Study 
 Full sample Liberals Conservatives 
N 190 98 92 
Party Democrat: 53.1% (101) 
Republican: 41.6% (79) 
Other/Independent: 5.3% 
(10) 
Democrat: 94.9% (93) 
Republican: 0 
Other/Independent: 
5.1% (5) 
Democrat: 8.7% (8) 
Republican:  85.9% 79 
Other/Independent: 5.4% 
(5) 
Age Mean =  36.6 (SD = 
10.70) 
Median = 34 
Mean =  35.79 (SD = 
9.92); Median = 33.0 
Mean = 37.51 (SD = 
11.46) 
Median = 34.0 
Gender Male:  81 (42.6%) 
Female: 105 (55.3%) 
Other/Non-binary: 1 
(0.5%) 
Missing: 3 (1.6%) 
Male: 45.9% (45) 
Female: 53.1% (52) 
Non-binary: 1 (1%)  
Male: 39.1% (36) 
Female: 57.6% (53) 
Non-binary: 0 
Missing: 3 (3.3%) 
Income Under $40,000: 33.3% 
(63)  
$40,000 - $99,999: 
49.2% (93) 
$100,000 or greater: 
17.4% (33) 
Missing: 1 
Under $40,000: 41.6%  
(41) 
$40,000 - $99,999: 
40.8% (40) 
$100,000 or greater: 
17.3% (17) 
Under $40,000: 23.9%% 
(22) 
$40,000 - $99,999:  57.6% 
(53) 
$100,000 or greater: 
17.4% (16) 
 Missing: 1 
Education Some HS or HS degree: 
8.9% (17) 
Some college or 2-year 
degree: 43.2% (82) 
4-year degree: 34.2% 
(65)  
Graduate/Professional 
degree: 13.7% (26) 
Some HS or HS 
degree: 9.2% (9) 
Some college or 2-year 
degree: 43.9% (43) 
4-year degree:  33.7% 
(33) 
Graduate/Professional 
degree: 13.3% (13) 
Some HS or HS degree: 
8.8% (8) 
Some college or 2-year 
degree: 42.4% (39) 
4-year degree: 34.8% (32) 
Graduate/Professional 
degree: 14.1% (13) 
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Race White: 81.8% (153)  
Black: 8.0% (15) 
Hispanic: 5.3% (10) 
Asian: 3.2% (6) 
All other: 1.6% (3) 
Missing: 3 
White:  76.5% (75) 
Black: 10.2% (10) 
Hispanic: 7.1% (7) 
Asian: 4.1% (4) 
All other: 1% (1) 
Missing: 1 
White: 84.8% (78) 
Black: 5.4% (5) 
Hispanic: 3.3% (3) 
Asian: 2.2% (2) 
All other: 2.2% (2) 
Missing: 2 
Religion Atheist/Agnostic/Nothing 
in particular: 35.9% (68) 
Catholic: 15.8% (30) 
Evangelical: 17.4% (33) 
Protestant (Non-
evangelical): 14.7% (28) 
Spiritual, but not 
religious: 7.9% (15) 
Jewish: 1.6% (3) 
All other: 6.8% (13) 
Atheist/Agnostic/ 
Nothing in particular: 
56.1% (55) 
Catholic: 9.2% (9) 
Evangelical: 6.1% (6) 
Protestant (Non-
evangelical): 13.3% 
(13) 
Spiritual, but not 
religious: 10.2% (10) 
Jewish:  2.9% (2) 
All other:  3% (3) 
Atheist/Agnostic/Nothing 
in particular: 14.3% (13) 
Catholic: 22.8% (21) 
Evangelical: 29.3% (27) 
Protestant (Non-
evangelical): 16.3% (15) 
Spiritual, but not 
religious: 5.4% (5) 
Jewish:  1.1% (1)  
All other:  10.8% (10) 
Religious 
import 
Mean = 4.23 (SD = 
3.12); 
Scale of 1-9; 
median = 3.0) 
Mean = 2.5 (SD = 
2.27) 
Median = 1.0 
Mean = 6.07   
(SD = 2.84) 
Median = 7.0 
Urban vs. 
Rural 
39.1% (74) live in a 
medium or large city 
21.2% (40) live in a 
suburb of a large city;  
39.8% (75) live in a 
small town or rural 
environment  
1 missing  
45.9% (45) live in a 
medium or large city 
18.4% (18) live in a 
suburb of a large city;  
34.7% (34) live in a 
small town or rural 
environment  
1 missing 
31.6% (29) live in a 
medium or large city 
23.9% (22) live in a 
suburb of a large city;  
44.6% (41) live in a small 
town or rural environment  
 
 
Descriptives. Average in-group thermometer rating was 76.23 (SD = 19.54), and average 
outgroup rating was 31.97 (SD = 22.0). As illustrated in Figure 5, the overall pattern matched 
that in Study 1. The average level of in-group minus out-group rating was 44.25 (SD = 32.56). 
The degree of affective polarization was larger among liberals (M = 48.71, SD = 30.35) than 
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conservatives (M = 39.50, SD = 34.29). This contrast that was not significant, but nearly so, 
t(188)=1.964, p =.051. 
Figure 5. Thermometer ratings by participant ideology and target group ideology, Study 2 
 
 
As in Study 1, desire for social distance was measured with three items. Means and 
intercorrelations between the three items, as well as the affective polarization variable, are 
displayed in Table 25. The “meet” and “marry” items are the most strongly correlated (R = .59, p 
< .001). Preference to live with likeminded others correlated only weakly with feelings about 
meeting those with opposing views, R = .17, p = .019. Affective polarization correlated 
positively with all three variables. 
Reliability analysis indicated that the three desire for social distance items had 
questionable reliability, α = .602. Alpha if item deleted scores suggested that removing the “live” 
item would substantially increase reliability, to .738. Therefore, in addition to testing results on 
the 3-item scale overall, each item is also analyzed separately. 
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Table 25. Descriptives and correlations between Study 2 dependent variable items (N = 190) 
 
Variables 
 
M (SD) 
 
DSD-
Live 
 
DSD- 
Marry 
 
DSD-
Meet 
Desire 
for 
social 
distance  
Affective 
polariza-
tion 
DSD-Prefer to live with 
similar others  
4.09 (1.60) 1     
DSD-Family member marry 
(reverse) 
4.33 (1.23) .314** 1    
DSD-Would like to meet 
(reverse) 
4.12 (1.46) .170* .592** 1   
Desire for social distance 
(total) 
4.18 (1.07) .695** .763** .807** 1  
Affective polarization 44.25 (32.56) .384** .446** .528** .601** 1 
 *p <.05, **p <.01. Higher scores reflect greater discomfort with ideological outgroup.  
 
Determining control variables. Preliminary analyses tested whether certain 
demographic and political variables correlated with any of the dependent measures. A summary 
of these analyses is in Table 26. Preliminary analyses revealed that affective polarization was 
highest among Black (M = 51.67, SD = 25.47) and Hispanic (M = 64.60, SD = 32.10) 
participants, and lower among White (M = 42.29, SD = 33.06) and Other race (M = 34.89, SD = 
30.18) participants. To maximize variance captured by the “race” control variable, race was 
coded as Black and Hispanic = 1, and White and Other = 0. This variable correlated significantly 
with affective polarization, R = .156, p = .033. No other demographic variable covaried 
significantly with either outcome variable.  
Several of the measured political variables covaried with the dependent variables. 
Ideology negatively correlated with desire for social distance, indicating that this tendency was 
lower among conservatives. Republicans also scored somewhat lower on desire for social 
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Table 26. Correlations between proposed control variables and dependent variables (N = 190 
except where otherwise specified) 
 Affective 
polarization 
Desire for 
social 
distance 
Age -.033 -.111 
Education .120 -.087 
Income (N = 189) -.095 .002 
Religiosity -.059 -.012 
Gender (N = 186) -.045 -.058 
Race .156* .051 
Ideology -.119 -.157* 
Party -.094 -.112 
Political interest .251** .190** 
Political news  .300** .264** 
Ideological 
extremity 
.556** .363** 
* p < .05, **p <.01 
Notes: Relationships with Education, Income, and Political News Consumption were 
tested using Spearman Rank Order correlation. Gender is coded as Female=-.5, Male=.5. 
Ideology is coded so higher numbers = more conservative; party is coded so higher 
numbers = more Republican identified. Race is coded as Black and Hispanic participants 
= +.5; White, Asian and other races = -.5.  
 
distance than Democrats, but this trend was non-significant. Frequency of political news 
consumption corresponded positively with affective polarization and desired social distance, as 
did political interest. Political extremity (distance from mid-point on the ideology scale) was 
clearly associated with both affective polarization and desire for social distance.  
For remaining analyses, the “primary controls” will thus include race, ideology, political 
interest, political news consumption, political extremity, and party (while not significantly 
associated with the DVs, party is retained to be consistent with literature regarding political 
outcomes).  
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Results: Main Analyses 
 ANCOVA predicting affective polarization. Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was 
used to test whether the manipulation influenced affective polarization, while controlling for the 
primary controls identified above. As shown in Table 27, there was no effect of condition on 
affective polarization, F(1, 179) = .647, p = .422. Estimated marginal mean polarization in the 
high essentialism condition was 42.27 (SE=2.82, N = 94), and 45.48 (SE = 2.81, N = 96) in the 
low-essentialism condition. Actual mean levels of polarization, calculated without controls, show 
a similar pattern MHighEssentialism = 43.09 (SD = 35.20), MLowEssentialism = 45.40, SD = 29.90. This 
contradicts the prediction specified in Hypothesis 7.  
Ideological extremity dominates the model predicting polarization, with a large effect 
size, while all other effects are trivial. Nevertheless, the effect of condition is still non-
significant, even when excluding all controls and running a simple between-groups t-test, 
t(188)=.488, p = .63.  
Table 27. ANCOVA results predicting affective polarization 
Variable df F Sig Partial Eta squared 
 
Race 1 0.58 .45 .003 
Party 1 0.393 .51 .002 
Ideology 1 0.056 .81 .000 
Political interest 1 0.921 .34 .005 
Political news 
consumption 
1 0.704 .40 .004 
Ideological 
extremity 
1 62.398 <.001 .258 
Condition  1 0.647 .32 .002 
 ANCOVA predicting desire for social distance. A similar ANCOVA was run, 
replacing affective polarization with desire for social distance, as shown in Table 28. Once again, 
111 
 
there was no effect of condition on the outcome, F(1, 179) < .001, p > .99, contrary to 
Hypothesis 8. The estimated marginal mean desire for social distance was 4.168 (SE = .105) in 
the high-essentialism condition, and 4.168 (SE = .104) in the low-essentialism condition. The 
actual raw means also did not meaningfully differ, Mhigh= 4.169 (SD = 1.20), Mlow= 4.167 (SD = 
0.95). Once again, ideological extremity is the strongest predictor of desire for social distance. 
There is no effect of condition, even when controls are excluded, t(188)= -.002, p > .99.  
Table 28. ANCOVA results predicting desire for social distance 
Variable df F Sig Partial Eta 
squared 
Race 1 .104 .75 .001 
Party 1 .026 .87 <.001 
Ideology 1 .901 .34 .005 
Political interest 1 .640 .43 .004 
Political news 
consumption 
1 .317 .57 .002 
Ideological 
extremity 
1 18.86 <.001 .095 
Condition  1 <.001 >.99 <.001 
 
Because correlation and reliability analyses suggested the “live” item was distinct from 
the “marry” and “meet” items within DSD, additional ANCOVA analyses were run testing each 
item independently. As shown in Table 29, no significant result emerged (all ps>.40). 
Interaction between condition and ideology. A two-way ANCOVA was run to test for 
a potential interaction between ideology (scored as -0.5 is liberal, +0.5 for conservatives) and 
condition (scored as -0.5 for the low essentialism condition, +0.5 for the high essentialism 
 
 
112 
 
Table 29. Effect of condition on each desire for social distance items 
Variable Mean (SD) in 
High 
Essentialism 
condition  
Mean (SD) in  
Low 
Essentialism 
Condition 
F Sig Partial Eta 
squared 
Live 3.95 (1.5) 4.18 (1.7) .575 .449 .003 
Meet 4.08 (1.5) 4.15 (1.4) .032 .858 .000 
Marry 4.25 (1.3) 4.40 (1.4) .589 .444 .003 
Results are presented controlling for race, party, ideology, political interest, political news consumption, 
and extremity. 
 
condition) in predicting affective polarization. The same set of covariates used in regression 
analyses (race, party, political interest, and political news consumption) were entered as controls. 
There was no main effect of ideology F(1, 178) = .007, p = .94, or of condition, F(1, 178) = .678, 
p = .411. There was also no interaction between ideology and condition when predicting 
affective polarization, F(1, 178) = .594, p = .442. Full results are presented in Table 30.  
Table 30: 2-way ANOVA results predicting affective polarization from ideology and condition 
Source F Sig. Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Corrected 
Model 
11.260 <.001 .336 
Intercept 221.68
0 
<.001 .555 
Party .263 .609 .001 
Race .491 .484 .003 
Political Interest 1.024 .313 .006 
Political News .758 .385 .004 
Extremity 60.856 <.001 .255 
Ideology  .007 .935 .000 
Condition .678 .411 .004 
Ideo X 
Condition 
Interaction 
.594 .442 .003 
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A similar 2x2 ANOVA was performed to predict desire for social distance. There was 
again no main effect of ideology, F(1, 178)=.009, p = .923, nor of condition, F(1, 178)=.012, p = 
.912. There was also no interaction between the two, F(1, 178)=1.491, p = .224. Full results are 
displayed in Table 31.  
Table 31. 2-way ANOVA results predicting desire for social distance from ideology and 
condition 
Source F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 4.168 .000 .158 
Intercept 1316.528 .000 .881 
Party .391 .533 .002 
Race .301 .584 .002 
Political Interest .569 .452 .003 
Political News .391 .533 .002 
Extremity 20.686 .000 .104 
Ideology  .009 .923 .000 
Condition .012 .912 .000 
Ideo X Cond.Interaction 1.491 .224 .008 
 
Similar 2x2 ANOVAs were run predicting each desire for social distance variable 
separately. These mostly demonstrated non-significant interactions; see Table 32. There was, 
however, a marginally significant interaction between ideology and condition for the “live” 
variable. As illustrated in Table 33, this interaction suggested that liberal participants’ desire to 
live in an ideologically segregated community increased in response to the high essentialism 
condition, marginally significantly. Conservatives’ desire to live in an ideologically segregated 
community slightly and non-significantly dropped in response to the high-essentialism condition.  
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Table 32. ANOVA results predicting individual desire for social distance scale items 
Variable Main effect of 
ideology 
Main effect of condition Interaction between 
ideology and condition 
 
Live F(1, 178)=.110, p = 
.74 
F(1,178)=.553, p = .46 F(1, 178)=3.053, p = 
.082 
 
Meet F(1, 178)=.167, p = 
.680 
F(1,178)=.084, p =.77 F(1, 178)=.285, p = 
.594 
 
Marry F(1, 178)=.035, p = 
.852 
F(1,178)=.778, p = .379 F(1, 178)=.075, p = 
.785 
 
In these analyses, the same covariates were entered as in the main desire for social distance analysis in 
Table 31 (race, party, political interest, political news consumption, and extremity). 
 
Table 33. Means by condition for the “live” item of desire for social distance  
Variable Mean in low 
essentialism 
condition 
Mean in high 
essentialism 
condition 
Significant slope? 
Liberals 3.722 4.276 Marginal, F(1,90) = 3.036, 
 p =.085 
Conservatives 4.259 4.033 No, F(1, 83)=.188, p = .666, 
In these analyses, the same covariates were entered as in the main desire for social distance analysis in 
Table 31 (race, party, political interest, political news consumption, and extremity). 
Mixed General Linear Model predicting affect toward ingroup and outgroup. A 
mixed GLM analysis was used to test the main effect of condition, in vs. outgroup evaluation, 
the interaction between the two variables. The same block of covariates used in the ANCOVA 
analysis are included in this GLM analysis. All variables were centered on their mean (or on the 
scale midpoint, in the case of party and ideology), so estimates would occur at the average level 
of each covariate.  
No interaction was expected; if there were, there would have been a condition effect on 
the difference-score ratings used as the dependent variable in ANCOVA. However, if the 
manipulation was influencing in-group and out-group evaluations in the same direction, for 
example, this would be revealed by main effects in this analysis. The analysis revealed there was 
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no main effect of condition on ratings, F(1, 179)= 0.566, p = .453. On the other hand, 
unsurprisingly, was a massive effect of in vs. out-group evaluation on thermometer ratings, F(1, 
179) = 226.85, p < .001. There was no interaction between condition and in- vs. outgroup rating, 
F(1, 179)= 0.647, p = .422. The pattern of means, illustrated in Figure 6, confirms the null 
effect: there is a large but completely parallel gap in in-group rating vs. out-group rating in both 
conditions. 
Figure 6. Mean evaluation by ingroup vs. outgroup and condition 
 
Exploratory analysis: responses to “bogus” questions. In addition to the dependent 
variables, political controls and demographics, there also were some data gathered by asking 
participants the three “bogus” questions about the article’s suitability for students. While not 
strictly intended to be analyzed, I explored these responses for a possible insights into the null 
results found on the dependent variables. If, for example, participants in one (or both) conditions 
rated the article as completely “difficult” for an 11th grader to understand, it is possible they were 
unable to comprehend it, and thus did not receive a complete “dose” of the manipulation. This 
could provide a potential explanation for null results.  
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Two items were assessed with multi-point scales: how “interesting” the article would be, 
and how “difficult” it would be, for a high school audience. Participants overall reported that the 
article was on the boring side, but near the midpoint, on the “interesting” scale, M = 3.51, SD = 
1.7 (range from 1 to 7). They further deemed the article close to the “just right” midpoint of the 
“easy to difficult” scale, M = 0.1, SD = 0.4, scale range -1 to 1. As demonstrated in Table 34, 
there was no effect of condition on either item (ps > 0.80). Therefore, there is little evidence 
from the “bogus” responses that participants had difficulty understanding, or were exceedingly 
bored, by the stimulus.  
Table 34. Ratings on bogus questions 
 Low essentialism 
condition 
High essentialism 
condition 
Contrast 
Interesting 
(scale of 1 to 7) 
3.51 (1.76) 3.51 (1.72) Mdiff=0.00, t(188)=-.001,  
p > .99 
Difficult 
(scale of -1 to 1) 
0.10 (.423) 0.10 (.390) Mdiff=0.01, t(188)= .143,  
p = .89 
 
A third item asked participants, “This article would be most interesting to students 
interested in (select all that apply)…”. Participants were free to select as many or as few subjects 
as they wanted. Reflecting good comprehension of the article, a vast majority of participants 
selected Political Science (93%). Sociology (67%) and/or Psychology (67%) were also selected 
by a majority of participants, while 0% selected Physics.  
Chi-square analysis was run to determine whether any subjects seemed more relevant in 
one condition vs. another, see Table 35. Neuroscience was selected more often in the high 
essentialism condition (45.7%) than the low-essentialism condition (24.0%), a difference in 
proportion that was significant, p <.01. A similar but marginal effect occurred in Biology (28.7% 
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in high essentialism condition, 17.7% in low essentialism condition, p = .07); and sociology 
(73.4% in high essentialism condition, 60.4% in low essentialism condition, p = .057). All other 
contrasts revealed no differences between conditions. Therefore, participants may have viewed 
the high essentialism condition as saying more about the brain, biology, and society as the low-
essentialism condition did. 
Table 35. Percent of participants who selected this subject as relevant to the present articles 
Subject Low essentialism 
condition 
High essentialism 
condition 
Chi square contrast 
between conditions 
English 14.6% 16.0% 0.069, p = .792 
History 29.2% 29.8% 0.009, p = .925 
Neuroscience 24.0% 45.7% 9.94, p = .002 
Biology 17.7% 28.7% 3.238, p = .072 
Psychology 63.5% 71.3% 1.297, p = .256 
Physics 0% 0% -- 
Chemistry 0% 2.1% 2.064, p = .151 
Math 4.2% 2.1% 0.646, p = .422 
Sociology 60.4% 73.4% 3.615, p = .057 
Political science 93.8% 92.6% 0.107, p = .744 
 
Study 2 Discussion 
 Main results. The existence and degree of affective polarization on thermometer ratings, 
and desire for social distance from ideological outgroups, was clearly replicated in this study. 
Participants rated their ideological in-group approximately 44 points higher than their outgroup, 
which resembles the 50-point difference observed in Study 1. Similarly, desire for social distance 
was at a nearly identical level as in Study 1, MStudy2 = 4.18 (SD = 1.07) vs. MStudy1 = 4.18 (SD = 
1.15). The most notable outcome from this study, however, was that the manipulation had, 
overall, no effect on either of these outcomes. Contrary to Hypotheses 7 and 8, neither affective 
polarization measured by thermometer ratings, nor desire for social distance, appeared to be in 
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any way influenced by exposures to the articles. A marginal effect did emerge on the “live” item 
alone, such that liberals were influenced by the manipulation in the expected direction, but 
conservatives were not. However, given the large number of analyses run in this study, a single 
trend that does not meet a p < .05 threshold should not be interpreted as strong evidence that 
such an effect exists.  
It is difficult to interpret null results, as one experiment cannot disprove a hypothesis. 
However, evidence can suggest some interpretations are more plausible than others. Two 
interpretations can be more easily ruled out: that participants failed to attend to or comprehend 
the article, and that insufficient power led to null p values.  
The pilot study was designed to ensure that the manipulation was effective at priming a 
high- or low- essentialism explanation for ideology. T-tests performed on a multi-faceted 
essentialism measure, and on each of the subscale-specific items individually, strongly 
confirmed that participants were able to receive the “high” vs. “low” essentialism argument as 
intended. Furthermore, responses to the “bogus” questions provided no evidence that participants 
misunderstood the articles. Majorities reported the article as being relevant to the content it was 
designed to reference, including political science, psychology, and sociology; and irrelevant to 
subjects like chemistry and physics. Furthermore, participants reported that the article’s 
difficulty would be nearly “just right” for 11th graders. The high-essentialism article was more 
likely to be rated as interesting to students interested in neuroscience (vs. the low-essentialism 
article, 46% vs. 24%). However, it is difficult to see how this would result in the present pattern 
of null results. 
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The power analyses to determine sample size for this study assumed a medium effect. So, 
it could be reasonable to consider whether the effect of the manipulation was simply a “small 
effect” that the sample size was insufficient to detect. However, effects on affective polarization 
trended in the direction opposite to prediction (Mdiff = 45.4 in low essentialism condition; Mdiff = 
43.1 in high essentialism condition). Desire for social distance was functionally identical in each 
condition (Mdiff = 4.18 in low essentialism condition; Mdiff = 4.18 in high essentialism condition). 
Neither including control variables, nor exploring items individually, did much to suggest there 
was a trend in the predicted direction that was simply too small to be detected with the available 
sample size.  
There are three main explanations that are more plausible. The first is more mundane: 
that the manipulation was simply too weak to shift political essentialism beliefs. The second 
consideration is more theoretically interesting: that political essentialism beliefs simply are more 
chronic, and not so easily shifted by experimental manipulations. The final interpretation, and 
most theoretically relevant, would be that essentialism simply has no causal influence on inter-
ideological attitudes. Each of these possibilities is explored in the General Discussion (Chapter 
5).  
Demographic effects on polarization. In Study 1, several demographic variables were 
found to covary significantly with affective polarization and/or desire for social distance: age, 
race, religiosity, and gender. In Study 2, these associations were not consistently replicated. In 
Study 1, age was positively associated with affective polarization (R = .103, p < .05) and 
negatively associated with desire for social distance (R =  -.105, p < .05). In Study 2, age was 
uncorrelated with affective polarization (R =  -.033, p = .652), and negatively, but non-
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significantly, correlated with desire for social distance (R = -.111, p = .127). The correlations 
with desire for social distance were similar across the two studies; suggesting that the difference 
in p value may be due to sample size differences.  
 Race was significantly related to affective polarization in both studies, but which races 
expressed greatest polarization differed between studies. In Study 1, White and Hispanic 
participants expressed the most extreme polarization. In Study 2, Black and Hispanic participants 
expressed the highest levels of polarization. Therefore, White or Black racial identity may not be 
particularly robust predictors of affective polarization; though the consistent findings for 
Hispanic participants may warrant further exploration. Race had an effect on desire for social 
distance only in Study 1; in Study 2, it was non-significant, and in fact trended in the opposite 
direction.  
 Higher religiosity was associated with reduced desire for social distance in Study 1, but 
no such relationship was found in Study 2. In Study 1, women expressed significantly more 
affective polarization and desire for social distance than men did. These relationships were much 
closer to 0 in Study 2, and were non-significant.  
 Political variables’ effects on polarization. Another cluster of variables that were 
measured in both Study 1 and Study 2 were the political variables. These include political 
interest, frequency of news consumption, political extremity, and political ideology. In Study 1, 
frequency of political news consumption was positively correlated with affective polarization 
and desire for social distance. These correlations were reproduced in Study 2. Self-reported 
political interest was surprisingly unassociated with both dependent variables on a bivariate level 
in Study 1, but in Study 2, a positive correlation did emerge for both variables. Extremity was 
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strongly associated with outcomes in both studies; correlation with affective polarization, R = .54 
in Study 1, R = .56 in Study 2. Extremity’s correlation with desire for social distance was also 
consistently observed, R =  .42 in study 1, R = .36 in Study 2. Ideology was negatively 
associated with desire for social distance in both studies, suggesting liberals score higher on this 
outcome than conservatives do. However, as shown in Tables 25 and 26 in Appendix C, this 
effect is erased when controlling for ideological extremity and other political variables. 
Therefore, the apparent “ideology” effect is most likely an artifact of the liberals in this sample 
being more extreme in their ideology than the conservatives.  
 Correlations that were observed in Study 1, but not in Study 2, do not necessarily indicate 
that such relationships are non-existent. It is possible that the effects are small, and thus only 
detected with larger samples. Or, it is possible they are only correlated under certain conditions. 
That is, exposure to the fabricated news articles may have overshadowed chronic baseline 
tendencies that tend to emerge due to gender, religiosity, etc. Still, evidence most strongly 
supports the robustness of the relationships between affective polarization and extremity, 
political news consumption, and Hispanic identity. 
Main effect of any prime? A retrospective overview of all results suggests exposure to 
any form of essentialism prime may weaken affective polarization. In Study 1, the survey 
program randomized whether the essentialism scale, or the thermometer ratings, were presented 
first. There was a 54-point gap in in-group vs. outgroup ratings when thermometer ratings were 
measured first. This dropped to a 45-point gap when essentialism was measured first (hence, why 
order was controlled for in Study 1 regression analyses). This contrast was statistically 
significant, t(383) = 2.771, p = .006. Notably, in both conditions of Study 2 (wherein 
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thermometer ratings were always measured after exposure to essentialism-relevant articles), the 
in-group minus out-group gap (Mdiff = 44.25) resembles that of the essentialism-first order 
condition of Study 1. In other words, people who were exposed to political essentialism concepts 
before they rated their affective reaction to political groups tended to express less affective 
polarization overall (approximately 9 points less, see Figure 7). 
Figure 7. Effect of order on ratings across studies
 
 However, without a control group in Study 2, in which participants spontaneously evaluate 
groups, this post hoc observation is not possible to more strongly confirm. Possible explanations 
for this pattern are explored in the General Discussion.  
Summary 
Affective polarization was again evident in Study 2, and correspondent to some of the 
same factors as observed in Study 1. Frequent news consumption, possessing an extreme 
ideological identity, and identifying as Hispanic or Latino all consistently related to accentuated 
affective polarization. However, the role of essentialism was less evident in Study 2 as it was in 
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Study 1. Whether an essentialist or non-essentialist view of ideology was primed had virtually no 
measurable effect on polarization. A marginal effect suggested liberals may have responded to 
the high-essentialism prime with a heightened preference to live among other liberals (as 
opposed to conservatives). Furthermore, a review of means across both studies suggests than any 
essentialism prime (whether high or low) may result in reduced polarization. These effects were 
not predicted a priori, but are intriguing trends that may be addressed with future research.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Summary and Implications  
 The two studies presented here assessed the role that political essentialism, a lay theory 
of the nature of ideology, plays in affective polarization. Among the intergroup attitudes 
measured by psychologists, inter-ideological attitudes are among the most negative (Iyengar & 
Westwood, 2015). Psychological frameworks used to quantify, and qualitatively assess this 
intergroup dynamic have included stereotyping (Crawford et al., 2013; Iyengar et al., 2012; 
Appleby & Borgida, 2016; Ahler & Sood, 2016), social/geographic avoidance (Motyl et al., 
2014; Suhay et al., 2016), discriminatory behavior (Chambers et al., 2013), and prejudice 
(Brandt et al., 2014). This paper brings another social psychological framework, that of lay 
theories, to the discussion. Psychological essentialism is the lay belief that categories represent 
real, deep-rooted, informative, immutable, discrete and perhaps invisible essences. To 
essentialize political identity is to believe that liberalism and conservativism represent real, 
informative, discrete and deeply-rooted differences. The present research proposed that 
variations in endorsement of this lay theory can correspond to inter-ideological attitudes.  
The goals of the present research can be summarized as a set of related questions: 1) do 
people essentialize political identity in a way that can be meaningfully measured? 2) Does 
political essentialism relate to the phenomenon of affective polarization at all? 3) How do 
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different facets of essentialism relate to each other, and to affective polarization outcomes?  4) 
What is the causal relationship between essentialism and affective polarization? 5) What 
additional evidence can this research provide on the phenomenon of affective polarization? 
Encouragingly for this research program, across the two studies, evidence supports an 
affirmative answer to the first two questions. The answer to the remaining three questions is 
more complex. This section will summarize the data related to each of these questions in turn.  
Q1. Do people essentialize political identity in a way that can be measured? Study 1 
established that political essentialism is a set of measurable beliefs that (mostly) cohere. A 
newly-crafted scale, designed to assess the essentializing lay beliefs people have about politics, 
demonstrated good reliability and predictive power. Participants in Study 1, whose demographic 
characteristics are in many ways similar to (though not truly representative of) the United States 
as a whole (Huff & Tingey, 2015), reported levels of essentialism that were closer to the 
midpoint than to either extreme of the scale. Strong conclusions cannot be drawn about levels of 
essentialism by comparing the mean to the scale midpoint, as there is no confirmation that the 
mathematical midpoint is in fact a “truly neutral” midpoint (as the “pro-“ and “anti-“ essentialist 
items may slightly vary in their extremity). However, there was clearly not a strong disagreement 
or rejection of political essentialism overall.  
Political essentialism beliefs corresponded with other related constructs in predicted 
ways. People who had a large number of cross-ideological social contacts reported reduced 
political essentialism beliefs. High intergroup contact quality, in terms of positivity, equality, 
cooperation, and closeness, also related to an attenuation in essentialism. This aligns well with  
Brown et al. (2007), who found reduced intergroup infrahumanization (a process related to 
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essentialism) resulted from greater intergroup contact in a longitudinal study. Increased open-
minded cognition also corresponded with reduced essentialism: people who report being willing 
to think in an unbiased fashion also reported that politics was more malleable, less discrete, less 
informative of one’s personality, and less “fixed” by biology. Conversely, essentialism was also 
positively correlated with measures commonly associated with polarization: political news 
consumption and ideological extremity. That such relationships emerged so consistently, and in 
the theoretically-predicted directions, suggests that the measure of essentialism is assessing a 
meaningful construct. The scale, in other words, possesses good convergent validity. On the 
other hand, it did not completely overlap with any other construct, confirming discriminant 
validity. The largest correlation was between essentialism and any other construct was with 
desire for social distance, with which it shared 21% of the variance.  
Confirmatory factor analysis, and correlation analyses of the subscales, mostly supported 
the notion that many political essentialism scale items were interrelated and indicated an 
overarching construct. However, both the confirmatory factor analysis and conventional 
correlational analysis of subscales suggested that biological basis beliefs were statistically 
distinct. Biological basis beliefs cohered internally (α  > .80), but generally did not correlate 
strongly, if at all, with the other subscales. Further discussion of this is in the Q3 Section. Data-
driven explorations of this scale also suggested some items that may cohere less well than others 
(Item 2, Item 18). This will be important to consider when refining the scale for future use.  
Q2. Does political essentialism relate to the phenomenon of affective polarization? 
Study 1 provided ample opportunities to assess this claim. All evidence suggested that political 
essentialism is indeed associated with affective polarization. Political essentialism furthermore 
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predicted desire for social distance from political outgroups. Both of these outcomes were 
significantly related to essentialism, both on a bivariate level, and when controlling for a variety 
of covariates. Essentialism explained variance in affective polarization and desire for social 
distance beyond what was explained by other political variables, including news consumption, 
political interest, and importantly, ideological extremity.  
The relationship between political essentialism and affective polarization was also 
“decomposed” into in-group and out-group ratings, via a mixed general linear model. This 
analysis demonstrated that political essentialism relates to both in-group and out-group affect 
ratings. Rather than only predicting more extreme negativity toward the out-group alone, 
essentialism related to inflated ratings of the in-group as well.  
In Study 2, wherein essentialism was manipulated rather than measured, there was no 
evidence of this relationship. This is unlikely to be because the relationship found in Study 1 is 
simply a fluke, given the strength and consistency of evidence in Study 1. Question 4 explores 
alternate plausible explanations for the null findings of Study 1.  
Q3. How do different facets of essentialism relate to each other, and to affective 
polarization? This research suggested that political essentialism is best regarded as a multi-
faceted construct, comprised of some beliefs about the current nature of liberal and conservative 
identity (discrete, informative, immutable), and some beliefs about the etiology of ideology 
(biologically or social determined). The present data suggests that not all proposed facets of 
essentialism are equally associated to affective polarization. While the overall political 
essentialism scale was predictive, explaining 10% of the variance in affective polarization, 
analyses using “facets” of essentialism were even more so, explaining 30% of the variance in 
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affective polarization. This is partially due to the contradictory relationships that different 
dimensions of essentialism had with the outcomes. Discreteness and informativeness beliefs 
consistently predicted greater affective polarization and desire for social distance, whereas 
biological basis and social determinism beliefs mostly predicted reduced polarization and desire 
for social distance. Immutability had little unique measurable effect on the outcomes. The 
positive correlation the outcomes had with discreteness and informativeness tended to be much 
larger than the those with social and biological determinism. Therefore, the overall scale 
mirrored the discreteness and informativeness factors, predicting greater affective polarization.  
 The present research uses essentialism as a tool to understand affective polarization as an 
intergroup phenomenon. It therefore engages with previous literature connecting lay beliefs to 
attitudes, such as work connecting beliefs about race to racism, lay beliefs about sexuality to 
homophobia, and so on. An interesting tension found in such work is that essentialism is often  
associated with more negative attitudes (e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2008; Zagefka, Nibgur, 
Gonzalez, & Tip, 2013); but in some cases, associated with more positive attitudes and tolerance 
(e.g., Jayaratne et al., 2006; Phelan et al., 2002). The argument that sexuality is genetically 
determined, for example, tends to be associated with reduced homophobia (Jayaratne et al., 
2006). A key finding from the present research is that biological lay theories of politics were 
associated, in some cases, with reduced affective polarization. This is contrary to the initial 
expectation -- and indeed contrary to other recent work in this area, which found a positive 
relationship between biological essentialism and desire for social distance from political 
outgroups (Suhay et al., 2016). The present research in fact lends support to Hibbing’s (2013) 
speculation that acknowledging biopolitics may lead to greater tolerance between liberals and 
conservatives.  
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 Beyond the biological determinism results alone, Study 1 invites an understanding of 
political essentialism as a multi-faceted construct more generally. Observing the pattern of 
results, two facets are strongly and consistently associated with greater affective polarization: 
informativeness and discreteness. Two facets relate (albeit more weakly) to lessened affective 
polarization: biological determinism, and social determinism. The influence of immutability, 
which emerged as a positive correlate in bivariate analysis, disappears when controlling for the 
other factors, so seems to be less relevant. Therefore, it seems that there are two pairs of factors 
that have distinct effects. The first pair of lay beliefs concerns the current nature of ideology: 
believing liberals and conservatives to be distinct groups (discreteness) and that ideology tells 
you a lot about a person’s personality (informativeness). The second pair concerns the etiology 
of ideology:  that it is biologically determined  (biological basis) or fixed at a young age (social 
determinism). Current nature beliefs may accentuate (or at least accompany) affective 
polarization, while etiology beliefs may attenuate it.  
 This “two-factor” description alone, however, is not sufficient to explain the richness of 
results. Empirically, a two-factor solution in exploratory factor analysis did not explain a 
majority of the data. Biological determinism and social determinism are uncorrelated (R = .07, p 
> .05), so they ought not be collapsed into a single factor. Furthermore, the individual factors 
appeared to function independently in their relationship to outcomes. GLM results suggested 
social determinism related only to reduced in-group liking, while biological determinism related 
to increased out-group liking. Reflecting on the social origin of ideology may reduce people’s 
affection for others who share their ideology. Perhaps recognizing the environmental 
determinants of one’s own ideology reduces the degree to which one’s ideology seems 
objectively, logically or even ethically “correct.” And perhaps reflecting on the possible genetic 
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origin of the opposing ideology helps “forgive” others of their “incorrect” political beliefs. Of 
course, at this point, these explanations are merely speculative; and these results should be 
replicated before they need to be strongly theoretically considered (see future directions).  
Q4. What is the causal relationship between essentialism and affective polarization? 
One goal of this research was to test whether essentialist beliefs about politics can cause negative 
intergroup attitudes and desire for social distance. Study 2 was designed to evaluate this 
prediction, and produced null results. Whether participants were primed with a high- or low-
essentialism concept of ideology had no effect on this outcome. This non-effect can be plausibly 
explained by three alternative frameworks, with increasing theoretical weight: A) that the present 
manipulation was too weak to shift essentialism beliefs; B) that political essentialism beliefs are 
simply chronic and enduring, and no brief experimental manipulation could realistically affect 
them; or C) that there truly is no causal relationship between essentialism and affective 
polarization. The implication of each of these explanations is discussed here. 
Failure of present manipulation. The efficacy of the article manipulation was validated 
by the results of the pilot study. However, in the pilot study, participants only reported their 
interpretation of the article’s message. This had the advantage of conservatively testing whether 
the manipulation communicated the message effectively and primed certain concepts. On the 
other hand, true persuasion was not assessed. Therefore, it is possible that participants 
understood what the article was saying, but did not believe the article consisted of true, 
convincing research. While the concept of “high” or “low” essentialism may have been 
effectively “primed,” it may not have been deeply internalized enough to shift true beliefs about 
political identity.  
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Bernstein et al. (2010) found that materials very similar to the ones used in this study 
were effective in significantly shifting actual beliefs about political essentialism (M = 5.44 vs. 
3.39 on a political essentialism measure, t(20) = 8.85, p < .001). However, as politics and 
political disagreements are increasingly salient, lay people may have more crystalized attitudes 
about the meaning and etiology of ideology. Spending several minutes reading an article online, 
during a paid study, may simply have been insufficient to shift such beliefs. Furthermore, 
Bernstein et al.’s (2010) materials were edited for this study; perhaps disrupting some convincing 
facet of the original materials.  
Another way in which the article may have functioned poorly is that it, by design, 
assumed political essentialism was unified construct with five sub-parts all covarying positively. 
The manipulation therefore simultaneously endorsed all five essentialism “facets” in the high-
essentialism condition, and counterargued all five in the low-essentialism condition. Study 1 
results initially suggested this was a reasonable approach. All subscales correlated positively on a 
bivariate level (except biological basis, which failed to correlate with several other scales), and 
the overall scale related to outcomes as predicted. On the other hand, subscale analyses 
suggested that different facets of essentialism related differently to affective polarization. 
Discreteness and informativeness strongly predicted affective polarization, while social 
determinism, and at times, biological determinism, predicted more inter-group liking (albeit 
more weakly). This manipulation, then, may have simultaneously heightened affective 
polarization (by emphasizing discreteness and informativeness), and dampened it (by 
emphasizing the etiology of ideology, via social or biological determinism). These effects may 
have cancelled each other out, ultimately producing a null effect.  
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Finally, it is possible that any priming of political essentialism, whether endorsing or 
counter-arguing essentialism, may soften negative inter-group affect and behaviors. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, this prospect is supported by the pattern of results across the two studies. Across 
two studies, there were four “conditions”: the two order conditions in Study 1, and the high 
versus low essentialism conditions in Study 2. In the three conditions in which people considered 
essentialism first, affective polarization ratings were consistently about 9 points lower than in the 
single condition wherein people spontaneously reported their affective polarization without first 
considering essentialism (see Study 2 discussion for additional details). Theoretically, this would 
suggest that considering the nature of ideology predicts lessened affective polarization than tends 
to exist at a chronic level. Perhaps a more motivational (e.g., wanting one’s values to be 
advanced and reflected in society), or emotional (e.g., being angry at an opposing party) 
dimension of politics is more chronically salient. These dimensions are more conflict-oriented, 
potentially leading to intense polarization. Priming the nature and etiology of ideological groups 
possibly reduces the salience of chronically salient frameworks, softening the degree of 
polarization. This explanation would be akin to sports team members expressing intense 
preference for their team and antipathy for the other team immediately before a game – when the 
desire to win is most salient. Asking team members to first reflect on the nature of the sport, and 
how people wind up on certain teams, etc., may predict reduced inter-team tension. Of course, 
this explanation is merely speculative, but could be explored experimentally in future research.  
Essentialism is chronic. Political essentialism beliefs may simply be difficult to shift 
situationally. Previous research on lay beliefs suggest that, while they are malleable, may also be 
chronic and developmentally-determined (Hong, Chiu & Dweck, 1995). Perhaps political 
essentialism beliefs are relatively crystallized, given the high degree of salience politics has in 
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the United States at this time. If this is the case, political essentialism beliefs may still be playing 
a causative role in determining affective polarization. It is simply that they will not be shifted by 
experimental primes. This potential explanation can be ruled out through more extensive 
manipulation checking. This could entail testing a variety of manipulations, and directly 
measuring participant’s own beliefs about ideology following the manipulation. If no 
experimental effects are observed, longitudinal studies, measuring both lay beliefs and attitudes 
over time, may be necessary to determine if the proposed causal relationship exists.  
True non-effect. The most theoretically impactful interpretation is that political 
essentialism beliefs simply do not causally influence intergroup attitudes. While a convincing set 
of correlations, regression coefficients, and mediation effects were presented here, essentialism is 
not necessarily the causal factor in these relationships. Study 2 may be interpreted as evidence 
against the explanation that political essentialism beliefs cause affective polarization. However, 
it does not directly inform which other causal relationships are most plausible.  
 Beliefs justify attitudes. It is possible that intergroup warmth, generated for other reasons, 
could “cause” political essentialism beliefs to arise. Post hoc justification is a plausible 
explanation for this causal path. That is, for example, a conservative person may begin to dislike 
liberals for motivational reasons (they want Republicans to win elections, and view liberals as an 
impediment to this goal). Then, when presented with the idea of political essentialism (e.g., that 
liberals and conservatives are fundamentally distinct), they endorse it, because it justifies their 
avoidance of liberals. This account would be congruent with research suggesting that liberals and 
conservatives differentially essentialize race, class, and sexuality in ways that confirm their prior 
attitudes (Suhay & Jayaratne, 2013). Similarly, Morton, Hornsey & Postmes (2009) argue that 
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essentialist beliefs do not precede prejudice per se but are called upon strategically to protect the 
in-group. However, other research strongly suggests that while such post hoc justifications 
process do occur, this does not preclude the alternative causal explanation. That is, research 
suggests that the connection between essentialism and prejudice can be bidirectional (Rangel & 
Keller, 2005, Levy et al., 2001).  
 Beliefs co-occur with attitudes. It can also be considered that negative attitudes, social 
avoidance, and an endorsement of essentialism simply co-occur. They could even be considered 
features of the same overarching construct. The results here would be consistent with such an 
account. Once again, a third causal variable (e.g., motivation to advance one’s values) could 
produce affective polarization, desire for social distance, and political essentialism 
simultaneously.  
 Given these possible alternate explanations, political essentialism beliefs are still 
important to measure and account for. Even if essentialism arises after a more basic affective 
evaluation of the outgroup, for example, it can help reinforce it, and inform what the perceived 
implication of that evaluation is. Additional outcomes that were not measured in the present 
research could be influenced, downstream. For example, merely disliking liberals, for example, 
may have a different effect on political tolerance than disliking liberals and viewing them as an 
entitative outgroup. It may be more tempting to restrict the rights of a disliked outgroup when 
that outgroup is also viewed as uniquely distinct from one’s own. Similarly, there are potential 
implications for political discourse and compromise. If people with opposing ideologies are 
evaluated as not just a disliked outgroup, but one constituted by immutability and discreteness, 
discussion and eventual compromise may seem futile.  
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Q5. What additional evidence can this research provide on the phenomenon of 
affective polarization? Setting aside essentialism, the present studies contribute additional 
insights to the understanding of the affective polarization phenomenon in general. The existence 
of affective polarization was confirmed in both Studies 1 and 2, with huge gaps in in-group and 
out-group ratings, and a moderate degree of discomfort expressed in interacting with ideological 
others.  
 Whether liberal or conservative identity is associated with greater affective polarization is 
of interest in survey research (e.g., Iyengar et al., 2012). The present research largely confirms 
that inter-ideological attitudes are mostly symmetrical. A trend in Study 1, and a significant 
bivariate correlation in Study 2, suggested that liberals express more affective polarization than 
do conservatives. This would contradict survey research by Iyengar et al. (2012), and Pew 
(2016), who found no particular difference between the two. And in fact, when controlling for 
extremity, this ideological difference was erased. Therefore, these trends are probably reflections 
of the peculiarity of the MTurk samples, where liberals are more extreme in their ideology than 
conservatives.  
 Several variables were found that related to accentuated affective polarization, in ways 
that largely confirm the findings of previous research. Ideological extremity strongly covaried 
with affective polarization (as in Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Webster & Abramowitz, 2017; 
also see Homola et al., 2016 for similar effects on stereotyping). Frequency of news exposure 
also positively corresponded to affective polarization, lending further evidence that polarization 
may be at least partially fueled by media messages (Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes, 2012). A unique 
contribution of Study 1 was the selective news exposure variable, measured by assessing the 
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proportion of news sources selected that are congenial to the participant’s ideology. This novel 
variable was only moderately correlated with the overall news frequency variable (R=.25) but 
was just as predictive of affective polarization and desire for social distance. It may therefore be 
a useful way of measuring congenial news exposure in future research (see also Peterson, Goel, 
& Iyengar, 2018, for a related, more resource-intensive, but non-self-report, approach).  
 Aligning with with findings by Mutz (2002a) on political tolerance, a measure of the 
ideological diversity among one’s social contacts corresponded with reduced affective 
polarization. Intergroup contact quality was negatively associated with in-group preference, 
which conforms to Mutz’s (2002a) findings that it was greater intimacy with a cross-ideological 
person related to increased tolerance. However, in contrast to Mutz’s (2002b) findings relating 
interideological contact to reduced political participation, adverse effects of contact on 
participation were largely not found in the present research. However, a marginal negative effect 
of intergroup contact on intention to vote (p = .06) suggests this hypothesis is worthy of further 
exploration.  
Limitations 
Design. The most notable limitation in this set of studies is the methodological 
narrowness of Study 2. It used a mono-method approach, only attempting to manipulate 
essentialism using a set of two fabricated articles. Relevant literature had provided evidence to 
believe this manipulation would be effective: several studies used similar, article-prime-based 
methods, and reliably found predicted effects on attitudinal outcomes (Bernstein et al., 2010; 
Rangel & Keller, 2011; Levy, Stroessner & Dweck, 1998). Furthermore, a pilot test confirmed 
that participants were sensitive to the message expressed. Nevertheless, in retrospect, the null 
137 
 
results are necessarily ambiguous; the independent variable was only manipulated in this single 
way, not allowing results to be observed across multiple methods.  
The article manipulation addressed all five proposed facets of essentialism. This seemed 
to be a reasonable first step, as a maximal manipulation of essentialism. However, given the 
mixed effects of various facets of essentialism, this “multi-faceted” approach may have in fact 
impeded the emergence of an effect. Presenting information about ideology’s informativeness 
alone, or biological basis alone, for example, may have produced unique, effects in opposing 
directions. Presenting the two messages together may have muddied each effect, resulting in a 
null result.  
Study 2 also suffered from lack of a control group. If a control group were included, it 
could help rule out (or verify) the suspicion that any essentialism prime reduces affective 
polarization. As it is, all participants in Study 2 considered the existence of political essentialism 
before responding to the dependent variables, whether the manipulation endorsed or counter-
argued it. The resulting pattern of affective polarization being depressed in three out of four 
“conditions” across the two studies remains somewhat ambiguous to interpret.  
Measures. Measures were selected to maintain continuity with relevant research. In-
group minus out-group ratings on the feeling thermometer is an enduring measure of intergroup 
affect that has been used in survey research since the 1960s (Iyengar et al., 2012); and serves as 
important marker of the degree of affective polarization (Iyengar et al., 2012). Desire for social 
distance was a key dependent variable for Suhay et al. (2016), whose research on biopolitics and 
attitudes is extremely relevant to the present studies. While these measures help situate the 
research among other relevant work, the measures are not particularly rich nor complex. The 
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three desire for social distance items also produced only borderline-acceptable reliability in both 
studies (.60 < α <.70 in both cases). Feeling thermometer difference scores, as they are assessed 
with a single “item,” are impossible to even validate with reliability analysis. Therefore, the 
entirety of affective polarization was assessed with a total of only four items. Measurement error 
on any single item may severely undermine the ability to detect true effects.  
The political essentialism scale itself performed reasonably well as a predictor and 
demonstrated sufficient reliability. However, confirmatory factor analyses suggested a 
hierarchical model with one overarching essentialism factor, and five subfactors, was less than 
ideally fitting. On the other hand, completely data-driven exploratory factor analyses did not 
suggest a clear alternative. Therefore, while the scale was effective for the current study, it may 
need some further refinement (see Future Directions).  
Finally, the results of this study are necessarily situated in a particular time in history – 
late 2017 to early 2018, during the Donald Trump presidency. The 2016 election, and subsequent 
presidency, saw rhetoric more explicitly negative and combative than typical in recent years. 
Trump’s campaign entailed leading chants demanding the jailing of his political opponent; and 
his rhetoric since his term started has been characterized as “demonization of those with whom 
he disagrees” (Jamieson & Taussig, 2017, p. 620). Hillary Clinton, while less vitriolic and 
negative in her rhetoric than Trump (Savoy, 2018), received criticism during her campaign for 
describing “half of Trump supporters” as belonging in “the basket of deplorables.” This rhetoric 
from political elites may easily accentuate affective polarization (see Iyengar et al., 2012), and 
possibly the degree to which liberals and conservatives are perceived as discrete and informative 
“camps.” The degree that political news stories focus so frequently on Trump, his rhetoric, and 
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norm-violating forms of expression also likely leads to a closer association between media 
exposure and polarization. Of course, affective polarization has been growing steadily since the 
1970s (Iyengar et al., 2012), so the political environment of 2018 may be seen as a point along 
an increasing trend, rather than an isolated outlying datapoint.  
Sample: excluding moderates. Both of the studies presented here represent only a 
subset of the population: Americans with a consistent liberal or conservative identity. That is, 
TurkPrime only allowed self-identified liberals (those who identified themselves as liberals on 
more than one occasion) and self-identified conservatives (those who identified themselves as 
conservative on more than one condition) to participate. While this was necessary in order to 
identify clear ideological in-group and out-groups relative to each participant, it is also presents a 
weakness for this study. Moderates, and those with inconsistent ideological identity (e.g. 
switching identity from conservative to liberal, or vice versa) are not represented by these results. 
Recent survey data suggests that 34% of Americans identify as moderate: a declining, but still 
sizeable portion of the population (Gallup, 2017). The present research affirms that people with 
more extremely left and right ideologies report both greater political essentialism and greater 
affective polarization. Therefore, this sample, which excluded people who dwell near the 
ideological midpoint, will likely tend to over-represent the degree of both polarization and 
essentialism.  
Sample: MTurk population. The use of an online survey design with an MTurk sample 
provided both advantages and disadvantages. MTurk, particularly in conjunction with 
TurkPrime, allowed for reasonably representative samples, featuring a roughly equal number of 
liberal and conservative participants, with a median age in the 30s, and a variety of education 
140 
 
levels -- all attributes that could not be expected from a student sample. Still, the samples skewed 
White relative to the United states population (Study1 = 76%; Study 2 = 82%; US Population = 
72%, per the 2010 United States Census). Furthermore, while an equal number of liberals and 
conservatives were requested via TurkPrime, the overall sample still reflected the liberal skew of 
MTurk as a whole. That is, the liberals tended to be stronger liberals (e.g., in study 2, the 
“liberal” half of the study had a mean ideology of 2.07 on the 7-point ideological scale 1.07 
points away from the endpoint, whereas conservatives had a mean ideology of 5.66 on the 7-
point scale, 1.34 points away from the endpoint). This ideology concern was largely mitigated by 
controlling for extremity. But the fact that the sample was not truly representative of the United 
States as a whole limits the generalizability of findings, particularly those simply describing the 
overall “average levels” of essentialism and affective polarization.  
Given the null results of Study 2, the most troublesome aspect of the sample was that 
MTurk workers tend to be “non-naïve” to psychological manipulations, as they are not prevented 
from participating in multiple, possibly similar psychology studies (Buhrmester, Talaifar, & 
Gosling, 2017). Many participants may have participated in similar studies before, wherein a 
prime was presented, then dependent measures assessed. This procedure is often followed by a 
debriefing statement, explaining the false nature of the cover story (if present), the prime, and 
how the prime was expected to influence effects downstream. Such non-naive participants may 
have not believed the cover story of the present study (“rate the appropriateness for a high school 
audience”). Participants then may have either a) discounted the credibility of the article; and/or 
b) defensively refused to be persuaded. It is worth noting that many of the studies presently cited, 
which found measurable effects of an essentialism-relevant article on subsequent attitudes, used 
student samples (Bernstein et al., 2010; Rangel & Keller, 2011; Levy, Stroessner & Dweck, 
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1998). MTurk’s effectiveness as a platform to run psychological experiments has been 
repeatedly confirmed (e.g. Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013; Buhrmesiter, Talaifar, & 
Gosling, 2017), but still presents a population less naïve to psychological manipulations than 
student samples are.  
Future directions  
Causality. The null results produced in Study 2, as well as the apparent “general priming 
effect” observed across studies, invite further explorations into causality. Alternate methods 
should be employed to see whether the lack of causality observed in Study 2 was simply a 
product of a flawed manipulation. To test the hypothesis more thoroughly, extensive pilot testing 
should be performed. Pilot testing could assess the effect of multiple manipulations, including 
manipulating a single facet of essentialism at a time. Furthermore, future tests of the essentialism 
causation hypothesis could measure shifts in the participants’ essentialism beliefs, rather than 
their mere interpretation of the article’s message. If done in conjunction with measuring the 
affective polarization variables, this would allow for mediation via essentialism beliefs to be 
tested. Future experimental manipulations should also include a control group, to test the effects 
of manipulations against a true baseline.  
Experiments could also be employed to explore alternate directions of causality. The 
most obvious next step would be to test the effect of inter-ideological affect on political 
essentialism. This would entail creating a manipulation that either elicits or dampens negative 
inter-ideological affect, and then measuring political essentialism. Such an approach was used in 
Keller (2005). Another approach may be to measure political essentialism as a justifier of 
exclusion, as in Morton et al. (2009). That is, an experiment could measure whether political in-
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group or political outgroup is being excluded or discriminated against, then measuring the degree 
that political essentialism is endorsed. This can test the degree to which essentialism functions to 
justify preferred differences in outcomes.  
A particularly informative follow-up direction would be to measure intergroup affect, 
intergroup contact, and essentialism in a longitudinal fashion. This could provide a rich dataset 
testing the sequence of events that most and least explain how intergroup behaviors, beliefs, and 
affect develop over time. This would be especially interesting to test on participants as they 
move to new geographic locations, start new jobs, or otherwise suddenly encounter a change in 
the ideological makeup of their environment (Motyl et al., 2014).  
Additional political outcomes. Effects of political essentialism beliefs are most likely 
not isolated to the dependent variables the present study focused upon: affective polarization, 
desire for social distance, and political participation. It is also of great importance to study the 
effects of beliefs on political outcomes more closely. In Study 1, political participation was 
assessed (both in terms of the past year, and immediate intentions to vote). A marginal, negative 
effect of intergroup contact on voting intention was discovered, but it is unclear how robust this 
effect is. Future research on political participation may use more nuanced and diverse 
measurements of intention to participate, including measuring other outcomes like intention to 
donate, intention to protest., etc.  
Some of the research most directly related to this project assess political tolerance, rather 
than, or in addition to, intergroup affect as a dependent variable (e.g., Suhay, Brandt & Proulx, 
2016, Mutz, 2002a). This is a greatly important outcome to assess as well. It is plausible that 
beliefs about ideology may influence how willing we are to tolerate ideological differences, as 
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discussed previously. Furthermore, interest in political discussion, persuasion and compromise 
are also important outcomes to measure. Essentializing a political outgroup may make dialogue 
seem impossible. This possibility seems quite likely, given research finding that those with 
“entity beliefs” about personality are less likely than those with “incremental beliefs” to confront 
someone who makes an offensive remark (Rattan & Dweck, 2009). Having a lay theory of 
politics that casts political beliefs as reflecting discrete, immutable social entities may also 
reduce interest in conversations that confront and explore disagreements.  
 Perceptions of the essential nature of liberals vs. conservatives. The political 
essentialism scale presented here measures attitudes about political ideology in general. It 
therefore does not differentiate between essentialism of the ingroup and essentialism of the 
outgroup, nor the perceived essentialism of liberalism vs. conservativism. With slight re-
wording, the scale could be re-written into two versions that assess beliefs about liberals and 
conservatives separately. Essentializing one’s in-group and out-group can both contribute to 
prejudice (see Zagefka, Nigbur, Gonzaelz & Tip, 2013). While GLM analysis reflects the distinct 
roles of overall essentialism on in vs. out group attitudes,  the present research does not address 
unique effects of in-group vs. out-group essentialism on such attitudes. Liberals and 
conservatives may be rated differently on essentialism measures, even averaging across in-group 
identification. For example, stereotypes of liberals being “emotional” but conservatives “rigid” 
(Crawford et al., 2013) may contribute to differential perceptions of essentialism. There is, for 
one example, a specific narrative that posits people get more conservative as they age (e.g., 
Glenn, 1974). This may lead to differential expectations of immutability. As Bukowski wrote, 
“What hardly ever happens / is a man going from being a young conservative to a / wild-ass 
radical in old age. / young conservatives become old / conservatives” (2002). An exploratory 
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study that assesses perceived essentialism of liberalism and conservativism (within-subject), and 
also measures the participants’ ideology, could disentangle unique effects of distinct ideologies 
and ingroup vs. outgroup status.  
 The degree that people essentialize party identification could be another interesting area 
for future research. Polarization based on party identification is just as apparent as polarization 
based on ideological identification (Iyengar et al., 2012). Differentiating ideological from party 
identification can also be important when expanding this research to other cross-cultural 
contexts. While a left-right ideological distinction is relevant to many political contexts 
worldwide, systems of government and party organization vary widely. Research could explore 
whether party participation is similarly essentialized in different contexts, or if it, for example, 
weakens in countries with a greater number of viable political parties, or a less politically 
divergent citizenry.  
 Refine the measurement of political essentialism. Future research should pursue 
refinement of the essentialism measure. Several analyses suggested that Item 2 and Item 18 did 
not cohere with the rest of the items. Furthermore, confirmatory factor analyses and correlational 
analyses suggested “biological basis” is a relatively distinct construct, mostly uncorrelated with 
the rest of the scale. Exploratory factor analysis suggested the social determinism factor can 
largely be captured by two items, while the other two are better modelled as part of more diffuse 
factor. A conservative next research step could entail collecting data and performing a “truly 
confirmatory” analysis of this data, informed by these findings (i.e., dropping some items, 
measuring social determinism with two items only).  
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A more extensive line of research could acknowledge that political essentialism is a 
construct with a moderate level of specificity, that could be either expanded or pared down. On 
one hand, it is a collection of beliefs, rather than a single belief. On the other, it does not capture 
the wide variety of beliefs people may have about political identity, some of which may not be 
easily characterized as “essentialist” beliefs. Two approaches would be reasonable extensions of 
the present research. One would be to pursue a briefer, more concise measure of essentialism-
related beliefs. This could entail selecting the one to two strongest loading items for each 
essentialism facet, and constructing a 5 to 10 item scale. This could  produce a measure more 
appropriate for survey research environments, which in turn could help facilitate research with a 
broader sample. A separate project would be to expand the measure of lay beliefs about politics. 
Lay people may employ other explanations for the mystery of why people’s political views vary 
so much. Do other people arrive at “incorrect” political beliefs because they are immoral, selfish, 
deluded, or unintelligent? Incorporating such alternate lay beliefs would enrich the five “factors” 
explored in the present research. This could help illuminate why, for example, anti-social 
determinism is related to greater polarization. Is it that polarized participants reject social 
determinism in favor of a less forgiving lay theory (e.g., that the outgroup is stupid or evil?). 
This could be a fruitful area for further exploratory research.  
Conclusion 
This set of studies provided an investigation of the connection between essentializing lay 
beliefs and affective polarization. The experimental evidence did not support hypothesis that 
shifts in lay beliefs about politics cause polarization. Correlational results, however, provided a 
great deal of richness in exploring the connection between essentializing lay beliefs, attitudes, 
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and related constructs. Essentialism about politics covaries positively with greater affective 
polarization and desire for social distance. It simultaneously corresponds negatively with open-
minded cognition and past intergroup contact. Mediation models are consistent with the 
explanation that intergroup contact, and open-mindedness, partially function to reduce affective 
polarization “through” reduced essentialism. Though, again, conclusions from such mediational 
models applied to cross-sectional designs cannot be provided as strong evidence of causation 
(Kline, 2015).  
The results provided here provide a great deal of exploratory, yet statistically significant, 
results that could be addressed with future research. Dimensions of essentialism that are more 
concerned with “etiology” of political ideology may in fact reduce affective polarization. Social 
determinism was associated with dampened ingroup warmth, and biological determinism related 
to increased outgroup warmth. While not predicted, these results are consistent with other 
research reflecting that essentializing lay theories can at times be associated with reduced 
prejudice (e.g., Angermeyer, Matschinger, & Corrigan, 2004; Haslam & Levy, 2006). Biological 
determinism, while expected to covary with a group of other essentializing lay beliefs, turns out 
to be a relatively distinct construct. While again contrary to expectations, it is congruent with 
related research about the facets of essentialism of other targets (Delgado-Acosta et al., 2016).  
If trends in affective polarization continue, with liberals and conservative increasingly 
disliking each other (Iyengar et al., 2012), moving away from each other (Motyl et al., 2014), 
and viewing each other through a stereotypic lens (Crawford et al., 2013), research on the 
psychological mechanisms related to such attitudes and behaviors will be increasingly important. 
The present research provides important evidence that lay beliefs do correspond with inter-
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ideological attitudes, and points toward directions for further investigation. There are serious 
potential consequences of polarization, not just for interpersonal harmony and comfort, but in the 
political domain as well. Extreme polarization is a suspected contributor to the decay of 
democracy itself (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; as cited in Laidler, 2018). A polarized electorate 
may be prepared to welcome harms to democracy (e.g., foreign election interference, restrictions 
to voting rights), as long as those harms are perceived as affecting a reviled opposing party. 
Feelings about members of opposing ideologies, and the lay beliefs that may bolster those 
feelings, should not be overlooked in studying this emerging phenomenon.  
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Consent Form 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
Project Title: Political attitudes study 
Researcher: Chase Wilson 
Faculty Sponsor: Victor C. Ottati  
 
Introduction:  
You are being asked to take part in a research study being conducted by Chase Wilson 
for a research project under the supervision of Victor C. Ottati, Ph.D. in the Department 
of Psychology at Loyola University of Chicago.  
You are being asked to participate because of your involvement with Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk. You must be a U.S. resident and 18 years or older to participate in 
this study. Approximately 420 individuals will be participating in the study.  
Please read this page carefully and ask any questions you may have before deciding 
whether to participate in the study.  
 
Purpose:  
The purpose of this study is to learn more about people’s beliefs about political identity 
and attitudes related to politics. Expertise in politics is not required to complete this 
study.    
Procedures:  
If you agree to be in the study, you will be asked to:  
- Complete several questionnaires about your beliefs  
- Respond to several questions about your thinking style, preferences, and attitudes  
- Respond to demographic questions  
This study should take you about 15 minutes.  
 
Risks/Benefits:  
Confidentiality will be maintained to the degree permitted by the technology used. Your 
participation in this online survey involves risks similar to a person’s everyday use of the 
Internet. There are no direct benefits to you from participation, but this study may 
benefit society by providing more understanding about how people perceive politics and 
political identity.  
 
Compensation:  
If you complete the study, you will receive $1.25 to compensate you for your 
participation. At the end of the survey you will be given a short code, which you will 
enter into the MTurk HIT page. This will ensure you are correctly identified as having 
completed the study so you can receive payment.  If you chose to end participation 
before completing the study, you will not be compensated. Payments are made via 
Amazon’s payment system.  
Confidentiality:  
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No identifying information will be collected for this study. All data will be associated with 
a unique identification number (e.g. 101, 102, 103…). The results of this study will 
primarily be used only in the aggregate form, for reports, presentations, or publications. 
During the research phase, the data will be stored on researchers’ private, password 
protected computers.  Only the researchers (Chase Wilson, Victor Ottati) will have 
access to it. After the primary research phase has concluded, the anonymous dataset 
will be stored indefinitely. This anonymous dataset may be made available to other 
researchers online upon request, or via Open Science platforms.   
 
 Voluntary Participation: Participation in this study is voluntary. If you do not want to 
be in this study, you do not have to participate. Even if you decide to participate, you are 
free not to answer any question or to withdraw from participation at any time without 
penalty. If you wish to exit the survey, you may do so by closing the browser window 
and returning the MTurk HIT.  
As this survey is anonymous, the researcher will not be able to identify and/or remove 
any individual responses dataset after they are submitted.  
Your decision to participate or not will have no effect on your relationship with Loyola 
University Chicago.  
 
Contacts and Questions:  
If you have questions about this research study, please feel free to contact Chase 
Wilson at cwilson9@luc.edu or the faculty sponsor Victor C. Ottati, Ph.D. at 
vottati@luc.edu or 773-508-3024.  
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the 
Loyola University Office of Research Services at (773) 508-2689.  
 
Statement of Consent: 
 
By selecting “I agree” and completing the survey you are agreeing to participate in the 
research.  
 
[ ] I agree  
[ ] No thank you 
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Political Essentialism Scale 
Questionnaire about political beliefs 
Below are a series of statements about “political beliefs.” “Political beliefs” refer to whether 
someone is conservative, moderate, or liberal.  
Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements, on a scale form 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). There are no right answers; please just share your 
honest opinion. 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Neither agree  
nor disagree 
Strongly 
agree  
         
 1 Liberals and conservatives are two distinct 
groups without much overlap. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 2 A conservative can start taking on some 
more liberal beliefs, but is still 
fundamentally a conservative (and vice 
versa). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 3 If you know someone is liberal or 
conservative, that tells you a lot about them 
as a person. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 4 People are socialized into being liberals or 
conservatives during their formative years 
(i.e., birth to age 18).  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 5 Whether a person is liberal or conservative 
is determined at least partly by their genes. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 6 The boundary between liberals and 
conservatives is fuzzy. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 7 People's ideology can easily change as they 
get older.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 8 You can’t really judge someone by their 
politics – it is a small part of who they are. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 9 How someone is raised doesn’t affect their 
political views very much. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 10 A person’s genes do not influence their 
political beliefs. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 11 A person’s political ideology is distinct; you 
are either are a liberal or a conservative. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 12 People’s political views can't really be 
changed. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 13 A person’s political views can tell you a lot 
about the kind of person they are. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 14 Whether someone is liberal or conservative 
is determined by their upbringing (the 
influence of their caretakers and 
environment up through age 18).  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 15 Different political views are caused, at least 
in part, by biologically hard-wired 
differences. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 16 People have many different political beliefs, 
and it is hard to categorize most people as 
either liberal or conservative. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 17 People can change their fundamental 
political beliefs at any time. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 18 It is impossible to judge how someone will 
react in new social situations based on 
knowing their political beliefs. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 19 Whether someone grows up in a liberal or 
conservative environment doesn’t determine 
their own politics as an adult.    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 20 A person’s political ideology is something 
that cannot be explained by their biology. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Affective Polarization (Thermometer Ratings) 
We'd like to get your feelings toward some of the major political groups in America today. To be clear, 
“conservative” means all people who are conservative (not just conservative politicians); and “liberal” 
means all people who are liberal (not just liberal politicians).  
Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the people. 
Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the people and that 
you don't care too much for these people. You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don't 
feel particularly warm or cold toward the people. 
Approximate meanings for different numbers:  
100 = Very warm or favorable feeling 
85 = Quite warm or favorable feeling 
70 = Fairly warm or favorable feeling 
60 = A bit more warm or favorable than cold feeling 
50 = No feeling either way 
40 = A bit more cold or unfavorable than warm feeling 
30 = Fairly cold or unfavorable feeling 
15 = Quite cold or unfavorable feeling 
0 = Very cold or unfavorable feeling 
 
How do you feel toward liberals?  
Very cold or unfavorable       Very warm or favorable 
 0 -------------------------------------------------------50-------------------------------------------------------100 
 
How do you feel toward conservatives?  
Very cold or unfavorable       Very warm or favorable 
 0 -------------------------------------------------------50-------------------------------------------------------100 
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Desire for Social Distance 
Preferred Social Interaction 
In deciding where to live, how important would it be to you to live in a place where most people 
held political views similar to your own? 
           Somewhat 
            important       
Not at all important (1)         (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Extremely important 
 
How do you think you would react if a member of your immediate family told you they were 
going to marry a [liberal/conservative]? Would you be generally happy about this, generally 
unhappy, or wouldn’t it matter to you at all? 
     
Very           Neither happy nor                  Very  
        Unhappy    Unhappy                                        happy 
(1)            (2)           (3)      (4)  (5)  (6)      (7)   
 
 
Would you generally like to meet and get to know people with [liberal/conservative] beliefs? 
[the above populates with “liberal” for conservative subjects, and “conservative” for liberal 
subject] 
Really dislike (1)     
Dislike (2)  
Dislike a little  (3)   
Neutral/Unsure (4)     
Like a little  (5)    
Like  (6)  
Really like (7)           
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Political Correlates 
Political Questionnaire 
 
How interested are you in politics and public affairs? 
 Extremely interested  
 Very interested  
 Somewhat interested  
 Not too interested  
 Not at all interested  
 
People vary in how much they follow politics in the news. How often do you read, watch, or 
listen to news about politics, in general?  
 [Never  
About once a year  
Several times a year  
About once a month 
About once a week  
Several times a week  
Daily (Less than 30 minutes a day, on average) 
Daily (30 minutes or more a day, on average)] 
  
And how often do you get news from a social networking site (such as Facebook or Twitter)? 
 [Never  
About once a year  
Several times a year  
About once a month 
About once a week  
Several times a week  
Daily (Less than 30 minutes a day, on average) 
Daily (30 minutes or more a day, on average)] 
 
Please click on all of the sources that you got news about government and politics from in the 
past week (whether online, on TV, in print, or on the radio – they all count). If you didn’t get 
news from any of these sources, please just select “none of these.”    
 
Fox News 
Breitbart 
The Blaze 
MSNBC 
New York Times 
NPR 
ABC News 
Wall Street Journal 
USA Today 
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None of these
 
Please answer the following questions. There are no right or wrong answers.  
1)      Thinking back to the national election in November 2016, when the presidential candidates were 
Hilary Clinton, the Democrat, and Donald Trump, the Republican, did you happen to vote in that 
election? [Yes No] 
2)      Since January 2016, at the beginning of the last national election year, have you worked as a 
volunteer – that is, for no pay at all or only for a token amount—for a candidate running for national, 
state, or local office? [Yes No] 
3)      Since January 2016, did you contribute money to an individual candidate, a party group, a political 
action committee, or any other organization that supported candidates? [Yes No] 
4)      In the past twelve months, have you contacted a federal elected official or someone on the staff of 
such an official?  I mean someone in the White House or a Congressional or Senate office? [Yes No] 
5)      In the past twelve months, have you contacted a state or local elected official such as a governor or 
mayor or a member of the state legislature or a city or town council or someone on the staff of such an 
official? [Yes No] 
6)      In the past two years, since October 2015 [NOTE: replace with current month at time study is run, 
if necessary] have you taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration on some national or local issue? 
[Yes No] 
Vote intention. 
So far as you know, do you expect to vote in the midterm congressional elections in November, 
208?          
Definitely will not         Not sure    Definitely will 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Open Minded Cognition. 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? There are no right or wrong 
answers, we are just interested your opinions. Please click on the circle that best matches your 
opinion, on a scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7) 
 
  
Strongly 
Disagree 
Neither agree  
nor disagree 
Strongly 
agree 
1 I am open to considering other 
viewpoints.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 I often “tune out” messages I disagree 
with. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 I believe it is a waste of time to pay 
attention to certain ideas. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 I try to reserve judgment until I have a 
chance to hear arguments from both 
sides of an issue.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 I have no patience for arguments I 
disagree with. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 When thinking about an issue, I 
consider as many different opinions as 
possible.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Past Intergroup Contact Quantity 
Past social interaction 
1. Think about the people you spend time with. This may include family members, people 
you interact with socially, coworkers, and others (but exclude young children). About 
what percent of these people have are liberal, conservative, moderate, or other? Please 
provide your best estimate. Numbers should add to 100%.  
Percent who are liberal (or left-wing): ____ 
Percent who are conservative (or right-wing):  ____ 
Percent who are moderate, have another ideology, have no political leaning, or  
  you don’t know what their ideology is  ______ 
  [program automatically sums the numbers above and prompts participant  
  ensure this number adds to 100] 
 
Do you know at least one [liberal (if conservative participant)/conservative (if liberal 
 participant)] person?  
 Yes, I do know one or more liberal. 
 No, I don't know any liberal people at all. 
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Past Intergroup Contact Quality 
 
Please think about the [liberal (if conservative participant)/conservative (if liberal participant)] 
person whom you spend the most time interacting with, and answer the following questions. 
 
2.  How negative or positive are your interactions with this person?  
       Neutral  
Very negative (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Very positive    
 
3. How close is your relationship with this person?  
Somewhat close 
 Not close at all (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Very close    
 
4. How equal is your relationship with this person?  (i.e., does one of you have more power 
than the other in some way, like a boss or a parent?)  
 
Somewhat unequal 
 Not equal at all (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Completely equal 
 
 
5. How cooperative is your relationship with this person?   
                    Somewhat  
     cooperative  
Not cooperative at all (1)   (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)     (7) Completely cooperative  
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Disgust Sensitivity 
The following items describe a number of conditions. Please rate how disgusting you find each 
condition.    
a) Seeing some mold on old leftovers in your refrigerator.                                             
b) Standing close to a person who has body odor.                                                             
c) Shaking hands with a stranger who has sweaty palms.                                                  
d) Stepping on dog poop.   
e) Accidentally touching a person’s bloody cut.                                                                
f) Seeing a cockroach run across the floor.                                                            
g) Sitting next to someone who has red sores on their arm.                                             
    
Response options:  
Not disgusting at all (1)  
Not too disgusting (2)  
Somewhat disgusting (3)  
Very disgusting    (4)  
Extremely disgusting  (5) 
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Demographics 
Demographic Questionnaire 
In what year were you born?  
[Drop-down menu: 1910 – 2000] 
Please select your gender.  
 [Drop-down menu: male, female, non-binary, prefer to self-identify: __________ ] 
Thinking back to the past year, what was your family’s annual income? 
[Drop down menu:  
 <$20,000 
$20,000 - $39,999 
$40,000 - $69,999 
$70,000 - $99,000 
$100,000 - $149,999 
$150,000 - $249,999 
$250,000 or more]  
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 [Drop down menu:  
Less than high school diploma 
 High school diploma or GED 
 Some college but no degree  
2-year degree (e.g., AA, AS)  
 4-year degree (e.g., BA, BS, AB)  
 Master’s degree (e.g., MA, MS, MSW) 
 Professional degree (e.g., MD, JD) 
 Doctorate Degree (e.g., Ph.D., Ed. D.)] 
 
Which of these categories describe you?  
 [Drop down menu:  
 White  
 Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin 
 Black or African Am.  
 Asian 
 Native American, American Indian or Alaskan Native 
 Middle Eastern or North African 
 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
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 Mixed race (two or more of the above)  
 Other _______________ ] 
 
Where would you place yourself on this political spectrum?  
 Extremely Liberal   
 Liberal  
 Slightly liberal  
 Moderate or Middle of the Road 
 Slightly conservative  
 Conservative  
 Extremely conservative  
  
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an 
Independent, or what?  
[1. Democrat 
2. Republican 
3. Independent 
4. Something else:___________] 
 
[One of these follow up questions will pop up based on response to above: 
If 1:  Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat? 
Strong Democrat 
Not strong Democrat 
If 2: Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican? 
Strong Republican 
Not strong Republican  
If 3 or 4: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?  
Closer to the Republican Party 
Closer to the Democratic Party 
Neither] 
 
What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no 
religion? 
None/No religion 
Protestant 
Catholic 
Evangelical Christian 
Christian (other)  
Jewish 
Muslim 
Buddhist 
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 Native American religion 
Hindu 
Another religion ________ 
 
How important would you say religion is in your own life?  
 
 Not important at all  Fairly important  Extremely important 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Which of these categories comes closest to the place you where you currently live? 
 In open country but not on a farm 
 On a farm 
 In a small city or town (under 50,000) 
 In a medium-size city (50,000 – 250,000) 
 In a suburb near a large city 
 In a large city (over 250,000) 
 Other 
Don’t know 
 
 
In what state (or region) do you live?  
 
[Drop-down menu: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,  Arkansas,  California,  Colorado,  Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New, Hampshire, New, Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, 
Wyoming, District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto 
Rico, US Virgin Islands, Other territory or region, I do not live in the U.S.] 
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Debriefing statement 
Thank you for participating in our study!   Your response will help contribute to the growing 
literature on political polarization. The purpose of this study was to look at the links between 
beliefs about political ideology, and attitudes toward people with opposing political views.  You 
completed a questionnaire that was intended to measure your level of “political essentialism”: 
the degree to which you think political identity is permanent, rooted in biology, etc. It is 
predicted that people who essentialize politics more will also tend to dislike, and desire to keep 
away from, people with opposing views. This prediction is grounded in other research that links 
essentialism to prejudice.  
To learn more about research on polarization, political essentialism, and the origins of political 
identity, please feel free to read the articles linked below:  
http://www.people-press.org/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-animosity-in-2016/ 
http://www.psypost.org/2017/01/people-believe-political-views-biological-basis-intolerant-
study-finds-46897 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2013/11/27/why-biology-belongs-in-
the-study-of-politics/?utm_term=.3174eade6b2f 
Lastly, we ask that you not discuss the details of this study with other MTurk workers, as that 
may bias individuals who may become participants in this study at a later time. However, if you 
found it worthwhile, please feel free to alert other workers to the availability of this study as a 
task. If you have any questions regarding this particular research project or psychological 
research in general, please feel free to contact:    
Chase Wilson, M.A.   
Coffey Hall, Room LL27  
Loyola University Chicago    
cwilson9@luc.edu    
 
Victor Ottati, Ph.D.    
Coffey Hall, 243    
Loyola University Chicago  
vottati@luc.edu    
 
For information or questions regarding research ethics and guidelines, please contact:     
 
Office of Research Services    
6525 N. Sheridan Road    
Granada Center, Suite 400    
(773) 508-2689   
ORS@luc.edu   
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Pilot Study Consent Form for Student Sample 
  
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH  
  
Project Title: Read and rate an article  
Researcher: Chase Wilson  
Faculty Sponsor: Victor C. Ottati   
  
Introduction:   
You are being asked to take part in a research study being conducted by Chase 
Wilson for a research project under the supervision of Victor C. Ottati, Ph.D. in the 
Department of Psychology at Loyola University of Chicago.   
You are being asked to participate because of your participation in Loyola University 
Chicago’s undergraduate Psychology participant pool. You must be 18 years or older to 
participate in this study. Approximately 50 individuals will be participating in the study.   
Please read this page carefully and ask any questions you may have before deciding 
whether to participate in the study.   
  
Purpose:   
The purpose of this study is to measure people’s reactions to a social-science themed 
article.    
Procedures:   
If you agree to be in the study, you will be asked to complete the following steps 
online:   
- Read an article (about 2.5 pages in length)   
- Answer several questions about how interesting and readable the article is, as well as 
your assessment of its meaning  
- Respond to demographic questions   
This study should take you about 5 to 10 minutes to complete.   
  
Risks/Benefits:   
Confidentiality will be maintained to the degree permitted by the technology used. Your 
participation in this online survey involves risks similar to a person’s everyday use of the 
Internet. There are no direct benefits to you from participation.   
  
Compensation:   
If you complete the study, you will be given one credit hour. You will be granted this 
credit within 24 hours of completing the study.   
  
Confidentiality:   
No identifying information will be collected for this study. All data will be associated with 
a unique identification number (e.g. 101, 102, 103…). The results of this study will 
primarily be used only in the aggregate form, for reports, presentations, or publications. 
During the research phase, the data will be stored on researchers’ private, password 
protected computers.  Only the researchers (Chase Wilson, Victor Ottati) will have 
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access to it. After the primary research phase has concluded, the anonymous dataset 
will be stored indefinitely. This anonymous dataset may be made available to other 
researchers online upon request, or via Open Science platforms.    
  
 Voluntary Participation: Participation in this study is voluntary. If you do not want to 
be in this study, you do not have to participate. Even if you decide to participate, you are 
free not to answer any question or to withdraw from participation at any time without 
penalty. If you wish to exit the survey, you may do so by closing the browser window.  
As this survey is anonymous, the researcher will not be able to identify and/or remove 
any individual responses from the dataset after they are submitted.   
Your decision to participate or not will have no effect on your relationship with Loyola 
University Chicago.   
  
Contacts and Questions:   
If you have questions about this research study, please feel free to contact Chase 
Wilson at cwilson9@luc.edu or the faculty sponsor Victor C. Ottati, Ph.D. at 
vottati@luc.edu or 773-508-3024.   
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the 
Loyola University Office of Research Services at (773) 508-2689.   
  
Statement of Consent:  
  
By selecting “I agree” and completing the survey you are agreeing to participate in the 
research.   
  
[ ] I agree   
[ ] No thank you  
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Study 2 Pilot Study Consent Form for Mechanical Turk 
  
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH  
  
Project Title: Read and rate an article  
Researcher: Chase Wilson  
Faculty Sponsor: Victor C. Ottati   
  
Introduction:   
You are being asked to take part in a research study being conducted by Chase 
Wilson for a research project under the supervision of Victor C. Ottati, Ph.D. in the 
Department of Psychology at Loyola University of Chicago.   
You are being asked to participate because of your participation in Mechanical 
Turk. You must be 18 years or older to participate in this study. Approximately 
50 individuals will be participating in the study.   
Please read this page carefully and ask any questions you may have before deciding 
whether to participate in the study.   
  
Purpose:   
The purpose of this study is to measure people’s reactions to a social-science themed 
article.    
Procedures:   
If you agree to be in the study, you will be asked to complete the following steps 
online:   
- Read an article (about 2.5 pages in length)   
- Answer several questions about how interesting and readable the article is, as well as 
your assessment of its meaning  
- Respond to demographic questions   
This study should take you about 5 to 10 minutes to complete.   
  
Risks/Benefits:   
Confidentiality will be maintained to the degree permitted by the technology used. Your 
participation in this online survey involves risks similar to a person’s everyday use of the 
Internet. There are no direct benefits to you from participation.   
  
Compensation:   
If you complete the study, you will be compensated $0.75. You will be granted 
this payment within 24 hours of completing the study.   
  
Confidentiality:   
No identifying information will be collected for this study. All data will be associated with 
a unique identification number (e.g. 101, 102, 103…). The results of this study will 
primarily be used only in the aggregate form, for reports, presentations, or publications. 
During the research phase, the data will be stored on researchers’ private, password 
protected computers.  Only the researchers (Chase Wilson, Victor Ottati) will have 
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access to it. After the primary research phase has concluded, the anonymous dataset 
will be stored indefinitely. This anonymous dataset may be made available to other 
researchers online upon request, or via Open Science platforms.    
  
 Voluntary Participation: Participation in this study is voluntary. If you do not want to 
be in this study, you do not have to participate. Even if you decide to participate, you are 
free not to answer any question or to withdraw from participation at any time without 
penalty. If you wish to exit the survey, you may do so by closing the browser window.  
As this survey is anonymous, the researcher will not be able to identify and/or remove 
any individual responses from the dataset after they are submitted.   
Your decision to participate or not will have no effect on your relationship with Loyola 
University Chicago.   
  
Contacts and Questions:   
If you have questions about this research study, please feel free to contact Chase 
Wilson at cwilson9@luc.edu or the faculty sponsor Victor C. Ottati, Ph.D. at 
vottati@luc.edu or 773-508-3024.   
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the 
Loyola University Office of Research Services at (773) 508-2689.   
  
Statement of Consent:  
  
By selecting “I agree” and completing the survey you are agreeing to participate in the 
research.   
  
[ ] I agree   
[ ] No thank you  
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Main Study 2 Consent Form 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
Project Title: Read and Rate an Article 
Researcher: Chase Wilson 
Faculty Sponsor: Victor C. Ottati  
 
Introduction:  
You are being asked to take part in a research study being conducted by Chase Wilson 
for a research project under the supervision of Victor C. Ottati, Ph.D. in the Department 
of Psychology at Loyola University of Chicago.  
You are being asked to participate because of your involvement with Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk. You must be a U.S. resident and 18 years or older to participate in 
this study. Approximately 200 individuals will be participating in the study.  
Please read this page carefully and ask any questions you may have before deciding 
whether to participate in the study.  
 
Purpose:  
The purpose of this study is to gather reactions to a social science-themed article.  
Procedures:  
If you agree to be in the study, you will be asked to:  
- Read an article (about 2.5 pages in length)  
- Answer several questions about how interesting and readable the article is 
- Respond to several opinion and demographic questions  
This study should take you about 10 minutes to complete.  
 
Risks/Benefits:  
Confidentiality will be maintained to the degree permitted by the technology used. Your 
participation in this online survey involves risks similar to a person’s everyday use of the 
Internet. There are no direct benefits to you from participation, but this study may 
benefit society by providing more understanding about how people perceive politics and 
political identity.  
 
Compensation:  
If you complete the study, you will receive $1.00 to compensate you for your 
participation. At the end of the survey you will be given a short code, which you will 
enter into the MTurk HIT page. This will ensure you are correctly identified as having 
completed the study so you can receive payment.  If you chose to end participation 
before completing the study, you will not be compensated. Payments are made via 
Amazon’s payment system.  
 
Confidentiality:  
No identifying information will be collected for this study. All data will be associated with 
a unique identification number (e.g. 101, 102, 103…). The results of this study will 
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primarily be used only in the aggregate form, for reports, presentations, or publications. 
During the research phase, the data will be stored on researchers’ private, password 
protected computers.  Only the researchers (Chase Wilson, Victor Ottati) will have 
access to it. After the primary research phase has concluded, the anonymous dataset 
will be stored indefinitely. This anonymous dataset may be made available to other 
researchers online upon request, or via Open Science platforms.   
 
 Voluntary Participation: Participation in this study is voluntary. If you do not want to 
be in this study, you do not have to participate. Even if you decide to participate, you are 
free not to answer any question or to withdraw from participation at any time without 
penalty. If you wish to exit the survey, you may do so by closing the browser window 
and returning the MTurk HIT.  
As this survey is anonymous, the researcher will not be able to identify and/or remove 
any individual responses dataset after they are submitted.  
Your decision to participate or not will have no effect on your relationship with Loyola 
University Chicago.  
 
Contacts and Questions:  
If you have questions about this research study, please feel free to contact Chase 
Wilson at cwilson9@luc.edu or the faculty sponsor Victor C. Ottati, Ph.D. at 
vottati@luc.edu or 773-508-3024.  
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the 
Loyola University Office of Research Services at (773) 508-2689.  
 
Statement of Consent: 
 
By selecting “I agree” and completing the survey you are agreeing to participate in the 
research.  
 
[ ] I agree  
[ ] No thank you 
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Instructions Page for Pilot And Main Study 
 
 
 
Instructions 
On the next page, you will see the text of an article adapted from the popular 
press.  
After you read the article, you will be asked to rate how good of a fit the article 
would be for high school students. Specifically, you will be asked rate how 
interesting and understandable it is.  
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Article Manipulation for Pilot and Main Study: High Essentialism Condition1 
 
Please read the following article. You will be asked several questions about it on the following 
page.  
Research from several major U.S. Universities indicates that political affiliation is not as easily 
changed as many might think.  
“Members of political groups share deep-seated attitudes, and although someone may 
occasionally vote for a candidate of a different persuasion, ideology tends to be a life-long thing.  
If someone is a conservative in college, they are likely to be conservative their whole lives.  The 
same is true for liberals.  Conservatives share a deep similarity with other conservatives. The 
same is true for liberals, they are just a lot alike,” reports Dr. Michael Huber of the University of 
Chicago, summing up the results of an analysis of 6 decades of voting behavior.  
“These affiliations are really quite stable,” continues Huber.  And the evidence shows he is right.  
Only a small percentage of people actually change their political affiliations after their early 
20’s.  A 35-year longitudinal study revealed that 86% of individuals still affiliate with the same 
political label that they did at age 20, and 94% still affiliate with the same political label they did 
at age 24.   Of those individuals who currently have college age children, 92% of those children 
identified as the same political party as their parents, yet additional evidence that political 
affiliations don’t change.  “One can say with near certainty that a liberal or a conservative at age 
20 will still be a liberal or conservative at age 80.” 
“Although someone might vote across ideological lines once or twice, the core values that 
underlie political affiliation don’t much change.  This affects the friendships that people foster, 
who people choose to marry, and even where people decide to live.  Political attitudes and 
affiliations have lifelong effects.”   
Political affiliations are informative  
People often assume that if they know someone is a liberal or conservative, they can infer 
something about that person’s personality or lifestyle. Interestingly, assumptions that people 
make about others, based on ideology, turn out to be more accurate than not. A 2015 UC-Santa 
Barbara study measured how accurate people were in estimating a stranger’s personality traits 
after interacting with them for just one minute. Overall, the participants had a better-than-chance, 
but not strongly accurate, estimate of the stranger’s personality. However, informing the 
participant about the stranger’s political leanings improved the participant’s assessment by 60%, 
on average.  Knowing the person’s political leanings even improved accuracy on traits that 
seemingly have nothing to do with politics.  Apparently, politics is not an isolated facet of a 
person’s personality or interests.   
                                                 
1 Article text was adapted from materials used by Bernstein, et al. (2010).  
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Eric Bodin, a political scientist at the University of Texas, has some thoughts about why politics 
can show us so much about people’s personalities. Liberals and conservatives tend to run in 
“uniquely isolated social circles,” he argues, enhancing similarities within each group.  Professor 
Bodin and his colleagues analyzed social networks, groups of friends and acquaintances, across a 
dozen small and medium sized towns across the U.S., in a study including more than 8000 
participants.  “Of course, people tend to have friends who share politics with them.  Liberals 
befriend liberals. Conservatives befriend conservatives.” He continues, “people often feel as 
though sharing political ideology is key in forming and maintaining social bonds. In reality this 
appears to be true, and it is a long term effect.” 
Political Genes? 
Recent research from Rice University links political affiliation to genetics.  Evidence supports 
the argument that political affiliation may be ingrained: "Political tendencies are like being left-
handed or right-handed -- you're born feeling more natural using one hand or the other," says 
David Mayer, a political scientist at Rice University. "It doesn't mean you can't switch -- but it's 
extremely difficult and more likely for people to think they’ve changed without realizing how 
their original affiliation influences their behaviors." 
It's a classic dispute of nature versus nurture, and it was Mayer's study on nearly 10,000 twins 
that started the debate three years ago. The study showed identical twins, who share all the same 
genes, are more likely to share political views than fraternal twins, who share only about 50 
percent of their genes.  This is even true when the twins are reared in separate homes due to 
adoption.   
The results of Mayer's study have led scientists at New York University to see whether brains of 
liberals and conservatives look any different.  In one study, researchers at NYU asked 43 study 
subjects to assess if they were liberal or conservative. They then strapped electrodes on the 
subjects and had them play a game on the computer. In this study published last year in the 
journal Nature Neuroscience, the researchers found that liberals and conservatives processed 
information differently. Specifically, they found differences in activity in the anterior cingulate 
cortex, an area of the brain that processes conflicting information. 
William Carlin, an assistant professor of psychology at NYU, and lead author of the study, says 
these results suggest that liberals and conservatives have some basic brain differences -- and 
those differences are influenced by our genetic makeup. 
"People used to think political attitudes were shaped only by our environment," he says. "Now 
we realize political attitudes are influenced in large part by our genes. We are born with neural 
pre-sets.  Though they can interact with the environment, the genetic component plays a crucial 
role in the political affiliations and behaviors in which people engage." 
“This is really groundbreaking stuff,” says Rob Alexander at the University of Chicago.  
“Understanding that political affiliation is stable, that it affects so many dimension of life, and 
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that it even has a strong biological component is certainly going to change the way both 
politicians and everyday Americans think about politics.”  
 
Nurture also plays a role 
While nature has powerful effects on whether we are liberal or conservative, scientists are also 
looking to early-in-life nurture as fundamentally shaping our political futures.  One’s upbringing 
cannot be ignored, argues Alexander. “Parents’ political leanings have a huge effect on their 
children’s political preferences.  A lot of this is explained by biology – but the remainder can 
largely be explained by how people are raised.”  Supporting this idea, a recent study published in 
the Journal of Political Science argues that the apple rarely falls far from the tree. The study 
shows that even children of politically apathetic parents are likely to be shaped by their parents’ 
ideology. This is partially explained by genes, but also partially explained by differences in how 
inherently liberal and inherently conservative people parent. The result is that political identity is 
deeply determined at a young age by both nature and nurture.  Once formed in childhood, 
political identity is relatively permanent in adulthood – leaving little room for adopting new 
ideological stances later in life.  
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Article Manipulation for Pilot and Main Study: Low Essentialism Condition 
Please read the following article. You will be asked several questions about it on the following 
page.  
Research from several major U.S. Universities indicates that political affiliation is more easily 
changed than many might think.  
“Though it is certainly true that members of political groups share attitudes, political affiliation 
tends change repeatedly through people’s lives.  If someone is a conservative in college, does not 
necessarily mean they are likely to be conservative their whole lives.  The same is true for 
liberals.  In fact, it turns out that conservatives tend to have relatively low levels of similarity 
with other conservatives, and liberals have low levels of similarity with other liberals.  This 
allows people to move relatively easily between political parties and affiliations over the course 
of their adult life,” reports Dr. Michael Huber of the University of Chicago, summing up the 
results of an analysis of 6 decades of voting behavior.  
“These affiliations are really quite unstable,” continues Huber.  And the evidence shows he is 
right.  Only a small percentage of people maintain their political affiliations after their early 20’s.  
A 35 year longitudinal study revealed that 52% of individuals still affiliate with the same 
political label that they did at age 20, and only 54% still affiliate with the same political label 
they did at age 24.  Of those individuals whom currently have college age children, only about 
50% of those children identified as the same political party as their parents.  In essence, this is a 
chance occurrence.  “It’s a 50-50 coin toss whether someone will affiliate as a liberal or 
conservative.  It is nearly impossible to say with any certainly that a liberal or a conservative at 
age 20 will still be a liberal or conservative at age 40.” 
 “People often vote across ideological lines, indicating that the ideological affiliations don’t hold 
much strength for most individuals over time. Though some have argued that political affiliation 
affects the friendships that people foster, who people choose to marry, and even where people 
decide to live, evidence to the contrary seems to be very prevalent.  In the post-collegiate 
environment, people easily make and maintain friendships and romantic relationships across 
ideological lines.  Political attitudes and affiliations seem not to have the lifelong effects that 
people once thought.”   
Politics are not that informative 
People sometimes assume that if they know someone is a liberal or conservative, they can infer 
something about that person’s personality or lifestyle. Interestingly, assumptions that people 
make about others, based on ideology, turn out to be quite inaccurate. A 2015 UC-Santa Barbara 
study measured how accurate people were in estimating a stranger’s personality traits after 
interacting with them for just one minute. Overall, the participants had a better-than-chance, but 
not strongly accurate, estimate of the stranger’s personality. Informing the participant about the 
stranger’s political leanings did not improve their accuracy whatsoever.  This was especially true 
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for traits that didn’t have to do directly with politics.  Apparently, politics is a rather isolated 
facet of a person’s personality and interests.   
Eric Bodin, a political scientist at the University of Texas, has some thoughts about why politics 
are so irrelevant to people’s personalities. Liberals and conservatives “do not run in isolated 
social circles,” he argues.  Professor Bodin and his colleagues analyzed social networks, groups 
of friends and acquaintances, across a dozen small and medium sized towns across the U.S., in a 
study including more than 8000 participants.  “People tend to socialize a wide assortment of 
people. Liberals befriend some conservatives. Conservatives befriend some liberals.” He 
continues, “people sometimes feel as though sharing political ideology is key in forming and 
maintaining social bonds. In reality this appears to not be true.” 
Political Genes?  
Though some researchers have argued that there is a genetic component to all behavior, 
researchers from Rice University have continually found a lack of relationship between political 
affiliation and genetics, supporting evidence for the argument that political affiliation is not 
ingrained: "Political tendencies are not like being left-handed or right-handed -- you're not born 
leaning one way or another," says David Mayer, a political scientist at Rice University. "People 
can change their attitudes easily and repeatedly through the lifespan.”  
It's a classic dispute of nature versus nurture, and it was Mayer's study on nearly 10,000 twins 
that started the debate three years ago. The study showed identical twins, who share all the same 
genes, are actually no more likely to share political views than fraternal twins, who share only 
about 50 percent of their genes.  This was even true when the twins are reared in separate homes 
due to adoption. “If genetics were a major factor in political affiliation then identical twins 
should have shown more similarity than fraternal twins. The data fail to show that, however.  
There is just no evidence that politics has a genetic link.  It’s all about what a person learns.”   
The results of Mayer's study have led scientists at New York University to see whether brains of 
liberals and conservatives look any different.  In one study, researchers at NYU asked 43 study 
subjects to assess if they were liberal or conservative. They then strapped electrodes on the 
subjects and had them play a game on the computer. In this study published last year in the 
journal Nature Neuroscience, the researchers found that liberals and conservatives processed 
information almost exactly the same and that any differences that did occur could not be 
attributed to political affiliation or ideology. Specifically, they found no differences in activity in 
the anterior cingulate cortex, an area of the brain that processes conflicting information. This 
area tends to commonly show differences in other group affiliations, but not using political 
affiliation. 
William Carlin, an assistant professor of psychology at NYU, and lead author of the study, says 
these results suggest that liberals and conservatives have some basic brain similarities -- and any 
differences that do occur are not influenced by our genetic makeup. 
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"People used to think political attitudes were shaped both by our environment and our genes," he 
says. "Now we realize there is little evidence that political attitudes are influenced by our genes. 
It is not as though we are born with neural pre-sets.  The immediate environment and one’s own 
free will plays a crucial role in the political affiliations and behaviors in which people engage." 
“This is really groundbreaking stuff,” says Rob Alexander at the University of Chicago.  
“Understanding that political affiliation is relatively unstable, that it has little continued impact 
on relationships, and that its lack of a strong biological component is certainly going to change 
the way both politicians and everyday Americans think about politics.  Political identity seems 
much more up for grabs than it did previously.” 
Upbringing isn’t everything 
While nature does not seem to wholly determine whether we are liberal or conservative, people 
may look to early nurture as fundamentally shaping our political futures.  This is not necessarily 
the case, argues Alexander. “It’s tempting to think that liberals and conservatives are essentially 
reflections of their upbringings.  Research isn’t really supporting this idea, either.  Parents’ 
political leanings only have a slight effect on their children’s political preferences.”  Supporting 
this idea, a recent study published in the Journal of Political Science argues that the apple often 
falls far from the tree. The study shows that even children of very politically active parents are 
likely to rebel against their parents’ political views. The result is that neither nature nor nurture 
strongly determine people’s political identity.  
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Pilot Study 2: Bogus Questions and Pilot Test Dependent Variables 
 
11th graders would likely find this article:  
  
      Neither boring  
          Nor interesting 
Boring  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Interesting 
 
       
  
In terms of reading level, for average 11th graders, this article would be:    
Too easy  
Just right  
Too difficult  
  
According to the researchers described in the article, political beliefs…   
  
Are not changeable 1 2    3    4     5  Are changeable  
Are biologically based1   2    3    4     5   Are not biologically based  
Are determined by upbringing   1   2    3    4     5  Are not determined by upbringing  
Group people into distinct camps    1  2    3    4     5   Do not group people into distinct camps  
Tell you a lot about someone’s personality  1   2    3    4     5  Do not tell you a lot about 
someone’s personality  
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Main Study 2: “Bogus” Questions for Both Conditions 
 
11th graders would likely find this article: 
 
         Neither boring  
          Nor interesting 
Boring  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Interesting 
 
 
In terms of reading level, for average 11th graders, this article would be:   
Too easy  
Just right  
Too difficult 
 
This article would be most interesting to students who are interested in (select all that apply): 
 English  
History 
Neuroscience 
 Biology 
 Psychology 
 Physics 
 Chemistry  
 Mathematics 
 Sociology 
 Political science 
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Main Study 2 Transition Page 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you! Next, you will be asked to answer some attitudinal and demographic questions about 
yourself.   
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Main Study 2 Dependent Variables and Political Controls 
 
How interested are you in politics and public affairs? 
 Extremely interested  
 Very interested  
 Somewhat interested  
 Not too interested  
 Not at all interested  
 
People vary in how much they follow politics in the news. How often do you read, watch, or 
listen to news about politics, in general?  
 [Never  
About once a year  
Several times a year  
About once a month 
About once a week  
Several times a week  
Daily (Less than 30 minutes a day, on average) 
Daily (30 minutes or more a day, on average)] 
  
In deciding where to live, how important would it be to you to live in a place where most people 
held political views similar to your own? 
           Somewhat 
            important       
Not at all important (1)         (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Extremely important 
 
How do you think you would react if a member of your immediate family told you they were 
going to marry a [liberal/conservative]? Would you be generally happy about this, generally 
unhappy, or wouldn’t it matter to you at all? 
     
Very           Neither happy nor                  Very  
        Unhappy    Unhappy                                        happy 
(1)            (2)           (3)      (4)  (5)  (6)      (7)   
 
 
Would you generally like to meet and get to know people with [liberal/conservative] beliefs? 
Really dislike  Dislike    Dislike a little  Neutral/Unsure    Like a little      Like             Really like 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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We'd like to get your feelings toward some of the major political groups in America today. To be 
clear, “conservative” means all people who are conservative (not just conservative politicians); 
and “liberal” means all people who are liberal (not just liberal politicians).  
Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the 
people. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the 
people and that you don't care too much for these people. You would rate the person at the 50 
degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the people. 
Approximate meanings for different numbers:  
100 = Very warm or favorable feeling 
85 = Quite warm or favorable feeling 
70 = Fairly warm or favorable feeling 
60 = A bit more warm or favorable than cold feeling 
50 = No feeling either way 
40 = A bit more cold or unfavorable than warm feeling 
30 = Fairly cold or unfavorable feeling 
15 = Quite cold or unfavorable feeling 
0 = Very cold or unfavorable feeling 
 
How do you feel toward liberals?  
Very cold or unfavorable     Very warm or favorable 
 0 --------------------------------------50-----------------------------------------100 
 
How do you feel toward conservatives?  
Very cold or unfavorable     Very warm or favorable 
 0 --------------------------------------50-----------------------------------------100 
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Main Study and Pilot Study 2: Demographics 
 
Demographic Questionnaire 
In what year were you born?  
Please select your gender.  
 [Drop-down menu: male, female, non-binary,] 
Thinking back to the past year, what was your family’s annual income? [Study 2 main study 
only] 
[Drop down menu:  
 <$20,000 
$20,000 - $39,999 
$40,000 - $69,999 
$70,000 - $99,000 
$100,000 - $149,999 
$150,000 - $249,999 
$250,000 or more]  
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? [Study 2 main study only] 
 [Drop down menu:  
Less than high school diploma 
 High school diploma or GED 
 Some college but no degree  
2-year degree (e.g., AA, AS)  
 4-year degree (e.g., BA, BS, AB)  
 Master’s degree (e.g., MA, MS, MSW) 
 Professional degree (e.g., MD, JD) 
 Doctorate Degree (e.g., Ph.D., Ed. D.)] 
 
Which of these categories describe you?  
 [Drop down menu:  
 White  
 Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin 
 Black or African American  
 Asian 
 Native American, American Indian or Alaskan Native 
 Middle Eastern or North African 
 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
 Mixed race (two or more of the above)  
 Other _______________ ] 
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Where would you place yourself on this political spectrum?  
 Extremely Liberal   
 Liberal  
 Slightly liberal  
 Moderate or Middle of the Road 
 Slightly conservative  
 Conservative  
 Extremely conservative  
  
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an 
Independent, or what?  
[1. Democrat 
2. Republican 
3. Independent 
4. Something else:___________] 
 
[One of these follow up questions will pop up based on response to above: 
If 1:  Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat? 
Strong Democrat 
Not strong Democrat 
If 2: Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican? 
Strong Republican 
Not strong Republican  
If 3 or 4: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?  
Closer to the Republican Party 
Closer to the Democratic Party 
Neither] 
 
What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no 
religion? [Study 2 main study only] 
None/No religion 
Protestant 
Catholic 
Evangelical Christian 
Christian (other)  
Jewish 
Muslim 
Buddhist 
 Native American religion 
Hindu 
Another religion ________ 
 
How important would you say religion is in your own life? [Study 2 main study only] 
 Not very important 
Fairly important  
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Very important 
  
 
Which of these categories comes closest to the place you where you currently live? [STUDY 2 
MAIN STUDY ONLY] 
 In open country but not on a farm 
 On a farm 
 In a small city or town (under 50,000) 
 In a medium-size city (50,000 – 250,000) 
 In a suburb near a large city 
 In a large city (over 250,000) 
 Other 
Don’t know 
 
In what state (or region) do you live?  
 
[Drop-down menu: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,  Arkansas,  California,  Colorado,  Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New, Hampshire, New, Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, 
Wyoming, District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto 
Rico, US Virgin Islands, Other territory or region, I do not live in the U.S.] 
 
How interested are you in politics and public affairs? [PILOT STUDY ONLY; ASKED ON 
PREVIOUS PAGE IN MAIN STUDY] 
 Extremely interested  
 Very interested  
 Somewhat interested  
 Not too interested  
 Not at all interested  
 
People vary in how much they follow politics in the news. How often do you read, watch, or 
listen to news about politics, in general? [PILOT STUDY ONLY; ASKED ON PREVIOUS 
PAGE IN MAIN STUDY] 
 
 [Never  
About once a year  
Several times a year  
About once a month 
About once a week  
Several times a week  
Daily (Less than 30 minutes a day, on average) 
Daily (30 minutes or more a day, on average)] 
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Debriefing Statement for Pilot Study 2 
 
Debriefing  
  
Thank you for participating in this study!   
  
The purpose of this study was to determine whether the message of the article was understood by 
participants. You read one of two versions of an article that described ideology as fixed and biological 
(“essentialized”) or changeable and less clearly defined (“less essentialized”). In either case, the article 
you read was fabricated/made up by researchers. It was necessary to imply that the article was real, 
because we are ultimately interested in the impact of such information on people’s 
attitudes. Additionally, we were primarily interested in your assessment of the articles message, rather 
than your ratings of its appropriateness for a high school audience.   
  
Based on the results of this study, the article you read may be used in future research. Your participation 
in this study helps this program of research move forward.  
  
In this study, research was described that may reflect some scientists’ actual views of political identity. 
However, this is an area that is still being researched and explored. If you are interested in some 
perspectives related to what you just read, please see the following links:   
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2013/11/27/why-biology-belongs-in-the-
study-of-politics/?utm_term=.3174eade6b2f   
http://www.psypost.org/2017/01/people-believe-political-views-biological-basis-intolerant-study-finds-
46897  
  
We ask that you please not discuss this study with other [students (for undergraduate 
audience)/individuals (for MTurk audience)], as that may bias individuals who  may be 
future participants in this study. If you have any questions regarding this particular research project or 
psychological research in general, please feel free to contact:     
    
Chase Wilson, M.A.    
Coffey Hall, Room LL27   
Loyola University Chicago     
cwilson9@luc.edu     
    
Victor Ottati, Ph.D.     
Coffey Hall, 243     
Loyola University Chicago   
vottati@luc.edu     
For information or questions regarding research ethics and guidelines, please contact:     
    
Office of Research Services     
6525 N. Sheridan Road     
Granada Center, Suite 400     
(773) 508-2689    
ORS@luc.edu    
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Debriefing Statement for Main Study 2 
 
Debriefing     
    
Thank you for participating in our study!   The purpose of this study was to look at the links between 
beliefs about political ideology and attitudes toward political outgroups.  You read one of two versions 
of an article that purported ideology to be fixed and biological (“essentialized”) or malleable and less 
clearly defined (“less essentialized”). You then reported your attitudes toward people who share, or do 
not share your ideology. It was these attitudes we were primarily interested in, rather than your rating 
of the article’s appropriateness for a high school audience.   
  
This study involved deception. The article you read was made up by researchers. It was necessary to 
temporarily deceive study participants in order to directly investigate relationship between beliefs about 
the nature of politics, and attitudes towards others. The article reported research that does reflect some 
scientists’ views of political identity. However, this is an area that is still being researched and explored. 
If you are interested in some perspectives related to what you just read, please see the following links:   
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2013/11/27/why-biology-belongs-in-the-
study-of-politics/?utm_term=.3174eade6b2f   
http://www.psypost.org/2017/01/people-believe-political-views-biological-basis-intolerant-study-finds-
46897  
  
We ask that you not discuss this study with other workers, as that may bias individuals who   
may become participants in this study at a later time. If you have any questions regarding this 
particular   
research project or psychological research in general, please feel free to contact:     
    
Chase Wilson, M.A.    
Coffey Hall, Room LL27   
Loyola University Chicago     
cwilson9@luc.edu     
    
Victor Ottati, Ph.D.     
Coffey Hall, 243     
Loyola University Chicago   
vottati@luc.edu     
  
For information or questions regarding research ethics and guidelines, please contact:     
    
Office of Research Services     
6525 N. Sheridan Road     
Granada Center, Suite 400     
(773) 508-2689    
ORS@luc.edu    
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Summary of Additional Analyses 
While all formal hypotheses from Study 1 were fully addressed in Chapter 3, several of 
the exploratory research questions entail additional analyses that were not easily incorporated 
into the structure of the main text. The results of these analyses are presented in this Appendix. 
These include Research Question 9 (“Intergroup Contact and Political Participation”), Research 
Question 7 (“Interaction between Intergroup Contact Quantity and Quality), and parts of 
Research Question 3 (“Results Relating to Disgust Sensitivity”). Other analyses are addressed 
here because of discoveries that occurred during the course of analysis. First, the exploratory 
analysis of the political essentialism scale is described (“Exploratory Factor Analysis of the 
Political Essentialism Scale”). An alternate set of regression results, using the political 
essentialism factors that were derived from exploratory factor analysis, is presented in the section 
“Regression Results Using Exploratory Factor Analysis-Derived Subscales.” Finally, an 
exploratory test of whether essentialism (and its subscales) is as an independent predictor of 
polarization outcomes, controlling for a host of other measured variables, is presented under 
“Robustness of Essentialism as a Predictor Using Maximal Controls.”  
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Intergroup Contact and Political Participation 
 The primary analyses examined effects on intergroup relations: the attitudes ideological 
groups have toward each other, and their preferred social distance from each other. However, it 
is possible that while intergroup contact can increase tolerance and affection between ideological 
groups (Mutz, 2002a), it can also produce the effect of decreasing political participation (Mutz, 
2002b). This set of analyses explore the potential adverse effect of intergroup contact on political 
participation.  
A set of items asked whether or not subjects participated seven different political 
activities (e.g., voting, volunteering for a campaign, etc.) in the past year. Table 36 summarizes 
the responses to these questions. A majority reported voting in the 2016 election (84%) but fewer 
than 20% participated in each of the other categories of participation. Values on the past political 
participation variable range from 0 to 7, with a mean of 1.71.  
Table 36: Forms of political participation 
Item N Number (%) who 
selected yes  
Voted in 2016 election 384 323 (84.1%) 
Bumper sticker or other signage 385 68 (17.7%) 
Volunteered for a campaign 384 19 (4.9%) 
Contributed to a campaign 383 47 (12.2%) 
Contacted national representative 384 72 (18.8%) 
Contacted a local representative 385 72 (18.7%) 
Participated in a protest 383 52 (13.6%) 
 
A regression model was built with intergroup contact as a predictor, along with the set of 
primary covariates1, and number of political activities in the past year as the outcome. Identical 
                                                 
1 Preliminary analyses revealed that, while completely uncorrelated with essentialism and the affective polarization 
variables, education and income were significantly correlated with intention to vote in 2018, one of the two variables 
of concern for these analyses. Therefore, these two variables are included as controls here as well.  
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regression equations were run, replacing intergroup contact quantity with intergroup contact 
quality (these were not run simultaneously, so that null results could not be interpreted as the two 
variables’ effects suppressing each other). As demonstrated in Table 37, in Models 1 and 2 there 
were no significant effects of intergroup contact quantity (β = -.03, p = .58) or quality (β = .01, p 
= .84) on past year’s political participation. Model 3, tested whether quantity and quality interact 
to predict political participation (as in, only people with a large amount of high-quality 
intergroup contact would show reduced participation). The interaction term was also 
nonsignificant, β = .066, p = .38. Finally, regression model tested whether political essentialism 
itself significantly influences political participation (Model 4). This relationship was also 
nonsignificant, β = .06, p = .24. 
Table 37. Predicting political participation from intergroup contact quality, quantity, and their interaction; 
and political essentialism 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 
 b  (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
IC quantity  -.002 (.004)   -.004 (.00)   
IC quality   .013 (.06) .040 (.06)   
QuantityX 
Quality 
  
  
.088 (.07)   
Essentialism       .121 (.10) 
Ideology -.398* (.16) -.331* (.17) -.310+ (.17) -.437** (.16) 
Party .024 (.15) -.112 (.16) -.126 (.16) .061 (.15) 
Order .002 (.15) .086 (.15) .043 (.15) .024 (.15) 
Race .110 (.20) -.014 (.21) .008 (.21) .122 (.15) 
Gender .148 (.15) .047 (.15) .059 (.15) .134 (.20) 
Age .052 (.08) .046 (.08) .027 (.08) .077 (.15) 
Religiosity .147+ (.09) .153+ (.09) .144 (.09) .160+ (.08) 
Income .104 (.08) .130 (.08) .105 (.08) .114 (.09) 
Education .195* (.08) .162* (.08) .177 (.08) .176 (.08) 
Constant 1.702*** (.14) 1.543** (0.32) 1.49*** (.33) 1.224 (.38) 
N 373        349  347  376  
Adjusted R2 .058       .062    .069       .057  
+p <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001 
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Another item asked about a behavioral intention: the intention to vote in the 2018 
midterm election, on a scale from 0 (definitely will not) to 10 (definitely will). Mean level of 
intention was 7.69 (SD = 2.86), with a median of 9.0. Following Pew (2016), selecting 9 or 10 on 
this scale is considered an indicator of actual vote intention2. By this metric, 208 (54%) of 
participants strongly intend to vote, while 176 (46%) do not. This binary vote intention variable 
(1=strong intention to vote, 0=not strong intention to vote) serves as the dependent variable of 
interest for the following analyses.  
Logistic regression was used to test whether intention to vote in 2018 was predicted by 
intergroup contact quality, quantity, and/or political essentialism. These regression analyses were 
structured similarly to the past political participation outcome, with each predictor entered 
separately, and the covariates remaining the same. Results indicated that intergroup contact 
quantity was marginally related to reduced intention to vote, B = -.011 (SE=.006), Wald=3.621, 
p = .057. However, there was no relationship between intergroup contact quality and intention to 
vote, B = .076, SE=.092, Wald=.683, p =.41; nor between essentialist beliefs and intention to 
vote, B = -.198 (SE=.156), Wald =1.624, p = .20. 
Table 38. Predicting intention to vote in 2018 election 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b  (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
IC quantity  -.011+ (.006)     
IC quality   -.076 (.092)   
Essentialism     -.198 (.156) 
Ideology -.032 (.242) -.009 (.254) .015 (.241) 
Party -.412+ (.229) -.420+ (.243) -.473 (.228) 
Order -.161 (.221) -.193 (.227) -.147 (.220) 
Race .029 (.298) .083 (.314) -.053 (.296) 
                                                 
2 In the Pew (2016) study, 75% of those who selected 9 or 10 on a vote likelihood scale were verified as having 
actually voted, vs. 34% of those who selected 7 or 8.  
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Gender -.072 (.224) -.002 (.230) -.072 (.223) 
Age .544*** (.121) .467*** (.123) .498*** (.120) 
Religiosity .065 (.132) .068 (.137) .056 (.132) 
Income .276* (.119) .276* (.122) .277* (.118) 
Education .205+ (.113) .178+ (.115) .219 (.112) 
Constant .340 (.217) -.267 (.486) .743 (.575) 
N 381 357 384 
Cox & Snell R2 .117 .097 .113 
 
+p <.10, *p <.05, *p <.01, *p <.001 
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Potential Interaction between Intergroup Contact Quantity and Quality 
Research Question 7 regarded the interaction between intergroup contact quantity and 
quality. That is, it was predicted that intergroup quality may negatively influence essentialism, 
and lessen affective polarization, but only among those who have a large quantity of intergroup 
contact. To test this hypothesis, the intergroup contact quantity and quality variables were 
centered, normalized, and multiplied together to form an interaction term. Three regression 
models tested the significance of this interaction with three different dependent variables: 
essentialism, affective polarization, and desire for social distance, while controlling for the 
primary control variables.  
 Results of the relevant regression analyses are displayed in Table 39. There is no 
significant interaction between quality and quantity when predicting any of the three outcomes. 
When controlling for each other, the intergroup contact quantity and quality variables both 
remained significant unique predictors of affective polarization and desired social distance. 
However, only intergroup contact quality significantly predicted essentialism. 
Table 39. Predicting essentialism, ingroup preference, and desire for social distance with the 
interaction between intergroup contact quantity and quality 
 DV: Essentialism DV: In-group 
preference 
DV: Desire for social 
distance 
 Unst. B SE Unst. B SE Unst. B SE 
Ideology .142 (.111) 1.626 (3.512) -.104 (.122) 
Party -.194+ (.106) -5.131 (3.341) -.026 (.116) 
Order .132 (.100) -7.516* (3.141) -.105 (.109) 
Gender -.077 (.101) -6.160+ (3.178) -.244* (.110) 
Race -.308* (.138) -17.515*** (4.362) -.358* (.151) 
Age -.088+ (.052) 2.974+ (1.628) -.056 (.056) 
Religiosity .043 (.060) 1.689 (1.892) .004 (.066) 
IC quantity  -.044 (.051) -5.628** (1.606) -.179** (.056) 
IC quality -.291*** (.052) -4.671** (1.625) -.416*** (.056) 
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IC quantity x 
quality  
.059 (.047) -.435 (1.491) -.016 (.052) 
Constant -.126+ (.069) 44.148*** (2.176) 4.051*** (.075) 
N 356 356 356 
Adjusted R2 .023 .135 .215 
+p <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001 
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Disgust Sensitivity and Ideology 
 Regression analyses were run to test whether disgust sensitivity is moderated by ideology 
in predicting in-group preference, desire for social distance, and/or essentialism. It was 
considered that disgust motivates only conservatives’ dislike of liberals, as disgust sensitivity 
plays a role in upholding traditional sexual morality (Crawford et al. 2014). To run these 
analyses, disgust sensitivity and ideology were centered and normalized, then multiplied together 
to form an interaction term. Results of these regression analyses are presented in Table 40 below.  
Table 40. Interaction between disgust sensitivity and ideology in predicting outcomes 
 DV = In-group 
preference 
DV = Desire for 
social distance 
 
 
 
DV = 
Essentialism 
Unst. B SE Unst. B SE 
 
SE Unst. B SE 
 Party -6.378+ 3.327 -.038 .118  -.131+ .074 
Order -8.317* 3.269 -.157 .116  .050 .073 
Gender -6.726* 3.328 -.198+ .118  .001 .074 
Race -19.424*** 4.378 -.448* .156  -.233* .097 
Age 2.285 1.686 -.129* .060  -.091* .037 
Religiosity .341 1.986 -.076 .071  -.021 .044 
Ideology 1.895 3.546 -.123 .126  .093 .079 
Disgust 1.714 1.706 .144* .061  .149*** .038 
Ideology x 
Disgust 
1.098 1.602 .060 .057  .015 .036 
 (Constant) 42.990*** 2.188 4.015*** .078  3.578*** .049 
 N 378  378   378  
 Adj. R2 .084  .064   .058  
+p <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001 
 
 While the interaction between disgust sensitivity and ideology did not emerge for any 
outcome, the analyses did reveal some interesting results. The association between disgust 
sensitivity and essentialism, which was observed at the bivariate level (See Chapter 3), was 
replicated. Controlling for other factors did not erase the association between these two 
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variables; in fact, evidence suggests a quite significant relationship, β = .208, t(368)= 3.929, p < 
.001.  
 A positive association was also found between disgust sensitivity and desire for social 
distance in the regression model, β = .125, t(368) =  2.370, p = .018. This association was non-
significant at the bivariate level. Therefore, there may be a connection between disgust 
sensitivity and interest in avoiding political others. However, this does not extend to ingroup 
preference. Disgust sensitivity may be more closely associated with preferred behavioral 
responses to political others, rather than evaluative affect toward them.  
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Exploratory Factor Analysis of the Essentialism Scale 
Because confirmatory factor analysis resulted in an inconclusively adequate level of fit, 
an exploratory factor analysis was run to derive a data-driven factor model for the questionnaire. 
This analysis was run to determine if a different factor structure could better explain the set of 
items. If a substantially different, illuminating factor structure emerges, it would be useful to re-
run the primary regression analyses substituting these data-driven subscales.  
Preliminary analyses. The ratio of participants to variables is 19.25 (385/20), which 
suggests a sufficient sample size for exploratory factor analysis (Field, 2009). The sample size 
also exceeds the minimum 200 suggested by Fabrigar et al. (1999) for a set of items with 
moderate communalities.  
To perform the exploratory factor analysis, a maximum-likelihood procedure was 
selected, following popular guidelines (Fabrigar et al., 1999). Because the subfactors of 
essentialism were expected to be correlated, an oblique, direct oblimin rotation was selected. All 
“anti-essentialism” items were reverse-scored prior to factor analysis, to simplify the 
interpretation of results. 
Initially, all 20 items were entered into factor analysis. A preliminary check of item 
communalities confirmed that Item 2 shared too little variance with the rest of the scale, with a 
communality of .185 (below .200 cutoff; Child, 2006). All other items had communalities >.300 
(average = .547). Therefore item 2 was dropped, as in all preceding analyses, and the remaining 
19 items were analyzed. 
Selecting number of factors to extract. To determine the number of factors to extract, I 
was guided primarily by parallel analysis (Horn, 1965). For this analysis, I used syntax 
developed by O’Connor (2000, 2018) for parallel analysis in SPSS. The program generated 
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1,000 parallel datasets, which were random permutations of the actual raw data, with the same 
number of variables and cases. The program then performed principal axis factoring on the 
random datasets, and reported the mean eigenvalues (and 95% confidence interval around those 
eigenvalues) found by factor analyzing those random datasets. This produces an estimate of 
eigenvalues that might be expected from random chance alone. Six eigenvalues derived from the 
“real” data exceeded the upper limits of the 95% confidence intervals around the largest six 
eigenvalues of the random data. Therefore, this parallel analysis indicated that six factors in the 
data were significant, at the p <.05 level.  
Methods and sample sufficiency. I ran an exploratory factor analysis on the 19 items, 
using maximum likelihood extraction and direct oblimin rotation, requesting a 6-factor solution. 
Maximum likelihood is preferred when trying to determine accurate parameter estimates, rather 
than simply describing the data within the sample (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2013). An oblique 
rotation was requested, as the factors are theoretically expected to correlate (and indeed, the 
theoretically-proposed factors did, as much as R=.57, see Table 17).  
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy was .802, suggesting the data 
are suitable for factor analysis (Kaiser, 1974). This was confirmed by Bartlett’s test of sphericity, 
χ 2 (171) = 2665,.15, p <.001, which indicates the data contains sufficiently large correlations for 
factor analysis. 
Main EFA results. The initial six-factor solution produced factors with a mostly 
interpretable and “clean” pattern of loading However, item 16 failed to load >.35 on any single 
factor, and thus was dropped. A 6-factor solution was then requested for the remaining 18 items. 
The resulting pattern matrix revealed a clean 6-factor solution, with all items loading >.40 on 
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only one factor (see Table 41. The six factors explained 69.6% of the total variance in scale 
responses. 
 Alternate models. Before accepting this six-factor model, two alternate models were 
considered: a five-factor model and a two-factor model. Several indicators suggested that six 
factors may be too many. One is that the 6th factor had an eigenvalue <1.0 (.820), failing to meet 
a commonly cited minimum “cutoff” for factors to retain, despite being deemed significant via 
parallel analysis. Also, an examination of the pattern of eigenvalues (and the resulting scree plot) 
indicate a relatively drop-off in eigenvalues between the 2nd and 3rd factor (3.316 to 1.765) 
between the 5th and 6th factor (1.293 to .802), suggesting a 5- or 2-factor solutions may also be 
justifiable.  
A five-factor solution, using the same specifications as the six-factor solution (ML 
extraction, direct oblimin), resulted in some cross-loadings (Item 1 and item 11 loaded >.40 on 
two factors), and less substantively interpretable factors. A two-factor solution resulted in six 
items that failed to load on either factor, and explained less than half of the variance in the data 
(39.9%). After eliminating these six items, the two factors still explained less variance in the 13 
remaining items (51.6%) than the original 6-factor model explained in 18 items (69.6%). 
Therefore, the 6-factor solution is retained: it provides the most interpretable model, with the 
largest amount of variance explained, for the greatest number of variables.  
The six-factor solution in many ways resembled the original theoretically-proposed 
structure (see Table 41). All four items initially labelled as “informativeness” items loaded on 
Factor 1; all 4 “biological basis” items loaded on Factor 2. Factor 4 represented the three 
remaining immutability items (omitting only Item 2, which was dropped), and Factor 6 
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Table 41. Pattern of factor loadings for 6-factor exploratory model 
*Items worded in an anti-essentialist direction. See Appendix A for item wordings.  
Loadings with an absolute value <.30 are replaced by 0 for easier interpretation. 
 
represented the remaining “discreteness” items (omitting only Item 16, which was dropped). The 
only major divergence from the theoretically-proposed factor structure was that the “social 
determinism” items were distributed across two factors: Factor 3, on which Items 9 and 19 
loaded positively; and Factor 5, on which items 14 and 4 loaded negatively. 
Factors 
Item # 1 
Informativeness 
2 
Biologica
l basis 
3 
Pro-Social 
determinism 
anti-bio basis 
4 
Immut-
ability 
5 
Anti-Social 
determinism 
6 
Discreteness 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0.763 
3 0.836 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 -0.590 0 
5 0 0.768 0 0 0 0 
6* 0 0 0 0 0 0.532 
7* 0 0 0 0.542 0 0 
8* 0.541 0 0 0 0 0 
9* 0 0 0.703 0 0 0 
10* 0 0.834 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0.429 
12 0 0 -0.308 0.573 0 0 
13 0.842 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 -0.739 0 
15 0 0.631 -0.325 0 0 0 
17* 0 0 0 0.705 0 0 
18* 0.356 0 0 0 0 0 
19* 0 0 0.472 0 0 0 
20* 0 0.648 0 0 0 0 
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Because all anti-essentialism items were reverse-scored, the negative loadings on Factor 
5 do not represent a simple reverse-scoring issue. Rather, this is factor appears to represent an 
“anti-social determinism” factor, where higher scores reflect disagreement with two particular 
social deterministic items. Factor 3 is largely represented by the two reverse-scored items about 
how one is “raised.”  A biological basis item (Item 13, loading = -.325) and an immutability item 
(Item 12, loading = -.308) also borderline load onto this Factor. Therefore, Factor 3 may 
represent a more general belief that ideology is socially determined, and thus neither biologically 
based nor immutable. In contrast, Factor 5 is represented (negatively) by two items, 14 and 4, 
that explicitly state that ideology is determined before “age 18.”  Because the two items load 
negatively on this factor, Factor 5 may represent the more specific rejection of the notion that 
ideology is “fixed” by “age 18.”  
The six factors correlated weakly to moderately; see Table 42. As in the theoretically-
derived analysis, informativeness and discreteness were moderately strongly associated (R=.51), 
and biological basis beliefs corresponded positively with immutability beliefs (R=.34). 
Surprisingly, the “pro” and “anti” social determinism factors were uncorrelated (R=-.03). 
 
Table 42. Correlations between EFA-derived factors 
 
Variables 
Inf. Bio. Pro-Soc. Imm. Anti-Soc. Dis. 
Informativeness 1.0      
Biological basis .065 1.0     
Social determinism .223 -.149 1.0    
Immutability .261 .338 .124 1.0   
Anti-social determinism -.149 -.188 -.033 -.171 1.0  
Discreteness  .507 -.041 -.018 .312 -.058 1.0 
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Regression Analysis Using Empirically-Derived Factors 
The exploratory factor analysis suggested some slight modifications to the initial, 
theoretically-derived 5-subscale model. Therefore, factor scores were generated using regression 
for each of the six EFA-derived factors. Then, the primary regression analyses predicting in-
group preference and desire for social distance (see Tables 19 and 20 in the main text) were re-
run with these six factor scores in place of the original five subscales.  
Results are displayed in Table 43. They largely confirm what was found in the original 
regression analyses based on the initial subscales. Both with and without controls, discreteness  
Table 43. Predicting ingroup preference with EFA-derived subscales 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 b  (SE) b (SE) 
EFA-Informativeness 8.582*** (2.151) 7.534*** (2.102) 
EFA-Biological basis -2.067 (1.911) -1.155 (1.885) 
EFA- Pro-Social determinism 2.467 (1.888) 1.893 (1.856) 
EFA- Immutability 1.440 (2.159) -0.73 (2.123) 
EFA- Anti-social determinism 7.270*** (1.800) 6.305** (1.812) 
EFA- Discreteness 11.44*** (2.430) 12.458*** (2.397) 
Ideology   1.091 (3.06) 
Party   -5.166+ (2.87) 
Order   -8.550** (2.80) 
Gender   -0.473 (2.93) 
Race   -15.89*** (3.79) 
Age   1.045 (1.48) 
Religiosity   2.33 (1.70) 
Constant 49.79** (1.43) 44.15*** (1.86) 
N 385 385 
Adjusted R2 .272 .320 
*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001. Note: Race is coded as +.5=White and/or Hispanic; -.5=Black, 
Asian or Other (Preliminary analyses suggested that this was the starkest racial contrast). Gender 
was coded +.5=male/other; -.5=female. Ideology is scored as higher=more conservative; party is 
scored such that -.5 = more Democrat-identified, +.5 = more Republican-identified. Higher 
scores on age = older; higher scores on religiosity = more religious. Order was coded such that -
.5=DVs were measured first, +.5=Essentialism scale measured first.  
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and informativeness are the most powerful predictors of in-group preference. Immutability and 
biological basis have no effect. The “splitting” of social determinism into two factors highlights 
that the effect of social determinism on in-group preference is largely driven by Factor 5 (thus, 
items 4 and 14). People who disagree that ideology is fixed by age 18 seem to display stronger 
affective polarization. In other words, people who do believe that ideology is fixed by age 18 
display less polarization. The regression analysis with 6 factors and controls explained 32% of 
the variance in in-group preference (adjusted R2=.320). This does not improve upon the variance 
explained by the original theoretically-derived subscales (adjusted R2=.339). 
When predicting desire for social distance, results again resembled those from the initial 
regression analysis, see Table 44. Informativeness was the overwhelmingly largest predictor of 
desire for social distance. Discreteness also explained some additional variance. As in 
predictions of in-group preference, the anti-social determinism factor positively related to desire 
social distance. Those who believe that ideology is fixed by age 18 had less desire to remain 
socially isolated from those with opposing views. In contrast to the original regression analysis, 
the EFA-derived immutability factor significantly predicted desired social distance (though this 
relationship dropped to non-significance after controlling for the primary covariates). The 
regression analysis with 6 factors and controls explained 35.7% of variance in desire for social 
distance (adjusted R2 = .357), which does not improve upon the variance explained by the 
original theoretically-derived subscales (adjusted R2 = .379). 
Table 44. Predicting desire for social distance with EFA-derived subscales 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 b  (SE) b (SE) 
EFA- Informativeness 0.536*** (.07) .507*** (.07) 
EFA- Biological basis 0.004 (.06) 0.025 (.06) 
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EFA- Pro-Social determinism 0.074 (.06) 0.052 (.06) 
EFA- Immutability 0.168* (.05) 0.137+ (.07) 
EFA- Anti-social determinism 0.138* (.06) 0.152* (.06) 
EFA- Discreteness 0.163* (.08) 0.201* (.08) 
Ideology   -0.158 (.10) 
Party   0.038 (.10) 
Order   -0.166+ (.10) 
Gender   -0.046 (.10) 
Race   -0.260* (.13) 
Age   -0.141** (.05) 
Religiosity   -0.007 (.06) 
Constant 4.178** (0.48) 4.081** (.063) 
N 385 385 
Adjusted R2 .328 .357 
*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001. Note: Race is coded as +.5=White and/or Hispanic; -.5=Black, 
Asian or Other (Preliminary analyses suggested that this was the starkest racial contrast). Gender 
was coded +.5=male/other; -.5=female. Ideology is scored as higher=more conservative; party is 
scored such that -.5 = more Democrat-identified, +.5 = more Republican-identified. Higher 
scores on age = older; higher scores on religiosity = more religious. Order was coded such that -
.5=DVs were measured first, +.5=Essentialism scale measured first.  
 
The EFA-derived, six-factor model does not provide improved explanatory power for the 
primary dependent variables. In fact, the adjusted values are lower when using these factor 
scores than the R2  values originally proposed subscales (R2exploratoryfactors = .32 vs. R
2
Original = .34). 
Therefore, additional analyses using this six-factor model were not pursued.  Similarly, the six 
empirically derived factors did not explain any additional variance in desire for social distance 
(R2exploratoryfactors =.36 vs. R
2
Original=.38). Therefore, additional analyses were not pursued using 
these data-driven factors.  
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Robustness of Political Essentialism as a Predictor 
 Several analyses confirm there a clear relationship between political essentialism and 
measures of partisan antipathy, including both affective polarization and a desire for social 
distance. Mediational  results suggested this relationship were robust to the inclusion of controls, 
including the proposed political correlates. That is, even when controlling for political extremity, 
for example, there remained a significant unique effect of political essentialism on in-group 
preference. This was not initially hypothesized, as it was predicted that effect of political 
variables on intergroup attitudes may “flow through” essentialism beliefs, and thus there would 
be no unique effect of essentialism after controlling for them.  
To explore for a “unique” contribution of essentialism beliefs, beyond what is explained 
by typical political variables, a series of regression analyses were run. These analyses replicate 
the main regression analyses, but also include many political correlates. The complete results are 
summarized in Table 45. As shown in Model 1, political extremity is clearly a strong unique 
predictor of affective polarization, β =  .407, p < .001. Biased news consumption is also a 
significant positive predictor, β =  .158, p = .003. Interestingly, race and order are still unique 
predictors (p < .01) even with all of these controls entered. Most importantly, overall 
essentialism remains a strong unique predictor,  β = .234, p < .001. Model 2 confirms that the 
unique positive effect of the essentialism scale is largely driven by the discreteness factor, β = 
.314, p < .001, and informativeness factor, β =  .180, p = .002. In contrast to the results without 
controlling for political covariates (see Table 19 in the main analyses), biological basis emerges 
as a unique negative predictor of affective polarization, β = -.112, p = .020. Social determinism 
is also negatively associated with affective polarization, but not significantly, β =-.074, p = .105.  
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Table 45. The effect of essentialism overall scale and subscales affective polarization, controlling 
for all primary controls and political correlates 
 
 Model 1: Overall scale Model 2: 5 Theoretically-
proposed Subscales 
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient  SE 
Essentialism overall 
scale 
10.776*** 2.28   
Discreteness   10.109*** 1.80 
Immutability   .028 1.59 
Informativeness   5.798** 1.82 
Social determinism   -2.418 1.49 
Biological basis   -3.721* 1.59 
Ideology 3.854 3.59 4.485 3.27 
Party -5.338+ 3.10 -6.508* 2.82 
Order -8.464** 3.05 -5.933 2.80 
Gender -2.598 3.12 2.291 2.91 
Race -11.545** 4.22 -10.442* 3.85 
Age 1.645 1.65 1.196 1.51 
Religious importance 1.354 1.92 2.196 1.75 
Ideological extremity 17.090*** 2.13 15.224* 1.97 
Political interest -2.109 1.73 -1.764 1.57 
News frequency 1.289 1.31 -.363 1.22 
Selective News 9.678** 3.27 7.099* 3.00 
Disgust -1.022 2.35 -2.708 2.16 
Constant -26.53+ 14.43 32.69* 12.54 
Overall adj R2 .360  .472  
*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001 
Table 46 shows two identical models, but predicting desire for social distance. Once 
again, in Model 1, Essentialism remains a powerful unique predictor, β = .388, p <.001. In fact, 
the β statistic suggests this is a stronger predictor than ideological extremity, β = .288, p <.001. 
In contrast to predictions of affective polarization, overall frequency of news consumption is a 
significant predictor (β =  .116, p = .028) while selective news consumption is not (β = .076, p = 
.15). In this model as well, when controlling for other covariates, disgust emerges as a significant 
predictor of desired social distance, β =  .098, p = .047.  
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Table 46. The effect of essentialism overall scale and subscales desire for social distance, 
controlling for all primary controls and political correlates 
 Model 1 (overall scale) Model 2 (subscales) 
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient  SE 
Essentialism overall scale .637*** .08   
Discreteness   .162* .07 
Immutability   .107+ .06 
Informativeness   .462*** .07 
Social determinism   -.111* .05 
Biological basis   .009 .06 
Ideology -.028 .13 -.010 .12 
Party .024 .11 -.006 .10 
Order -.236* .11 -.166 .10 
Gender -.019 .11 .062 .11 
Race -.186 .15 -.107 .14 
Age -.112+ .06 -.143** .05 
Religious importance -.065 .07 -.041 .06 
Ideological extremity .433*** .08 .356*** .07 
Political interest .038 .06 .032 .06 
News frequency .102* .05 .077+ .04 
Selective News .166 .12 .058 .11 
Disgust .166* .08 .115 .08 
Constant -.407 .509 2.479*** .46 
Overall adj R2 .376  .455  
*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001 
In Model 2, it is clear that informativeness is strongly related to desired social distance, β 
= .401, p < .001. Discreteness is also positively associated with this outcome, β = .140, p = .014; 
and immutability is marginally positively predictive, β =.093, p = .065. Social determinism is 
negatively predictive of desire for social distance, β =  -.095, p = .04. These results largely 
mirror the main regression results without controlling for political covariates, see Table 20 in 
Chapter 3. Results also suggest that informativeness beliefs are more strongly associated with 
desired social distance than political extremity (β =  .237, p <.001), but other facets are less so. 
Overall, these additional analyses suggest that essentialism is a unique predictor of 
affective and behavioral polarization. People will equally extreme views, and equally congenial 
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political news consumption patterns, vary in their orientation toward political others. This 
variation correlates significantly with degree of political essentialism, suggesting a unique 
relationship between lay beliefs and polarization.  
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